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SYMPOSIUM
CONSTITUTIONAL "REFOLUTION"
IN THE EX-COMMUNIST WORLD:
THE RULE OF LAW
September 26, 1996
FOREWORD*
Since the collapse of communist power in the early 1990s, Eastern Europe and
the rest of the former Soviet-dominated world have experienced significant and
unprecedented changes. Although potentially revolutionary in impact, the eco-
nomic, political, and legal transitions have been achieved through reform of exist-
ing institutions rather than violent revolution. Timothy Garton Ash has called this
process "refolution." This symposium will focus on the development and promo-
tion of the rule of law in the context of this "refolution" now underway in the for-
mer communist world. The panelists, each an experienced and renowned special-
ist, will present their views in a roundtable format that will include extensive
audience questions.
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
DEAN CLAUDIO GROSSMAN: Good morning, I am Claudio Grossman, Dean of
the Washington College of Law of American University. I want to welcome you
and thank you for your presence in the conference. This conference is part of our
program to celebrate the Law School's Centennial.
We were created 100 years ago by two women. And we are, I would say, the
only law school in the country and in the world created by women. And that is
why we are very proud.
Ms. Gillett and Ms. Mussey, as a matter of fact, 100 years ago decided to create
a law school because women were excluded from the legal profession in most ju-
risdictions. And they understood something else that was very important and has
continued through our tradition. They understood that there was not a possibility
or a chance to promote important values of human dignities if women themselves
could not be empowered by the knowledge of the legal field.
They realized that the law in the legal system played a role as an important in-
strument of social engineering. However, without empowering those who would
like to advance their positions in the legal system, without empowering themselves
with the skills and values and the knowledge necessary in the legal field, it would
not be possible to achieve a society without discrimination and where people could
develop themselves to their limit or potential.
There was another interesting aspect to Ms. Mussey and Ms. Gillett when they
created this law school. Since the beginning, they had a strong universalist ap-
proach. One was working for the Red Cross, the other was an advisor of the
Kingdom of Sweden. And they were promoting values in the global arena at the
same time. They understood that it was not possible to advance the position of
women in the country and the expansion of democracy and human rights if, in
their world, those values would not be advanced.
They thought that the best way to consolidate and expand a rule of law in their
country was also to achieve a world where the rule of law and human rights and
dignity would be achieved for all. That is why we are very happy to receive you in
the spirit of the tradition of the founding mothers of the Washington College of
Law with this very important conference.
Many of our professors and, in particular, Professor Herman Schwartz, have
had a strong interest in Eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, I suspect sometimes
that Herman has a brother that looks like him because I don't know how he can, at
the same time, be in the Czech Republic, in Russia, and here teaching a class and,
in addition to that, creating an exciting environment that motivates our students
and us, his colleagues, to continue to pursue the values of our founders. So, at the
same time that I open this conference today, I want to express my recognition for
the type of role model that Herman represents here in the Washington College of
Law.
Thank you very much for your presence here. We are honored to have you all,
and I wish you a very good conference and deliberations. Thank you very much.
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PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHvARTZ: Thank you. As you can tell, without paying
any attention to the content of what has been said, we are truly an international law
school. Claudio's accent from South of the Border and mine from South Brooklyn
assure you that we present you with a world-wide view.
We are really very pleased to have you here and to have this really quite splen-
did list of panelists today. I am sure many of you have wondered about the title of
the conference and whether it is a typographical error: the use of the word
"refolution" with an "F" instead of a "V". We really do know how to spell
"'revolution."
The fact is, it is not an error. Back in mid-1989, the noted English journalist,
Timothy Gartin Ash, wrote an article about the massive changes taking place in
Poland and Hungary. And these were clearly not traditional revolutions, and yet
they were so much more than simply reforms. They were transformations of some
kind or another. And he gave them the name of "refolution," creating a new word
that combined the notions of reform and revolution. Of course, within months af-
ter he wrote that, more and more countries have gotten involved in that process,
this largely, except in one or two places like Romania, bloodless transformation,
ignoring of course, Bosnia. And although he has since reverted to using the word
"revolution" for what has occurred in places like Prague and East Germany and the
like, the fact remains that these still have been relatively bloodless transitions
rather than the kind of traditional revolutions, such as one which occurred in
America, France, Russia, China and the like, that we all read about in history.
Now the extensible goal, it is not clear how true it has been, of all these has
been the creation of some kind of constitutional democracy governed by the rule
of law and devoted to freedom and protection of individual rights. All of those
countries profess that. Back in 1990, Ralph Damdorf, the great social scientist now
at Oxford, wrote a little book that he modeled on Edmund Burke's "Reflections on
the Revolution in France." He entitled it "Reflections on the Revolution in
Europe," a letter intended to be sent to a Polish gentleman. Burke's was a letter
intended to be sent to a French gentleman.
And he suggested that there are three stages to this kind of revolutionary
change, revolutionary whatever you want to call it: constitutional, economic, and
social. And he said, the first canon should be done immediately. The second will
take at least six years, and, as we have seen in many places, far more than six
years. The third, the creation of some kind of social institutions, that might take as
many as sixty years. Now, the second and third stages are really not our business
here. We are a law school, and our focus is indeed, on the first. But none of us are
so naive or foolish as to think that first can take place without the second and third.
And, indeed, the fact that, partly by accident and because of who they were, if
you look down the list of our nine panelists, in every case we have two lawyers
and one social scientist in each group. This reflects the interrelationship between
law, civil society, and the economy. Darndorf noted, when referring to the first
stage, the constitutional stage, "This is the hour of the lawyers." But he did not,
obviously, mean all lawyers, just the lawyers around here when he said, "Those
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who have the imagination and comparative experience to find a way out of the
monopoly of the party and all subordinate monopolies."
Today, we are going to talk about that hour of the lawyers, the three facets of it.
First, the process of actually making a constitution, a process that has proceeded
smoothly in some areas and surprisingly bumpily in other areas; surprising because
the place where they seem to be having the most trouble is where it all started,
Poland.
The second panel will deal with one of the key props of this new order, the
constitutional courts. Because in almost all of these countries, this new and
strange institution has become an essential part of the effort being made, often a
very controversial part.
And in the third panel, in recognition of the fact that lawyers, political scien-
tists, and others from outside this area from the West have played a very signifi-
cant role, we have decided to have a discussion of what kind of role this has been,
how useful it has been, how effective it has been, what the shortcomings have
been, and the like.
And to deal with these, we have assembled a set of experts, all of whom have
had extensive experience working in these areas. I think that at least all the panel-
ists and at least some of the moderators fit Darndorf s description of imagination
and comparative experience.
The first panel will be moderated by Lloyd Cutler, and I will introduce the
panelists and Mr. Cutler, and then we will turn to Mr. Cutler. Lloyd Cutler, I
would say, is almost a household name to those people who spend a few minutes
in front of the nightly news. We have worked together for some six years now,
and to me he exemplifies one of the great American traditions of the lawyer,
statesman, and scholar that goes back to Madison and Hamilton and Jay and Jef-
ferson. As a lawyer, he has created, really from scratch, one of the major law
firms in America and has represented and been involved in some of the major
causes of our time in every court, and has argued numerous Supreme Court cases.
As a statesman, as you probably know, he has been counsel to two Presidents,
both of whom were in a good deal of need at the time: President Bill Clinton re-
cently and President Jimmy Carter back in 1979.
And, of course, he has been involved, if only through that, in some of the great
events of the day. But he has also recently been counsel to Secretary Christopher
as a member of the Balkan Commission at Dayton.
Some years ago, he headed a Commission on Violence in America at President
Kennedy's request. He helped found the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights
under Law, one of the major civil rights groups of America.
As a scholar, he has studied deeply and written frequently, spending time at Ox-
ford studying the science of government. And, most relevant to this conference,
on constitution making, he co-chaired a committee of a group of us-five of us,
actually, are here today-who were probably the first group of foreigners to come
and try to work with the countries in Europe on constitutional reform, as early as
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December 1989.
And, during this period and before, he has also been chairman of the Salisbury
Seminar, an institution which has introduced and trained hundreds of European
and Latin American and African and other young people in what it takes to have a
decent constitutional democracy and rule of law.
I will simply tell you that at the last session which I was privileged to attend,
which was a very exciting time, Judge Goldstone was there, and others. I turned to
one of the staff people and asked, "Tell me, are all of these sessions like this?"
And she paused and said, "When Lloyd runs it." So, that is our moderator, Lloyd
Cutler.
Since I am up here, I may as well introduce the rest. And these are all not only
distinguished, not only among the very, very best in their field, but also the most
experienced in working in that area.
Immediately to Lloyd's right is Professor Eric Stein of the University of Michi-
gan, truly one of the great men in the world of international law. Eric is Professor
of Comparative Law at the University of Michigan emeritus.
He was working with us in Czechoslovakia. He is originally from Czechoslo-
vakia, and his personal story, which will be incorporated in a really quite wonder-
ful, comprehensive book on the Czechoslovakian effort of constitution-making,
will be published soon by the University of Michigan Press.
The weaving together of his personal experiences and what has happened sub-
sequently makes the book a treat to read as well as practically a textbook in the
difficulties of trying to put together a constitution between nations which are un-
happy with each other, which do not have a lot in common with each other.
He has been an advisor to the State Department, to the European Union, has
taught all over Europe, has received umpteen honors from all over, and we are
very fortunate to have Eric here.
Next to him is one of the odd fish we have imported into this law school, Pro-
fessor Robert Sharlet, who has just been made, actually, the Chauncey Winters
Professor of Political Science at Union College.
Bob, it is not too much to say, is one of the two or three leading experts on
Russia and the former Soviet Union in the world today. He has written exten-
sively, producing numerous books and articles. He has advised the American Bar
Association's Central and East European Law Initiative ("CEELI") Project on a lot
of the work they do, and, for two years, he worked intensively here in Washington
with the Rule of Law Consortium, which has been working on trying to introduce
and facilitate judicial reform in the former Soviet Union. That has involved judi-
cial training, legal reform, and the like, and he has gone back to Union college but
continues to work with the Rule of Law Consortium.
And on the end is Professor A. E. Dick Howard, The Whiteburk and Miller Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Virginia. I think I can say without the slightest
fear of contradiction that there is no more outstanding constitutionalist in America
than Dick Howard.
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Dick knows constitutional law, has participated in making constitutional law, in
writing constitutions at virtually every level, from the state level, where he was the
key figure in revising the Virginia Constitution, to working all over Europe.
Dick listed for me at my request some of the places he has worked, and, clearly,
this particular setting is too small to encompass Dick's experience: Brazil, Hong
Kong, the Philippines, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Alba-
nia, and, most recently, South Africa.
Dick has written widely. He has most recently given the very distinguished
Tanner Lectures and has published them in a wonderful little book about the effort
toward a rule of law.
We are very, very fortunate to have Dick and all the others here. I think you
have heard more than enough from me. Let me turn it over to Lloyd.
PANEL I
THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE RULE OF LAW
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: Thank you, Herman. My favorite introduction story
about the kind of introduction that was just given to all three of us involves Sena-
tor John Sherman Cooper. I hope some of you remember him.
He was a very distinguished, lovable Senator from Kentucky, and he was at
some Yale function where three or four people of his ilk, like Dean Acheson, were
all introduced in glowing terms. He said it reminded him of his first campaign for
Congress back in 1940, when he and his opponent, in order to save money, rented
one car together and went around from one county seat to another within their dis-
trict in Eastern Kentucky.
And they arrived at one little town where there was a great crowd in front of the
courthouse as they drove up. And the county judge said to them, as they marched
up the steps, "I would be mighty pleased to introduce you to the crowd," and they
accepted.
I won't try to imitate the judge's accent, but he said, "The man who is about to
speak to you is a great friend of the farmer. He knows the problems of the work-
ing man. He knows what it is like to go down into a coal mine. He is a keen stu-
dent of foreign affairs, and he understands the problems of the housewife. And if
we send him to Congress, he is going to be the best representative we ever had."
And Senator Cooper said that the judge then turned to me and my opponent, and
he said, "Now which one of you fellows want to speak first?"
I guess I get to speak first. And there is a certain amount of overlap, as you can
see, among these three conference topics, but this first one, on constitution mak-
ing, asks two key questions.
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One is can the constitution-making process itself help to advance the establish-
ment of the rule of law in newly-emerging democracies? The second is how much
have rule of law considerations entered into the political aspects of constitution-
making?
You will hear from our three panelists. I hope I can hold them down to twenty
minutes or less. And that should leave us a half an hour or so for comments and
questions at the end.
Let me make just a few preliminary observations. It is obvious, I think, that it
takes more than a constitution to create a workable democracy. The constitutions
of virtually all of the Latin America states are identical to the United States' Con-
stitution, at least they were in the beginning. And look what happened to most of
them.
The constitution in the Philippines was identical to the American Constitution.
And look at how many upheavals occurred in the Philippines. And, of course, the
constitution of the Soviet Union has a bigger list of enforceable human rights than
any constitution in the world, I would say, and yet it turned out to be a Potemkin
village.
There is a true shaggy dog story that fits the point I want to make about consti-
tutions. It is about two retired gentlemen who would walk their dogs together
every morning in Central Park. One day around noon they arrived at the Tavern
on the Green, a big restaurant in Central Park. And one of them said, "I am getting
hungry, let's go in and have lunch." And the other said, "They won't let us in with
the dogs." And the first one said, "Well, you just watch me. Do whatever I do."
So, the first man, who had a nice German shepherd, walks up to a waiter and
asks for a place for lunch. The waiter says, "We can't take you in with the dog."
He says, "Don't you realize I am blind, and this is my seeing eye dog?" And the
waiter was so embarrassed he put him at a table.
And then the second fellow came up. Same scene, "We can't let you in with the
dog." "Don't you realize I am blind, this is my seeing eye dog?" And the head
waiter said, "But that is a Chihuahua." And the poor fellow thought for a minute,
and said, "Do you mean they actually gave me a Chihuahua?"
And the question it presents, the point I am trying to make is, depending on the
customs of the country, its traditions, its past experience with democracy, what it
really wants to achieve for itself, your constitution can either be a big, robust Ger-
man shepherd or, as in many countries, it can turn out to be a Chihuahua.
The great virtue, of course, of a written constitution is that it helps to record a
consensus of the country, a broad consensus on basic principles, usually principles,
at least, in the post-communist world, based on what we call the rule of law. It is
very important in many countries to have that kind of consensus in the beginning,
so there is a standard against which the actions of the government can be judged.
It is a very different task to write a constitution at the end of the 20th century
than it was at the end of the 18th century. Our little, short, ten-, twenty-page
constitution, even with all of its amendments, survives and exists in that form
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largely because, as Herman has pointed out many times, we have some 200 years
of interpretation of these few, broad, general terms that have helped us to interpret
that constitution over the years.
If you try to write a modem constitution, let's say we convened a new constitu-
tional convention to rewrite the constitution, even if the substance did not change
one wit, I dare say the text would be 20 or 30 times larger than the text of this very
brief constitution we have today.
And that is what has happened to most of the Central European constitutions
that you are going to hear about. Because they have to record not only these few,
concise, pithy words of the bill of rights, they also have to record the way in which
it has been interpreted by other democracies with constitutional bills of rights. The
best example, of course, is that in most of Europe, modem Europe, the bill of
rights, every single provision of the bill of rights, whether it is freedom of the
press, freedom of religion, freedom from arrest, whatever, always says, "except to
the extent necessary to maintain order in a democratic society," or words to that
effect.
And that is meant to cover shouting fire in a crowded theater and many, many
other things that we would not allow here. For example, in most of Europe, it
would be quite constitutional-in fact, it amazes them that we did the opposite-it
would be quite constitutional in most of Europe to ban the Skokie Nazi parade.
Why does the rest of the world look to the West? I suppose the only way we
can answer that is, first, that with modem communications-I am going far be-
yond blue jeans, records, and such things-but, with modem communications,
television programs, the rest of the world sees the society of the United States, or,
at least, part of that society, at first hand. And in most of Central Europe, at least,
large segments of the population have relatives in the United States and have had
heard a great deal about the United States, in places as diverse as Bosnia, I would
say, the former Soviet Union.
People think of the United States of America, with all the imperfections that we
recognize, as the place they would like to be or the system under which they would
like to live.
And much of that comes down to a yearning for some sort of rule of law. And
the last point I want to make is that, while it is too late for most of us to be the
James Madison of our own country, it is a great satisfaction to play a little bit of
the role in being the James Madison of another country.
And now, Dick Howard.
PROFESSOR A.E. DICK HOWARD: Good morning. The first opportunity I had
actually to work with the making of a constitution was in Virginia, during the
drafting of that state's constitution. I must tell you that, after you have worked
with a state legislature, there is nothing in Prague or Budapest that holds any ter-
rors. I have cut my teeth with experts.
Of course, we in Virginia would like to think we invented the idea of a consti-
tution, with perhaps a little help from Massachusetts. You will forgive us for that
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conceit.
In the Western liberal, democratic tradition, much centers around the making of
constitutions, but I think one is bound to be struck by the range of ideas and in-
sights that you find even within that liberal democratic ideal.
It is, therefore, not surprising that, as we begin to push the frontiers of constitu-
tionalism further in places like Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, the new constitutions do not turn out to be carbon copies of the kinds of
constitutions we might know in this country or Western Europeans might recog-
nize.
In my thoughts on the subject this morning, I will confine myself largely to
what I would call Central and Eastern Europe, i.e., not the former Soviet Union
and the republics which are part of it. The part of the world on which I will focus
includes the states running from the Baltics down to the Balkans.
At the outset, I should comment on some of the things which countries in this
region have in common, and also on some of the things which are not shared char-
acteristics.
As to the things that these countries of the former communist world do share:
most of them, at least in the Eastern European scene, are small countries; they are
also countries all of which share the unhappy experience of having lived for a half
a century under communism.
All of them have some legacy of European institutions, though they may differ
in kind. All of them are either on the road to, or at least purport to be on the road
to, some kind of democratization and pluralistic electoral system. And all of them
are on, or at least talk about being on, the road to market economies, to some kind
of economic reform.
So, there are in these countries shared characteristics which would affect any
search for the rule of law. But, as soon as you get close to these countries, you be-
gin to sort them out as not simply being entities on a map.
One realizes how strikingly different in some very fundamental ways they are.
For example, there are the historic traditions that separate some from others. It is
hard to overlook the difference of having lived, let's say, under the Aus-
tro-Hungarian influence for centuries or, on the other hand, as some countries did,
under the Ottoman Empire.
Those historical legacies still have their impact. There are also differences, as
we know, of religion-the Catholic, or Orthodox or, in some cases, a more secular
kind of tradition.
There are obviously differences of nationality and ethnicity. The idea of the
rule of law may be seen rather differently through the lens of a country which is
relatively homogenous. For example, Poland or Hungary, states which, as coun-
tries in the region go, are fairly homogenous ethnically.
There are other countries which, of course, have large, and often rather restless
ethnic minorities. The Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia would be
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good examples.
The countries differ in their democratic experience. Czechoslovakia from 1918
to 1938 was a thriving, vibrant democracy. There are other countries in the region
which have simply never had that kind of experience.
Finally, of course, there are striking differences in economic development. Po-
land, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are well on their way to being relatively
prosperous countries. They are moving in the direction of the kind of standard of
living one finds in the 'West, whereas other countries in the region are either
struggling or, indeed, are downright poor. Albania, for example, is a country
whose standard of living is not much above that of Ethiopia.
Let me turn to constitution-making itself. If you are trying to take an abstrac-
tion like constitutionalism or democracy or the rule of law, and apply it to the
making of an actual, written constitution, one thing that interests me is: where do
the drafters get the ideas they use? Do they take out a yellow pad and write at the
top, "We the people of," and say, "the Czech Republic." And then do they make it
up as they go?
One doubts that very much. A student in a class in first-year contracts doesn't
say simply, "Well, what is a contract?" You look at one, don't you? You look at a
model and work from there.
What one finds in the post-communist world is a great deal of synthesizing, the
borrowing of ideas from one place or another. Now, the people of these countries
do make an attempt at retrieving-at least there is often a hope that one can re-
trieve-as much of the indigenous constitutional experience as possible.
There was a lot of talk in Poland, for example, about reviving the ideals of the
great May 3, 1791 Constitution. And they had hoped to do it in time for 1991.
That deadline, however, has passed.
The Hungarians are very proud of the fact that they have carried over a great
deal of their pre-communist Hungarian rule of law legacy into the post-communist
world. They have sought to deal with the problem of transition.
The indigenous experience is, of course, not the whole story. Drafters then
look to other models. I remember one of my friends on the Romanian constitu-
tional drafting commission bragging to me that he had read twenty-six different
constitutions. I reckon that was about 20 too many; half a dozen of the best ones
would have done very nicely. The point, however, is that drafters do, in fact, bor-
row a great deal.
From the American perspective, I am bound to say that the amount of direct
textual borrowing from the U.S. tradition is limited. Recall Lloyd Cutler's mention
of our 18th century document.
To understand American constitutionalism, one begins, of course, with the text,
but then you have to reckon with five hundred volumes of the U.S. Reports. There
is no way a draftsman can distill all of that into a document.
The fact is that the Central and Eastern European drafters look much more
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closely at Western European models. One finds that it is the German and French
constitutions which are especially influential, and, to a lesser extent, Spain, Italy,
Scandinavia, and some of the others.
The reasons for European influence are fairly obvious. Not only are these
models readily available, but there is a powerful wish on the part of Europeans
who lived under communism once again to be part of the family of Europe.
That is partly tradition, a sense of affiliation. There is, of course, an economic
incentive. They want trade and investment. They would like to be admitted to
European institutions. What better way to show how European you are than to
draft a European-style constitution?
So the result is that it is the parliamentary system, not the American congres-
sional system, that is adopted. If drafters decide they want a strong presidency, it
is the French model, not the American model, that they use.
If they decide to have judicial review of the Marbury v. Madison kind, it is not
a U.S.-style supreme court they set up, it is a European-style constitutional court.
So you find a thoroughly European kind of influence which has obvious impli-
cations for thinking about rule of law. Take something as simple as the principle of
free speech. You will recall Lloyd Cutler's mention of the Skokie march, of the
problem of hate speech.
A European thinks very differently about the metes and bounds of free speech
than does an American. We are so infused with our First Amendment notion that
we tend to have much more expansive ideas of what free speech is all about than is
true in Western Europe and, therefore, is true in Eastern Europe.
You will find in Poland, for example, a willingness to prosecute people for
defamation of the nation or its leaders. These prosecutions are still being brought
in the post-communist era for the kind of speech which an American would as-
sume was bound to be protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, when you think about rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe, it
doesn't translate quite as crisply and neatly from the Western or the American
concept as one might have thought.
One of the basic problems that I see in this era of constitution-making in East-
ern Europe is how one goes about establishing a legitimate basis for constitutional
government.
There is an assumption in the liberal democratic tradition that it results in the
making of a written constitution; therefore, each of the post-communist countries
has set out on the road of writing a constitution.
Herman Schwartz mentioned the fact that it has been a very rocky road. Some
countries still haven't gotten the final constitution in place. Poland, for example, is
still limping along with its so-called "little constitution."
The writing of a constitution is only part of the constitutional project. One still
has to ask the question: wherein lies legitimacy, the basis for the citizen's obliga-
tion to obey the laws passed under that constitution? This is the search in political
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theory for consent or legitimacy.
In this country, during the early state constitutional period, Massachusetts gave
us, in 1780, the American model of the constitutional convention-the election of
delegates to a convention whose job it was to write a constitution and whose prod-
uct in turn was then presented to the people in referendum. That completed the
circle, and, from the standpoint of American constitutionalism, it offers a fairly
satisfying answer to the question of what is the legitimate basis for the constitu-
tion.
I find myself searching for the way that Central and Eastern Europeans have
tackled this particular question. What you find in that region is a very indistinct,
uncertain popular basis for the new constitutions.
The device of the constitutional convention or constituent assembly is not used.
Referenda are really quite rare. I think Estonia used the referendum. Russia, of
course, had one, but most countries don't do that.
What you have is the parliament passing the new constitution, typically by a
two-thirds vote. So, you have the body which is meant to live under the new
constitution being the one that enacts it, and, obviously, if they can get the
two-thirds vote, amends it.
To an American way of thinking about constitutions, this presents something of
a paradox. It is one made all the more difficult by the rather piecemeal and epi-
sodic quality of constitution-making in much of Central and Eastern Europe.
I mentioned Poland, still debating after all these years what constitution they
will finally adopt. The Czechs and Slovaks did get together on a Charter of Free-
doms, but they couldn't agree on a division of competencies, and, finally, the two
countries went their own ways.
Now, before one passes too ready a judgment and says, "Well, they just can't
get it right," it would be well to remember that, in the American experience from
1776 to 1787, much of the time we didn't get it right, either.
The first American state constitutions were very flawed documents. They were
rather primitive efforts at constitution-making, and they were soon abandoned or
changed. The Articles of Confederation, our first attempt at a national constitu-
tion, were woefully inadequate and had to be abandoned in favor of the document
that was worked out at Philadelphia in 1787.
From those fits and starts and half efforts and flawed beginnings came finally
the distinctive features of American constitutionalism-federalism, separation of
powers, checks and balances, judicial review, the benchmarks that we now associ-
ate with our system.
If I were to attempt to suggest the most striking single phenomenon that has
emerged on the constitution-making scene in Central and Eastern Europe-and in
this I anticipate the next panel this morning-I would nominate the emergence of
the constitutional court.
This is the one most remarkable thing that is happening, in constitutional terms,
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in Central and Eastern Europe, and is striking for two reasons. The first is that the
idea of a constitutional court is such a total break with the communist tradition.
Under Leninist/Marxist philosophy, one had a unity of party and state. The law
was simply an instrument of party policy. The idea that the law or courts or judges
could be independent was an anathema. Thus, to have constitutional courts with
the capacity to strike down even acts of parliament as unconstitutional is a world
apart from communism.
Constitutional courts are also a break with, or at least undermine, the traditional
European adherence to popular sovereignty and legislative supremacy. Europe has
been very reluctant to come to the judicial review table.
Judicial review is not an idea that takes comfortably in Europe. The French, in
particular, are slow to adopt the idea of full-blown judicial review. Early efforts in
Europe came because of the influence of Hans Kelsen in Austria and Czechoslo-
vakia in 1920. Even more influential has been the court created by the Basic Law
in Germany in 1949.
It is the German experience which, I think, has set so much of Central and East-
ern Europe on the same path. Since you don't find in post-communist Europe
constitutional conventions and referenda and other American notions of how one
puts the constitution on a legitimate basis, I raise the question whether the work of
the constitutional courts might begin to supply some of that sense of legitimacy.
This might be especially true in Hungary, where there is such open access to citi-
zen petitions. Consider also that because these courts have been brought into being
as part of the constitutional transition, that itself may add an air of legitimacy.
Recall the experience of the American civil rights movement in the 1960s,
when it was the courts that proved to be the only effective forum for American
blacks in the American south. Blacks went to court when the legislatures and
other bodies were closed to them, and when the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1958
Button case, recognized litigation itself as a protected form of First Amendment
expression. That is, of course, an American example, but, it seems to me, perhaps
something like that might take place in Central and Eastern Europe.
One final note. I have talked mainly about the making of constitutions, but let
me not leave the platform without a further thought. Even if Central and Eastern
Europe does a wonderful job of adopting impressive constitutions, and even if it
puts into place institutions like constitutional courts to implement those constitu-
tions and make them effective, there is something else that has to happen if the
rule of law is to become a fact in the post-communist world.
That something goes under different names. You might call it a legal culture.
You might call it civic education. You might call it civil society. What it requires
is overcoming the disrespect, the distrust, the cynicism that citizens naturally felt
about law and lawyers and courts and judges in the communist world, precisely
because the law was seen to be an instrument of party policy. That legacy is deep
and bitter, I think, in many of the people of the region. You can't expect they will
suddenly abandon those assumptions overnight.
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What is needed ultimately is what might be called civic education. I am struck
by the fact that the Poles in 1774 were the first nation in Europe to have a national
commission on education.
Three years later, in Virginia, Thomas Jefferson wrote what he called the "Bill
for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge!' If adopted, it would have estab-
lished a system of public education in Virginia. In talking about his bill, in his
Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson called for, and I quote Jefferson's lan-
guage, "Rendering the people safe as they are the ultimate guardians of their own
liberty."
That says it pretty well. That sums up what I would offer to you this morning
as the key to establishing the rule of law, not only in Virginia and America, but in
Central and Eastern Europe. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR ROBERT SHARLET: My task this morning is to talk to you about the
politics of constitution-making in Russia and the Newly Independent States
("NIS").
Yesterday was a banner day for constitutional politics in Russia, as you proba-
bly noted from the press here. Dr. DeBakey, a cardiovascular specialist and consti-
tutional surgeon of the first order, gave a positive prognosis for Yeltsin's heart,
and, by inference, Russia's political stability. Simultaneously, the Wall Street
Journal (9/26/96) concluded that a consensus has formed on the constitution
within Russia, and therefore, pronounced the country safe for foreign investment.
I would like to share with you several of the premises which shape my percep-
tion of the contemporary constitutional landscape in Russia and the NIS of the
former USSR.
First, the primacy of politics in the making, and the somewhat more desultory
implementation of new constitutions in Russia and the NIS. For instance, as a
political scientist who studies law, the most compelling query for me has been how
extensively have political considerations affected constitution-making and imple-
mentation.
Second, the predominance of constitutions as the new rules of the political
game in Russia and the NIS. By way of example, former Russian Foreign Minister
Kozyrev recently observed that people in Russia will no longer accept any author-
ity but an elected one. Similarly, the new political elites do almost nothing of con-
sequence without at least a reference to the constitution, if not a relevant constitu-
tional citation.
And third, the new post-Soviet constitutions tend to be perceived, by elites and
publics alike, along a spectrum from the constitution as "text" to a constitution as
"metaphor." Within the concept of text is Walter Murphy's distinction between
the anthority a constitutional text asserts, and the authority it exerts, while the
metaphoric end of the spectrum affords, of course, much greater license in consti-
tutional usage and interpretation.
To illustrate further, all three premises can be seen at work framing the follow-
ing examples:
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It was Gorbachev in the perestroika period of the late USSR who introduced the
idea of a constitution as the source of legitimacy and authority in the political
game, an idea, and now a full-blown vocabulary, which today informs public dis-
course in nearly all of the post-Soviet states with a few Central Asian exceptions.
Gorbachev was fond of the symbolic uses of a constitution. In political debate
he would figuratively hold up the constitution as if it were the conch in Lord of the
Flies to invest his words with greater authority. Towards the end of the Soviet
Union, as his troubles mounted, Gorbachev would sometimes envision the new
Soviet Constitution, then being drafted but never completed, as a kind of magic
carpet that would whisk him and his very troubled Soviet society to a brighter fu-
ture. Of course, it did not happen.
While Gorbachev's frequent constitutional references were generally sincere
and indeed intended to move the Soviet system towards deeper reform, the consti-
tutional games of the current president-dictator of Uzbekistan, Karimov, are an ex-
ercise in political cynicism designed primarily to furbish his international image
before a recent visit to the United States. In contrast, as a measure of Gorbachev's
success in changing the tenor of public dialogue during the last days of the Soviet
system, even the coup conspirators of August 1991 felt compelled in their initial
proclamation, to justify their actions by constitutional reference.
Subsequently, in the post-Soviet period, the violent end of the First Russian Re-
public in October 1993, was preceded by thunderous constitutional volleys be-
tween President Yeltsin and then parliamentary speaker, Khasbulatov. Ironically,
given the internally contradictory nature of the by then heavily amended RSFSR
Constitution of 1978, both constitutional warriors were able to find appropriate
ammunition in the text. That constitutional dispute, however, masking as it did a
fierce personal and political conflict, was finally resolved only by gunfire.
In Russia since ratification of its post-Soviet constitution in 1993, constitutional
language continues to suffuse the discussion of public issues. Witness just three
recent instances from the Russian political arena:
I. Parliament's constitutional challenge to Yeltsin's Chechen policy in the
Constitutional Court during spring and summer of 1995.
2. More recently, following the June 1996 presidential election, when Yelt-
sin's erstwhile National Security Advisor, Lebed, publicly demanded the dismissal
from the cabinet of the Minister of Internal Affairs whom he held responsible for
much of the carnage in Chechnya, General Kulikov, not heretofore known for his
legal acumen, cited the constitution in defense of his office.
3. The third instance most vividly illustrates the three premises at work in
Russian public life: the primacy of politics, the constitutional nature of discourse,
and the actual and symbolic uses of constitutional writ. Reference is to the current
discussion in Russia of the politics of surgical and constitutional bypass. In one of
many gaps in the Russian Constitution, Article 92.2 provides for the permanent
transfer of power, among several eventualities, in the event of the president's irre-
versible incapacitation due to health problems. Left unclear, however, is how such
a circumstance would be determined and who would make the final judgment. If
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one adopts a narrow reading of the clause, one might conclude that, by default, the
president, as patient, could himself make the judgment call.
Avoiding direct comment on what he surely hoped would be a hypothetical
situation, Yeltsin initially responded to public concern by invoking Article 92.3
which provides for the temporary transfer of power should the president be unable
to carry out his constitutional duties for a limited period of time. To this end,
Yeltsin announced that, prior to heart surgery, he would temporarily transfer par-
tial control of governmental operations to the prime minister, his constitutionally
designated surrogate or interim successor, while himself retaining possession of
the so-called nuclear suitcase. Yeltsin's compromise evoked the bizarre image of
the nuclear suitcase at the foot of the operating table and, in the unlikely event of
nuclear conflict, of a surgical nurse or perhaps even the anesthetist with a free
hand, launching a retaliatory strike.
In the end, it was Zhirinovsky, the court jester of Russian politics, who helped
clear up this bit of constitutional nonsense. The irrepressible Zhirinovsky sardoni-
cally mocked Yeltsin publicly, suggesting the reason he would not part with the
nuclear button, even when under the ether, was that the nuclear suitcase was in fact
a sham, containing only the president's underwear, his toothbrush, and a bar of
soap, standard luggage a presumptive political prisoner of the Stalinist era would
have had ready under the bed while awaiting his inevitable arrest.
Not long after, on September 19th, Yeltsin resolved the constitutional issue with
a decree which would temporarily transfer all power to Chernomyrdin, including
the nuclear luggage, during his then pending surgery and the immediate post-op
recovery period. The decree, along with Dr. DeBakey's upbeat prognosis for the
president's health, in no small measure, stilled some of the concern in Moscow
that Russia would be rudderless for months.
While Russian constitutional development appears troubled when measured by
Western standards, Russia is, in fact, doing exceptionally well when compared
with other former Soviet republics, excluding the three Baltic states. Several of the
Central Asian states remain mired in authoritarianism, while constitutional politics
in Armenia and Belarus are becoming increasingly regressive. By contrast, Russia
is the most progressive of the Newly Independent States in constitutional, political,
legal, and economic reform.
Finally, I would like to suggest several of the next generation of constitutional
problems which lay ahead for Russia:
First, there remains the fundamental problem of resolving the tension between
presidential decrees and parliamentary laws. The constitution does not specify a
clear hierarchy of laws, and conflicts have already arisen. Most notably, the presi-
dent's 1994 anti-crime decree, which is still in force, preempts legislation, not to
mention sections of the constitution and parts of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
There is also the problem of constitutional transparency, especially in regard to
the executive staff of the president. Yeltsin had steadily created within his presi-
dential apparatus a miniature government which to some degree duplicates func-
tions of the cabinet and parliament, while its operations are largely concealed be-
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hind Kremlin walls. Chubias, Yeltsin's new chief of staff, has announced that an
effort will be made to let more light into Kremlin deliberations. He intends that the
presidential administration try to better explain executive policies and actions and
the reasons behind them-in effect, a better information policy letting in more
sunshine. The new policy remains to be implemented.
Then there is the question of paraconstitutionalism and its relationship to the
constitution as text. Although the Federation Treaty was dropped from the draft
constitution in 1993 and demoted to sub-constitutional status, the Russian Federa-
tion since 1992 has steadily moved from a unitary state, in fact if not in name, in
the direction of a more federal structure, albeit an asymmetrical one. To quiet sev-
eral restive republics and regions, Yeltsin began in early 1994 to negotiate a series
of bilateral power-sharing and revenue-sharing treaties which tend to supplement
and soften paraconstitutionally the centrist tone of the constitution. The devolution
by treaty of the center's authority over the periphery continues, and is generally
regarded as a positive trend towards a more democratic system. It does, however,
represent a selective process of defacto constitutional amendment, without, as re-
quired by constitutional amending procedures, participation by parliament or the
public at large.
Finally, there is the long term problem not just for Russia, but even more so for
many other post-Soviet states, of building, or, to be more accurate, "growing" a
legal culture supportive of Rule of Law institutions. While in Russia a constitu-
tional infraculture as well as a legislative subculture are emerging, no one there or
in the West has a clear understanding of how a mass legal culture is fostered in a
long-time authoritarian society, how long such a process might take, or what the
intermittent consequences of its absence or weakness along the way to the future
might be.
To conclude, while Russia may be the most advanced of the NIS in constitu-
tional development, the new political system remains a work in progress with
much still to be done.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR ERIc STEIN: Lloyd Cutler and I are at an age where we look back.
And his mention of John Sherman Cooper made it irresistible to tell my own story
about John Sherman Cooper, one of the most attractive and appealing American
politicians I was privileged to work with.
I was assigned to him when he was appointed by President Truman as a mem-
ber of the United States General Assembly delegation to the meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly in Paris, a very important meeting at the time, when
Tito broke away from Stalin. No one knew what Stalin would do.
When the Assembly adjourned for the Christmas recess, Sherman Cooper was
invited by John McCloy and the German government to come for an official visit
to Bonn. The State Department made the arrangements. The Germans rolled out
the red carpet a mile long, but Sherman Cooper did not arrive.
There was a frantic three or four days where the United States Government
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made a worldwide search for a missing Senator, until a story came from Belgrade
that John Sherman Cooper, at the invitation of the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia
in Paris, went to Belgrade.
Actually, he forgot that he was supposed to go to Bonn.
I should like to make three more or less general points, all pertaining to post-
communist Europe. My first observation is this: When we think about constitu-
tion-making in that part of the world, we tend to focus on the specific negotiation
process, and we tend to overlook that it is just one thread in the unique, simultane-
ous processes of transformation at the political, economic and societal levels.
In fact, no precedent or theory exists for a transition from a Communist regime
to a free market economy, from Marx to markets as my colleague Michael Heller
has put it. It is no exaggeration to think of natural or man-made disasters: floods,
earthquakes, famines or wars, as the closest parallel.
In academic discourse, at any rate, the interaction between constitution-making
and multiple transformation has raised questions of priorities in the allocation of
human and material resources.
Bruce Ackerman of Yale felt that in Eastern Europe constitution-vriting should
precede, and provide conditions for, the free market, while others argued that a
certain level of economic stability was an indispensable precondition for democ-
racy.
For example, Judge Richard A. Posner had no doubt that the priority for Eastern
Europe should be economic rather than political. Vaclav Havel, at the time Presi-
dent of the Czech and Slovak Federation, "did not agree," I quote, "with the view
that the constitution is not the principal matter and that it can wait."
Bulgaria and Romania adopted their constitutions as early as 1991. In the
Czech-Slovak case, where the difficulty of the transformation was compounded by
still another transformation directed at the form of coexistence between the two
people, the Slovaks saw to it that constitution making be tackled along with, if not
before, economics.
But Poland and Hungary, after years of transformation, even today still do not
have constitutions in the formal sense, and the Ukrainian Parliament adopted one
as late as last June, only after the President threatened to call a popular referen-
dum.
The reality is that these countries have adopted a veritable multitude of so-
called constitutional laws amending the Communist constitutions, with the effect
that in Hungary for instance, as I understand it, almost all of the vital components
of a new basic document have been in place for some time, with the post-
Communist Constitutional Court undertaking to provide some coherence within
the system. Even the defunct Czech-Slovak Federal Assembly adopted some 43
constitutional laws before it went out of business at the end of 1992.
So in the real world, as I see it, priority has never been a real issue: constitution-
making has been pursued after the fall of the old regimes with vigor but, as an
eminently political process, it has been subject in different countries to widely dif-
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ferent forces and outcomes which call for discriminating empirical inquiry. This is
my first point.
My second point is to illustrate the validity of the generally acknowledged link
between constitution making and the changing political structures-and to do so in
a case where the interaction appeared in a particularly dramatic variant, marked by
a richness of constitutional and international law issues-the case of the late
Czechoslovakia.
This in a sense may sound like a coroner's post-mortem report but we might
keep in mind that, if nothing else, a historic record of a singularly peaceful solu-
tion of an ethnic conflict through "legal" discourse is of some value. Moreover,
the former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Petr Pithart, is invited to Brus-
sels and to Quebec to consult with local separatists, and Umberto Bossi of the
Italian Northern League invokes the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia as a
model of his "Padania." Are we facing a new trend toward further fragmentation
of the international system, this time through a non-violent process?
I have already mentioned that in Czechoslovakia-unlike in the unitary states
of Poland and Hungary-the constitution makers were faced with an ethnic con-
flict within an asymmetric, two-component federation: about twice as many people
live in the Czech Republic as in Slovakia. Tension between the two groups sur-
faced already within the unitary First Republic in the 1930s. It culminated in the
brief existence of the separate Slovak state under Nazi sponsorship. It led to the
creation of a Soviet-type federation in 1968. And it re-emerged with vengeance
after the collapse of the Communist straight-jacket in 1989.
In the early phase of the negotiations starting in 1990, the two basic issues were
the transfer of powers from the center to the two Republics and "strengthening na-
tional symbolism" such as the change of the name from the "Czechoslovak" to the
"Czech and Slovak" Federal Republic. The outburst of Slovak national feelings in
connection with the symbolic issues of the name and flag of the state came as a
real surprise to the Czechs.
The constitutional negotiations encompassed the entire spectrum of issues of
federalism, constitutionalism and democracy, and led to the adoption of the Fed-
eral Assembly of the Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms (which, incidentally
was in substance taken over in the constitutional orders of both successor Repub-
lics) and a host of other constitutional and "quasi-constitutional" legislation. The
primary focus, however, was the devolution discourse.
The Czech side believed that a solution should be found in the form of "a mod-
erate, enlightened centralism," which would preserve a uniform economic and
foreign policy, while the Slovaks signaled a growing, albeit not articulated, dissat-
isfaction. Nevertheless, the parties engaged in an essentially cooperative interac-
tion. While seeking their own "pay-offs" on the basic issues of power distribution
and other aspects of the successive drafts of the federal constitution, they were
prepared to cooperate in a solution that would preserve the federal state.
The phase ended with the Federal Assembly adoption, under strong Slovak
pressure, of the 1990 devolution law which restored, in effect, the allocation of
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powers between the federation and the two Republics as it was originally made in
the 1968 federal Constitutional Law, before the "re-centralization" ordained in
1970 as an aspect of the Soviet-imposed "normalization."
These positive moves toward a constitutional solution were made possible be-
cause the Federal Assembly was dominated by the two broad political movements
that emerged victorious in the 1990 first free national elections: the Civic Forum in
the Czech lands and its ally, Public Against Violence, in Slovakia. These were
broad, undifferentiated agglomerations held together by little more than opposition
to the Communist order.
The seeds of disintegration inherent in their very origin began sprouting during
the next phase of the negotiations, in which the Slovak side pressed beyond devo-
lution and symbolism for a new contractual foundation of the state in the form of a
"treaty" between the two "sovereign" Republics. The idea obviously originated in
the post-Soviet treaty for a Commonwealth of Independent States.
The Slovak-proposed "treaty" would determine both the power allocation and
the institutional structure, and the powers of the center would be limited to foreign
affairs, defense and the "single" market. The treaty would legally bind both Re-
publics and would oblige the Federal Assembly to incorporate it in the new federal
constitution. The hardest bargaining centered on the newly introduced issues re-
garding the legal nature of the treaty.
The treaty, the Slovaks first argued, should be binding under international law.
The Czech side branded this as unconstitutional and revolutionary, but after the
initial shock, a compromise was reached, with the majority of the Czech spokes-
men accepting the treaty idea and the Slovaks conceding that the treaty would be
an internal rather than an international instrument. However, the first question of
the status of the treaty remained highly controversial.
First, the Slovaks insisted--and this appeared to be the point closest to their
hearts--that the "sovereign" Republics must as such be the parties to the treaty
while the Czechs considered that absurd since the Republics were components of
the federation. Only the Republic Parliaments, acting on behalf of "the people",
could be the contracting parties.
Although formulated in terms of a compromise, the Czech position, based on
strict adherence to the 1960-1968 Constitution, ultimately prevailed. This, in real-
ity again a largely symbolic issue, turned out to be a major reason, or at least a
pretext, for the ultimate defeat of the draft treaty.
Second, the Slovaks claimed that the new constitution embodying the treaty,
after adoption by the Federal Assembly must be ratified by the two Republic's re-
spective parliaments, a demand that the Czechs reluctantly accepted, although they
viewed it as an inappropriate "confederative element." They emphatically refused.
however, to agree that any subsequent constitutional amendments would likewise
be subject to such ratification. The advice that the United States Constitution, for
instance, contains such a requirement did not make an impression.
Finally, as regards the issue of "international visibility," so close to Slovak
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hearts, a compromise solution reached after extensive talk about "indivisible sov-
ereignty," recognized an independent treaty-making power of the Republics to
send their own representatives abroad and receive foreign representatives, both to
be exercised "in harmony" with federal foreign policy.
The fragile agreement reached in a "block-buster" meeting held in a snowbound
Moravian village in February 1992, collapsed in the Slovak Parliament's Presid-
ium. That, for all practical purposes, ended the negotiations for a new constitution.
Parallel to the Republic-to-Republic negotiations on the treaty, the Federal As-
sembly debated proposals for the core parts of the constitution which defined the
three branches of the central government. The prevailing constitutional provisions
for the protection of the Slovak minority and the guarantees of Czech and Slovak
parity representation were to be retained or strengthened, and consociational ele-
ments added to assure the participation of Slovak representatives in central deci-
sion making. The bill, based in part on President Havel's draft, failed in the Fed-
eral Assembly by four votes.
Why this double failure? The answer again lies in the mutation of the political
system. On the Czech side, the fragmentation within the dominant Civil Forum
brought to the fore strong right-of-center groupings pressing for rapid completion
of the free market as a first priority, while in Slovakia the pro-federalist Public
Against Violence was rapidly losing support. This trend culminated in the second
national election in June 1992.
In the Czech lands, the strong federalist, moderate left-of-center was virtually
eliminated with the victory of the center-right coalition which by now was organ-
ized in the form of more or less traditional political parties. In the Slovakian
electoral "earthquake," the former pro-federalist Public Against Violence was also
practically obliterated in favor of the populist-national new Movement for Demo-
cratic Slovakia, which was organized by Vladimir Meciar's skill at manipulating
crowds with a platform promising both the continuation of the "common state" in
some undefined, loose form and relief from the hardships of the "Prague-imposed"
economic reform. This platform proved irresistible to the Slovak electorate.
When the constitutional negotiations resumed after the elections the principal
actors were the newly appointed Czech Republic Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus
and, of course, again, Vladimir Meciar, restored to his former office in Slovakia.
Their political power bases were in the Republics as there was no federation-wide
party of any significance.
For a brief period, a face-off persisted between the Slovak demand, now formu-
lated in terms of a "union," modeled vaguely on the 1991 Maastricht Treaty for the
European Union, and a Czech insistence on a "functional federation" or nothing.
The deadlock came to an abrupt end in the early autumn of 1992 with the two
leaders quickly agreeing on the division of the federation into two successor states.
An entirely new phase of negotiations based on newly defined common inter-
ests turned on two sets of issues. The first set concerned the modalities of the
separation including: (1) the date of the split (December 1, 1993) and budgetary
implications for the period preceding it; (2) the dismantling of the federal estab-
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lishment; (3) the division of the Army and of federal property estimated at some
$730 million, of 53 embassies, archives and other rights and obligations of the
federation, and questions of citizenship; (4) the constitutionality and legitimacy of
the separation process, including a possible referendum, and the role of the Federal
Assembly and of the Republic Parliaments; and, (5) the stance toward the outside
world, recognition of the two successor states by other states, status of treaties
concluded by the federal Republic, and admission to international organizations.
The second set of issues in this stage of negotiations dealt with the forms of the
future co-existence of the two states. The Slovaks, eager to salvage as much as
possible of the "union" scheme, pressed for a joint coordinating organ, but the
Czechs were ready only for a dense network of bilateral international treaties be-
tween independent states. The Czechs prevailed and some forty treaties or agree-
ments were negotiated, including one for a customs union. The negotiations at this
stage proceeded with surprising speed under the Damoclean sword of the immi-
nent date set for the split and in the new realization of their mutual interest in an
orderly, peaceful separation.
As my last point, I propose to discuss the extra-legal, extra-constitutional solu-
tion as an option in case of a deadlock in constitutional negotiations. Invoking
Kelsen, Hart and Schauer, a writer proclaimed recently that the questions of
amending or abolishing the basic norm are not legal questions and cannot become
objects of legal argument. The Czech-Slovak debate illustrates how mercilessly
the reality intrudes into the normativist-positivist constructs. There was no end to
legal argument.
In fact, one interesting aspect of the Czech-Slovak negotiations was the dogged
Czech insistence on legal continuity and on a strict adherence to the letter of the
prevailing constitutional order, based still on the 1960-1968 Communist constitu-
tion. One may think of several explanations for this stance: the positivist orienta-
tion of their legal education, the negotiated, "non-revolutionary" revolution of
1989 and an effort at a disassociation from the arbitrary, extra-legal ways of the
Communist regime. But it was clearly more than a coincidence that the opposition
to extra-constitutional solutions coincided conveniently with the Czech objective
of retaining the status quo of a federal system as against the Slovak
"unconstitutional" proposals for a radical change.
Professor Ackerman has evoked George Washington's decision to lend his im-
mense prestige to breaking the then existing confederate Constitution in order to
save the Constitutional Convention from certain failure. Ackerman adds, "If Mr.
Havel had President Yeltsin's courage, he would have broken with the Communist
Constitution and used his prestige to call a constitutional convention and a subse-
quent referendum, in which a national majority could have expressed its will."
Ernest Gellner, a distinguished English scholar with a Czech background, has
strongly disagreed, pointing to the fundamental differences in the relevant condi-
tions. As I see it, there may have been a magic moment in the autumn of 1990 at
the latest, when President Havel might have had enough influence to force an ex-
tra-constitutional way toward the adoption of a new constitution, such as the call-
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ing of a constitutional convention.
Actually, the then federal Prime Minister Calfa, the astute, professional politi-
cian in a sea of amateurs, raised this alternative in one of the President's confabs
but abandoned it promptly as unrealistic since the Assembly never would have
agreed to surrender its constitutional power.
With the Federal Assembly functioning and the regular constitution-making
process just gearing up in late 1990, I believe there was no apparent reason to fore-
see the eventual deadlock and to embark on a revolutionary route so foreign to the
local tradition. In fact, Havel never managed to translate his great prestige into
decisive political influence. Apart from his lack of political experience, Havel's
power position, in a civilized proto-democratic environment stressing "continuity"
and legality as against Communist arbitrariness, was not comparable to Boris
Yeltin's.
In my forthcoming book-if you allow a brief commercial-I have explored in
some detail the interaction of the constitution-writing with a wide range of contex-
tual factors, not only the changing political structure. I even took the risky chance
of speculating about the causes for the breakup of the federation, including cultural
differences, the economic and external factors, the media, the role of heroes or
villains, depending on where you stand. But this is a story for another day.
I had two or three points of a more general nature. And I'm not sure that I'll be
able to talk to you about more than two of these points. To that, Vaclav Havel,
president of the Czech and Slovak Federation, said-and I quote- "I did not
agree with the view that the constitution is not the principal matter and that it can
wait."
So you have these two views. In the Czech-Slovak case, there was no problem,
because the Slovaks insisted on the constitutional problem right from the begin-
ning. There, unlike in Poland and Hungary, the transformation process included a
fundamental change, as far as the Slovaks were concerned, in the coexistence of
these two peoples. So the Slovaks insisted that the constitution question be tack-
led, if not before economics and before democratization, at least at the same time.
Now, what conclusion do we draw in this context, from the situation in Poland
and Hungary, where after years of transformation, even today we do not have a
final formal constitution? And, of course, in the Ukraine, the Parliament adopted
the constitution only last June, after the president threatened to put the problem
before the people in a referendum.
But the reality is that, in all these countries, the parliament has adopted a multi-
tude of constitutional amendments through so-called constitutional laws.
So that in Hungary, for instance, as I understand it, you really have now a full
tapping of a constitutional system with a constitution caught trying to bring some
coherence into the constitutional pattern in the country.
So it seems to me, in the real world, the priority of constitution-making has
never been a problem. It has always been tackled very vigorously. But because
it's an extremely complicated process, the progress and the outcomes, of course,
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are very different.
So that's the first point I wanted to make. The second is that, I wanted to show
briefly the validity of the political science proposition that there is a very close link
between constitution-making and the changing political structure. And this was
shown very dramatically in the Czech and Slovak picture.
I want to talk briefly about that, even though you might have a feeling that it's
like a coroner's post mortem, because the country doesn't exist anymore. But I
think it's important to have a historic record of this fairly unique fiscal resolution
of an ethnic conflict through legal and constitutional discourse. Moreover, the
early prime minister of the Czech Republic is now being invited to go to Brussels
by the Flemish Separatists to talk to them about how to do it.
He was invited to Quebec for the same purpose. And now, last week, I under-
stand-I have seen that---that Umberto Bossi, the famous leader of Padania, is it?
Padania. He actually cites the Czechoslovak pattern. And that raises the question
that worries international lawyers and international politicians: whether we now
have here a new virus for further fragmentation of the international system?
Let me just say a few words about what actually happened. If you look at it
from a constitutional point of view-and I assume that, Lloyd, you won't add to
that-what you have in Czechoslovakia, unlike in Poland and Hungary, is that-
the constitution makers were faced with an ethnic conflict within and without a
largely dysfunctional Federation. As you probably know, there are twice as many
Czechs as there are Slovaks. And a tension existed between the Czechs and the
Slovaks.
Ever since the 1930s, under the First Republic, it culminated with the brief exis-
tence of a separate Slovak state under the Nazi sponsorship during the Second
World War. And it led to the creation of a Soviet type of dysfunctional federation,
really, in 1968, under the Slovak pressure. The tension reemerged with vengeance
after the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989. And I think one can think of
three phases of the constitutional discourse and development since late 1989 and
beginning 1990.
The first phase-really included two basic issues. One, the transfer of powers
from the Federal Center to the component Republics, and what I would describe as
the strengthening of national symbolism-for instance, the change of name from
the Czechoslovak Republic to Czech and Slovak Federation, are extremely impor-
tant from the viewpoint of the Slovaks, as symbols invariably are.
And this phase, which involved every conceivably constitutional issue of de-
mocracy and federalism, led to adoption, for instance, of a charter on basic human
rights by the Federal Assembly, which, in turn, was taken over more or less into
the constitutional orders of the-Independent Czech Republic and Independent
Slovak Republic.
Anyway, this phase ended in December of 1990, with the Federal Assembly
adopting-again, under strong Slovak pressure-a revolution law which trans-
ferred powers from the Center to the Republics, essentially to return to the original
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1968 text before the Soviet-imposed re-centralization in 1970, until after the sup-
pression in the spring.
So that was the first phase. And Lloyd and Herman Schwartz and (inaudible)
were involved essentially in that first phase, mostly.
The first positive development really was made possible because the political
scene and the Federal Assembly were dominated by the civil movement, which
was a very broad aggregate movement in the Czech Republic, and its ally, the
so-called Public Against Violence comparable movement, which really helped
people to gather more or less only by a strong rejection of the Communist Regime.
And that constellation began to disintegrate very quickly and became quite mani-
fest during the second phase of the negotiations. And the second phase also started
with the Slovak proposal for a treaty between the two republics that would put an
entirely new foundation to the coexistence of the two peoples. And, clearly, this
idea was inspired by the Russian experience with a Treaty for the Commonwealth
of Independent States.
This idea, that there should be an international type of a treaty between two
component federal states, shocked the Czechs and created waves all over the me-
dia. Eventually, a compromise was used. The Slovaks agreed that it would not be
an international treaty; it would be an internal agreement.
But the nature of this agreement, which involved the most esoteric and compli-
cated constitutional problems-the nature of this agreement has really never been
resolved. The idea of who the parties of the treaty really would be was not re-
solved. And actually, in the final preliminary agreement, the Czech view prevailed.
The agreements would not be between the independent two republics, but rather
between two parliaments, sort of acting on behalf of the people of the two coun-
tries. This essentially was one of the points that led to the final breakdown, involv-
ing a legal, in a way unreal point, that was used at least as a pretext on the Slovak
side for the final breakdown.
There were fascinating questions of, for instance, the Slovaks' interest that the
new constitution that would incorporate this proposed treaty must be ratified by
the parliaments of the two Republics. Well, that, the Czechs said, brings in a con-
federate element-it's unheard of. So, then, we tried to point out that the states in
the United States have the authority to ratify constitutional amendments. That
didn't make any impression whatsoever.
So, finally, the agreement ended up in a compromise, that in this particular
case, when the adoption of the first constitution would be subject to ratification by
the two Republics, any further constitutional amendments would not be. This is an
example of the type of problem that was faced.
There was a blockbuster meeting in a snowy Moravian village known as Mlada
(phonetic), to which the federal ministers had to use a helicopter to, where these
issues were finally put down into a draft. And a very broad agreement really was
reached on the basis of a compromise.
The interesting thing, as far as constitution making, is, again, that it was much
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easier to agree on the transfer of powers from the center to the Republics, than on
these symbolic constitutional issues of who is the party to the treaty and what the
legal effect of the treaty would be in terms of impact on the constitution-making
power of the Federal Assembly. That was much more important. And actually,
when this draft agreement came before the Slovak Parliament Presidium, it was
voted down.
And when I talked to some of the people, Slovaks, who voted against it, they
told me that they voted against it because of these symbolic things, which, of
course, indicates clearly the idea that nothing short of independence really was ac-
ceptable on the Slovak side.
Well, the third phase, I would mention only briefly, is really fascinating from
the viewpoint of both international law and new constitutional law. At that time,
the political structure governed or controlled by these broad political movements
completely changed already. On the Czech side, we have the emergence of the
right-of-center parties, with absolute priority for economic reform. And on the
Slovak side, the pro-Federalist movement was breaking down rapidly. And this
was confirmed by the 1992 elections, which brought forth the fact that the two Re-
publics have entirely different power bases.
On the Czech side, it was Vaclav Klaus' party of the right of center, again with
absolute priority for economic reform. On the Slovak side, the Federalist Move-
ment, Public Against Violence, broke down completely. It was practically elimi-
nated. And Mr. Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia, which he organized
after he was dismissed from the prime ministry, had a very substantial plurality.
And so there existed a situation in which there was no federal type of political
party and completely different political bases of the two new prime ministers, Va-
clav Havel in the Czech Republic and Vladimir Meciar, who was restored to his
official prime ministry out of the elections in Slovakia.
And, then, you have the third phase, which, as I said, was particularly interest-
ing from the viewpoint, of both constitutional and international law, and involved
essentially two parts. In the first part, there was a brief period of talk about salvag-
ing the common state. But the Slovaks came up with the idea of a union in the im-
age of the European Union's Maastricht Treaty.
And the Czechs said "functional federation," whatever that meant, or nothing.
And there was a deadlock for a couple of weeks, at the end of which those two
men and their parties decided to break up the state.
So in this last phase, you had, in the first place, a cluster of problems: setting up
the date for the breakup; division of the army; division of the federal property,
which was estimated to something like $750 million; division of fifty-three em-
bassies, the federal embassies, Czechoslovak embassies, archives; and all the rights
and obligations in international organizations.
And so, then, the problem-a very important problem of the constitutionality
and legitimacy of the separation process itself, who decides and should there be a
referendum or not? And finally, the stance, the position toward the outside world,
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the recognition by the outside world of those two successive states, their treaty ob-
ligations, and so on.
And the second cluster was the problem of future coexistence between these
two new states. And that was all negotiated in the autumn of 1992, with an im-
mense speed and intelligence, I think.
The Slovaks wanted to salvage as much as possible from the Union treaty.
They wanted to have a coordinating organ between these states. And the Czechs
didn't want to have anything to do with it at all.
So that is it: they drew up some forty international treaties on a variety of sub-
jects being negotiated and included a customs union, but no indication of any co-
ordinating factor.
Well, I think my time is up. I would have liked to have talked about the last
problem, and that is, why didn't these two negotiators forget about the constitution
and do what George Washington did by actually breaking the mandate of the
Constitutional Convention and writing a new Constitution, and thus saving, actu-
ally, the Constitution.
PANEL I-AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: We'll move directly to questions. I just want to make a
couple of quick points. Professor Sharlet pointed out to you how much higher
Gorbachev's status is in the West, or outside of the Soviet Union, than it is within
the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, he has descended about to the status of,
let's say, Harold Stassen.
And I never quite understood that until I had a Russian taxi driver one day in
New York, listening to us talking about Gorbachev, who said, "Why do you like
him so much?" And we explained we admire him. And his answer was: "We hate
him. He's the one who stopped the vodka." And you may remember that at some
point he did stop the production of vodka in the Soviet Union. And that showed
he had little, if any, experience in democracy.
There are three points that haven't been developed that I just want to mention.
And maybe they can come up in the questions. One is that constitution-making in
Central Europe has to deal with this unresolved problem of self-determination.
The U.N. Charter refers to "self-determination" as a basic right, a human right.
And at the same time, it refers to the inviolability of borders and the impermissi-
bility of a state interfering in the domestic affairs of another state. There is virtu-
ally no way to reconcile those principles.
And every politician and every ethnic group exploits its version of what
self-determination means, going, in many cases, as in Bosnia, to absolute sover-
eignty. The same thing is true in Croatia and Slovenia.
Something has to be done about that, as to whether we need some international
tribunal like the World Court telling us what "self-determination" really means in
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case-by-case situations. But that is the heart of civil war and armed conflict in
Central Europe that we must try to avoid, if possible.
The second is the difficulty within Europe of entrenching a constitution, of
having it actually approved by some sort of referendum of the people or of re-
gional or local legislatures, or whatever.
The German Constitution, for example, one of the most important in Europe,
has never been ratified by the German people. It is simply an act, a so-called basic
law of the legislature. And that's something that also plagues how you go about
building a constitution in that part of the world.
And the third is the remarkable degree--certainly untrue here in America-to
which the national constitutions and laws of European countries have to take into
account the transnational institutions that have been developed, such as the Euro-
pean Union and the European Court of Justice and, even more importantly, the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights, where a citizen of a country
can bring a complaint against his own government for denial of his personal hu-
man rights. It's something that at least the Republican conservative elements of
our legislature would never stand for.
True, we have joined the U.N. True, we've joined the Organization of Ameri-
can States Convention on Human Rights. But I imagine it will be decades before
we would even consider the idea that an American citizen could go before a multi-
national tribunal to condemn his own government's actions in denying him his
human rights.
And with that, let's go directly to questions. Yes, sir. Please identify yourself
when you speak.
MR. BORATLEY VISCOSKY: Boratley Viscosky (phonetic), Catholic University
of America. I would direct my question to Professor Howard, first of all, but
maybe to the whole panel. You mentioned that drafting a constitution is just one
full step. But the second is just to implement by constitution to see how it will look
in real life.
I believe that a lot of research was done as far as the drafting process is con-
cerned. We raised a generation of people who know how to draft, these new engi-
neers-constitutional engineers. But not much work was done just to check how
the products really work.
Let me be more specific. We know that these first constitutions in East Central
Europe were either adopted hastily by new democratic governments or will be
adopted by these new teams of Communist-post-Communist regimes.
Now, the question is-a number of questions come to mind. Will these two
types of constitutions be pretty much the same? Will they be different? Will the
new constitutions-let's say we can expect that (inaudible) will adopt a new con-
stitution. Now, for the (inaudible) constitution and if that a new post-Communist,
Communist team will adopt this constitution, will this constitution-will it have
this Communist flavor? Well, if the answer is yes, how it will operate in the cir-
cumstances created before? Will the new access be functional or dysfunctional for
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market mechanisms? Where the constitutions are expected to legitimize govern-
ments, will the old constitution-old new constitutions legitimize Communist re-
gimes?
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: May I interrupt for a moment? You have asked about six
or seven questions.
MR. BORATLEY VISCOSKY: Oh, yes. I know. Well, I
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: Can we limit ourselves to one question-
MR. BORATLEY VISCOSKY: Okay.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: -and, at most, one minute of comment?
MR. BORATLEY VISCOSKY: Okay. Well, but my question, let's combine it in
two questions, actually. The first one: How do you hope all these constitutions
will be? The second: How they will be implemented and when we can comment
on it?
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: Thank you.
PROFESSOR A.E. DICK HOWARD: Should I give one answer or six? It seems to
me that those who write constitutions in post-Communist Central and Eastern
Europe are as much at sea about what they're doing as were the framers of the first
American state constitutions.
The drafters in post-Communist countries have launched an enterprise of which
they have an abstract understanding. Some very good people, lawyers, law profes-
sors, and others, are doing the work. But they're doing it against an abstract tem-
plate, the idea of a constitution.
For example, I think they're not clear on who they're talking to when they write
a constitution. Are they writing it for the lawyers and judges to implement in a
court, as in the constitutional courts? Are they writing them as instructions to legis-
lators and administrators who must live under those constitutions? Or are they
writing them as charters of aspirations for the new peoples, in terms of a picture of
the kind of society they would like to achieve? In a sense, they're doing all of
those things in a single document. That makes those documents, it seems to me,
sometimes cumbersome.
Add to that the fact that the drafters are looking in several directions at one time
about what the purpose of the document finally is. Are they trying to achieve a
transition to pluralistic, multi-party democracy and free market economies, or are
they trying to preserve, at least in some measure, the legacy of the socialist era?
Reading a typical constitution, you may find in one place the declaration, "We
are a market economy." Then, you find at another place a long laundry list of so-
cial and economic rights, all the sort of things the state is supposed to do for peo-
ple, the entitlements that we call affirmative rights. Drafters may try to have it lots
of different ways in a single document.
My last point. What makes this further complicated is the fact that judicial re-
view of the kind being exercised by the constitutional courts is a new thing. It re-
calls the fact that, in Marbury v. Madison, John Marshall had to imply judicial re-
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view into a constitution that didn't expressly give the Supreme Court that power.
Equally, I think, drafters are drafting new constitutions in which courts will
have to interpret in a society where judicial review really has no tradition. I think it
is a problematical chore which is going to take a lot of time to sort out.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: The woman in the back.
Ms. SUSAN BENDER: Hello, I am Susan Bender with the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs. We are an organization funded principally by
the Agency for International Development to help promote democratic develop-
ment abroad, and I work primarily with our programs with legislatures. And so,
the question I have is, and we have worked with varied degrees in Georgia, Ma-
lawi, South Africa, and Palestine with the constitution development process, the
question I have is a follow-up to a point Professor Howard made about whether or
not the legislature is an appropriate body to take on this task. And you sort of
implied that it was problematic, and the suggestion of self-dealing, if they can
write the rules themselves and amend them themselves, is that a good place?
And I have just raised the question of whether, indeed, it is a good place for this
to take place in many situations where those are people who have been elected in a
process that is deemed free and fair; and the legislature is in part faced with the
task of becoming a serious body and governing the country and, therefore, why
wouldn't it be appropriate as opposed to, for example, a referendum which, if not
carefully managed, can be an executive's wish list and perhaps also a more legiti-
mate place than a constituent assembly or some other---another that would require
another election, another group of people? So, I wonder whether, indeed, you
think that there is--that it -is not all bad for legislatures to task? From my per-
spective, it has been part of the process of legislatures developing a role in gov-
ernments.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: All right, Eric, go ahead.
PROFESSOR ERic STEIN: I am rather doubtful about referenda. You could put
what happened in Yugoslavia after the referendum, and in the Czech-Slovak pic-
ture, for instance, the federal assembly spent days debating what questions should
be put before the people and never agreed on the issue. So I don't see any reason
why the concept of representative democracies would not cover even constitution-
making. That would be my feeling. And I think it is based on the experience in
Eastern Europe. Could you show me an instance where a referendum really was a
successful solution to the problem? And look at Quebec, of course, and on the
Western side of it. Moreover, if you look at Czechoslovakia, the whole idea of ref-
erendum is not part of the political culture.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: This really relates to the entrenching problem. If the leg-
islature is the final word, the legislature can always change the constitution. And
even if the constitution they pass says it takes a super majority to change it, that is
not necessarily so in that kind of a system. You still do not have a true legitimiza-
tion of the constitution. What the South Africans have done is really very interest-
ing and, I think, unique. As you know, they negotiated the principles of a consti-
tution among the various interest groups. They then elected the equivalent of a
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constituent assembly to write the real constitution.
But they provided that the real constitution then had to go to the constitutional
court for a determination as to whether it went beyond or violated these
pre-negotiated constitutional principles that had been worked out.
Professor Schwartz wants to exercise his droit du seigneur.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Well, there is one additional reason why the
legislature-there are quite a few-should not be the vehicle. And that is, the
electoral system in many of these countries, as a result of which, in places like
Poland and Hungary and, I think, in some of-I am not sure about Czechoslova-
kia-because of the threshold requirement of five percent, a great many people are
disenfranchised and do not have any representation in the legislature.
For example, in Poland, I think the entire, certainly in Hungary, the entire far
right was excluded from the parliament. And so, you have a hugely top-heavy and
distorted parliamentary picture in which a party with thirty percent, and this has
happened again and again, thirty to thirty-five percent, winds up with fifty-five
percent of the seats, so that you have a question of legitimacy that results in part
from that kind of thing, which, I think, you would not have if you had some kind
of constituent thing.
I agree with Eric that with the referendum, you spend God knows how much
time just worrying about the language or the question, and the other problem is
that, if you have a referendum, if you have a long, complex constitution-
remember Schwarzenburg argued this in Czechoslovakia-it gives somebody
something to shoot at.
So that, although an awful lot of people will find ninety percent of it, they will
find ten percent anathema, such as abortion or something like that, and the net re-
sult will be rejection when, basically, there is a general agreement.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: The gentlemen in the left rear.
MR. FRED QUINN: A question for Professor Howard. I am Fred Quinn from the
Federal Judicial Center. The constitutions of many of these newly-emerging states
have separation of powers as a pillar, but the constitutional balance is sometimes
upset by fairly easily invocable provisions for war powers, emergency powers, or
the use of decrees.
If you were sitting working with colleagues from those countries, would you
downplay this problem as one in the evolution of the constitutional state, or would
you, in Professor Sharlet's medical imagery, recommend prompt surgery?
PROFESSOR A.E. DICK HOWARD: Having been brought up in the American
tradition of separation of powers, I have to try to wean myself away from that. It is
interesting that you hear a lot of talk about separation of powers in the Central
European setting. What they are typically talking about, I think, is really separa-
tion of functions, rather more like the British parliamentary system. I mentioned
earlier that one simply finds nowhere in this part of the post-communist world an
American-style congressional/presidential system. That is simply unknown, in-
deed, I would say, unimaginable. A parliamentary system assumes from the outset
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a very different kind of play on the idea of separation of powers from the one that
we are familiar with.
I am troubled, and you put your finger on one of the problems, by the way in
which new constitutions--this is not confined to Eastern Europe-often have
fairly generous assumptions about emergency powers, the powers of crisis, or that
sort of thing. Latin America is an area where that kind of tradition operates rather
freely. In Central and Eastern Europe, it is going to take some time to work out the
problem. I think they are going to have to experiment with some kinds of alloca-
tions. I think the key will be a notion-recalling Montesquieu or Madison-that,
even if the final product doesn't look like an American separation of powers, there
has to be some kind of dispersion of power. One way I would achieve that-and
this outruns your question, if I may be permitted-is not only dispersing power
among the branches or functions of the national government, but some disperse-
ment of power among levels of government.
Partly because of European traditions and partly because of socialist or Leninist
philosophy, the idea of local governments or regional governments having any
significant autonomy is almost unknown historically in Central and Eastern
Europe. When it has been proposed, it has run up against a lot of resistance. In
Poland, for example, I think the proposal to energize local government has really
been at a standstill. There are a lot of reasons why those in power don't like to let
it go, even if they were democratically elected.
All in all, I think the problem of centralized power is still very much a problem
in the post-communist world.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: The German basic law has a very narrowly defined set of
emergency powers, and they are very short in time, within sixty days, one hundred
days, whatever. The legislature must be convened to ratify what was done during
the emergency period.
The woman in the rear row in the shades.
MS. MADELEINE CRONE: Yes, I apologize for the shades, eye surgery.
Madeleine Crone, I am senior advisor with the National Center for State Courts,
International Programs.
In some of the work that we have done, particularly I am thinking of Latin
America and the Caribbean or Haiti, I think that we have witnessed, in terms of
legal culture or constitutional framework, a sort of sometimes awkward blending
of principles that relate to common law and principles that relate to civil law. And
I think that a sort of hybrid is emerging in terms of that kind of thinking. So I was
wondering whether you think that kind of attempt to embrace different types of
traditions is also taking place in Central and Eastern Europe?
And the second part of the question is, to what extent will this affect also the
more traditional common law or civil law systems here or in France, etcetera?
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: Professor Sharlet, would you deal with that?
PROFESSOR ROBERT SHARLET: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will comment
briefly on the basis of my experience with the Rule of Law Consortium here in
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Washington and in the former Soviet Union, as well as my involvement during the
summer in an Agency for International Development conference where a number
of presentations were made on the subject by European and American lawyers and
representatives of international organizations.
What I have heard discussed in these venues is a gradual merging of selected
aspects of the civil and common law systems, especially in the area of civil and
commercial law. Conversely, I have not detected a similar blending in Western
efforts to assist the NIS in the sphere of criminal jurisprudence, Russian and
Ukrainian prosecutors are interested in U.S. prosecutor training techniques, but
they are still wedded, to some extent, to the inquisitorial systems, although it now
functions within a more adversarial framework.
Ms. ERICA SLAUGHTER: Thank you, I am Erica Slaughter from the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I have been particularly interested in the
little debate this morning between whether it is better to put a constitution to a
legislature for approval or to a body of citizenry.
But one of the issues that no one has really touched on, and I would like to
throw it on the table to make things a little bit more complicated, is the question of
how you determine what is your initial body of citizenry.
And I recall that nineteen of the post-communist countries that I think form the
subject of discussion this morning, are newly-independent states-some of which
have adopted very exclusionary citizenship laws. I think in particular, of the
Czech Republic, Macedonia, and some of the others. And I was just wondering if
you had any comments on that?
PROFESSOR ERIC STEIN: I would not call the Czech citizenship law exclusion-
ary. It is quite comprehensive. The only problem was to facilitate the Slovaks,
who decided to stay in the Czech Republic, to get the citizenship quickly.
And there were some delays because of the original requirement. I don't want
to go into detail. And the other problem is with the gypsies, with the roamers,
there are some-nobody knows how many. It is like our illegal immigrants. I
think there are 600,000 of these roamers, and they are not interested in these
problems.
And, as a result of it, there is some discrimination, but it is not a matter of legis-
lation. It is a matter of practice obligation.
MS. ERICA SLAUGHTER: May I follow up?
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: Professor Sharlet wanted to say one word.
PROFESSOR ROBERT SHARLET: Let me just add a word. I tend to see the prob-
lem from the other side, looking in particular at Russia, Ms. Slaughter. In this
sense, the exclusionary aspects of some of the Latvian and Estonian legislation-
which is perfectly understandable politically, demographically, and historically,
but does not sit well with international lawyers-has stimulated some discussion in
Russian legal circles of possibly conferring citizenship on all Russians in the dias-
pora.
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That would be a very serious problem for some of the smaller states which have
antagonized Russia in the sense that the Russian Constitution, Chapter Two, pro-
vides for protection of Russian citizens living abroad, and there are twenty-five
million people in the Russian diaspora.
This in some future scenario could serve as a pretext for some type of aggres-
sive action, so I think that is the greater concern. If I were a Latvian or an Esto-
nian legislator, I would curb my inclinations and come to some agreement.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: Very quick follow-up.
Ms. ERICA SLAUGHTER: Just to press you a little bit more about how you think
this question relates to the drafting of constitutions, if at all?
PROFESSOR ERIC STEIN: Well, it is a question of defining the citizenship of the
so-called nationality principle and civic principle. Anybody who is within the terri-
tory and has been living within the territory of the country has the right to become
a citizen. Some of the constitutions have it.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: And all the Bosnian Croats are Croatian citizens as well as
Bosnian citizens.
PROFESSOR ERIC STEIN: The Slovaks advocated strongly dual citizenship, and
the Czechs said absolutely no way. That was one of the issues during the final
stages.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: Last question.
MR. CRAIG BABB: My name is Craig Babb, and I've worked in some of the
countries that you are discussing here. Most of these countries, in fact, undergoing
these transitions are in varying degrees of rather substantial economic distress. In
response, donor countries worldwide and particularly multilateral lending institu-
tions are providing very substantial assistance. And in most cases, they are also
providing very substantial conditions.
My question is, do you think that this influence, really an economic influence in
all of these countries, is providing any kind of a deleterious influence on the con-
stitution-making and, in Mr. Cutler's terms, a "constitution entrenching"?
PROFESSOR ROBERT SHARLET: I would say yes, very briefly. The fact that eco-
nomic reform got underway first in the lead country, in this case, in Russia has had
a very adverse effect on legal reform.
Those of us who have tried to help some of those countries are hoping that the
two reform processes can be more in tandem elsewhere, in places that have been
slower to start.
As Oleg Rumyantsev said here in Washington a couple of years ago at a con-
ference that Dick Howard, Herman Schwartz and I were at with the Russian Con-
stitutional Commission, the economic changes, the creation of great pools of legal
and illegal private wealth was crushing the law and was crushing attempts at legal
reform.
So, it is too late now in many cases. But, if you could start from scratch and
create an ideal scenario, you would want to have the legal reforms well prepared
1997]
AM U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
before you launch the demonopolization of property.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: An interesting historical aspect of this is that the breakup
of Yugoslavia at the moment it happened was attributable, at least in part, to the
fact that the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") had been urging the govern-
ment in Belgrade to establish a strong central bank so that it could exercise mone-
tary control over the entire Yugoslavia.
And the Slovenian politicians and then, the Croatian politicians, those at the
richest parts of the area, took advantage of that to say that they weren't going to
submit to that kind of dictation from Belgrade.
And that contributed-it wasn't decisive, but it did contribute-to the breakup
and all the constitutional problems that that has led to.
PROFESSOR A.E. DICK HowARD: Lloyd, may I add one anecdote to your an-
swer? And that is, twenty-five years ago, when we were writing Virginia's consti-
tution, it was pretty much a home-grown product; we thought we were sophisti-
cated enough to write our own constitution.
But the one exception regarded provisions of the constitution dealing with bond
issues. We had to ship off our draft provisions to bond counsel in New York to be
sure that the New York lawyers were satisfied with what we were doing before we
dared put them in the Virginia constitution.
So, we had a little taste of colonialism there, I have to tell you. And so when
constitution-makers enter the economic sphere, apparently others-investment
counselors, economists, and the like-decide that they have the ability to preempt
the local decision in that respect.
What this opens up, if I may add one final comment, is a debate that you hear a
lot in another context in this country. And that is whether there is some essential
connection in constitutionalism between the kinds of political freedoms that we
assume are part of our constitutional democracy and something like a market
economy. In other words, is the idea of a socialized or nationalized economy anti-
thetical to individual freedom? We debate that a lot.
There are a few sections of our federal constitution which set out economic
purposes. You can't take property without compensation; you can't violate the ob-
ligation of contracts.
But, by and large, the framers left the economic outcome to the political proc-
ess, and I think it would be very wise if, by and large, the framers of Eastern and
Central European constitutions permit the same kind of latitude.
MR. LLOYD CUTLER: And on that wise note, let me thank the panel. Thank you
in the audience for your very, very, good questions.
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SPECIAL PRESENTATION
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW IN THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: When the record of the somewhat
stumbling, uneven-but, I think, forward-march of freedom in our time is writ-
ten, there will be several glowing pages devoted to the man who's next to speak to
US.
Aryeh Neier has done more than almost anybody I know of in the world today
to move both this country domestically and, beyond that, the world. Now that we
know there may be life on Mars, it boggles the mind as to what his next phase may
be.
What Aryeh has done in this country and abroad, I think, is unmatched. He
originally was bom in Hamburg, Germany, left Germany in 1938, 1939, living an
even more dangerous life. Went to college here in 1966, 1967, took over the New
York Civil Liberties Union and, shortly thereafter, the American Civil Liberties
Union ('ACLU") around 1969, 1970. At that time, those of you who are old to
remember these things know that the ACLU was a nice, good organization. It
played a modest but important role in America.
Aryeh transformed it, adding a whole range of projects that really revolution-
ized this country: women's rights-the first head of that was Ruth Bader Gins-
burg--prisons, Vietnam veterans, children. In one area after another, new projects
were started. And in the important events of the time, with the many other efforts
to oppose repression of one kind or another, Aryeh was the leading spokesman.
Then sometime in the late 1970s, early 1980s, Aryeh moved into the area of
international human rights. He joined Human Rights Watch; again, then a very
small organization built essentially around Helsinki Watch. When he left it a few
years ago, it had become a huge organization as human rights organizations go, an
organization that had offices throughout the world, whose reports were distin-
guished by accuracy, precision, and courage.
And throughout this time, Aryeh was not just some gray eminence behind the
scenes, but was speaking out again and again. And throughout this time, not only
was there the brilliant organizational work going on, but scholarly work as well.
Aryeh is the author of a good many books, as well as a soon-to-be-published,
somewhat misguided effort pushing the notion of war crimes trials, but even
Homer nodded.
In any event, Aryeh is now involved in another tremendous opportunity. I
don't know if his strength will hold out for this one. I don't know if there's
enough jet fuel to cover his travels. But now he's head of the Open Society Insti-
tute, which one of the other great people of our time, George Soros, has set up.
Great things have been happening with them, and great things will continue to
happen.
So we're very fortunate today-very fortunate indeed--to have Aryeh Neier.
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MR. ARYEH NEIER: Thank you very much.
When Herman catalogued my achievements, he left out my failures. And one
of my failures has ever been to be persuasive-with Herman himself, especially-
on the question of war crimes trials. But I haven't given up. Herman, there is still
hope for your salvation, and I'm going to continue working on it. I will write it up
as a continuing failure.
Yesterday, there was a very significant judicial decision in Croatia. It was a
case before the Zagreb municipal court. It was a prosecution of journalists associ-
ated with a newspaper, the Ferrall (phonetic) Tribune.
The Ferrall Tribune is a muckraking, satiric newspaper, and it is virtually the
only medium of expression in Croatia, that has not been either taken over by the
Tudjman government or closed down by that government that has remained criti-
cal of that government. The prosecution of the journalists at Ferrall Tribune was
based on a law recently adopted in Croatia that made it a crime to disparage the
President of the country. In essence, they were being prosecuted for "laissez
majeste," and the Zagreb municipal court acquitted the journalists.
In essence-and I haven't seen the decision yet-the court found that the jour-
nalists had not engaged in defamation because clearly what they had published
was satiric, and therefore this could not possibly constitute the crime of defama-
tion. This seems to me enormously important, both in protecting freedom of the
press in a country where that has been under very significant attack for an ex-
tended period, but also in helping to establish the independence of the judiciary.
What I'm now going to say constitutes speculation. I don't know why the court
came to that decision, but my speculation is that it has to do with the climate that
has been created in Croatia, not from above, but from below. That is, the constitu-
tional process and the process of forming a constitutional court in Croatia have a
lot less to do with this significant development with respect to judicial independ-
ence.
And the fact that there is a significant, aroused citizenry within the country; that
substantial human rights organizations have developed in Croatia; that journalists
themselves-even though most of their media have been shut down or taken
over--constitute a significant group in the country, attempting to exercise freedom
of speech; and that a civil society has developed in Croatia, despite the authoritar-
ian character of the government, all combined to help to create a climate in which
it is possible for a Zagreb municipal court to defy the President of the country and
to make a significant contribution to freedom of the press and to independence of
the judiciary.
It seems to me, that as one tries to promote the rule of law in the countries of
the former Soviet Bloc, it is essential that efforts should not be focused exclusively
on top-down efforts dealing with constitution writing and constitutional courts and
legislation. Instead, the effort to promote the rule of law should also be a bot-
tom-up effort.
The need for a bottom-up effort, I think, is great anywhere. But perhaps it's es-
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pecially great in countries where the judicial system is based on a civil code, in
which the role of precedent is by no means comparable to its significance in sys-
tems that are based on common-law traditions. Even, however, in systems like our
own, I think it is hardly possible to promote the rule of law unless one is simulta-
neously engaged in efforts that are bottom-up as well as efforts that are top-down.
Herman mentioned that I had a long background in domestic civil liberties in
the United States. Perhaps if I could just refer to the most famous experience in
the United States in trying to establish, or to make effective, the rule of law at a
point that it was seriously challenged.
The most significant decision in the history of the United States Supreme Court,
I think, is Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, holding that segregated education
violated the Constitution. That was a top-down effort to change the way in which
all of life was organized in a large part of the United States. And the Supreme
Court decision in Brown actually preceded the emergence of a significant bot-
tom-up movement for desegregation in the South.
The civil rights movement in the United States was, in many ways, a product of
the decision rather than the cause of the decision. And the civil rights movement,
as we came to know it in the United States, effectively emerged the following year
with the Montgomery bus boycott led by Martin Luther King, Jr.
But the Supreme Court decision, per se, did not achieve the desegregation of
the schools in the United States. It took the emergence of the civil rights move-
ment and it took an enormous amount of effort from the bottom-up throughout the
region in order to desegregate the schools, the libraries, the voting booths, all of
the institutional elements of segregation. It also took, of course, firmness by the
judiciary, in maintaining their dedication to desegregation, to accomplish the trans-
formation of the region.
Looking back on that, it's hard to imagine that the judiciary would have dem-
onstrated the firmness that it did unless there had been, simultaneously, a signifi-
cant citizen effort to effectuate the rule of law and actually to accomplish the de-
segregation that had been ordered by the judiciary.
At the time of the civil rights struggle in the United States, a book by a so-
cial-Darwinist sociologist of the turn of the century used to be cited quite a lot. It
was by a man named William Graham Sumner, and he had vaitten a book that was
once famous, called "Folk Ways."
The line from the book that was cited all the time in those days was, "State
ways can't change folk ways." The defenders of segregation argued that the "folk
ways" that were expressed by segregation were not susceptible to alteration
through legal process. The folk ways themselves would have to change before the
desegregation could be accomplished. On the other side, it was argued that, in
fact, the folk ways that were expressed by segregation were themselves a product
of state ways---that segregation itself had been ordered and thereby had become a
folk way.
As one thinks back on that argument, it seems to me that both sides had a cer-
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tain degree of merit to their possession. The ways of the state, by themselves, can-
not change the way in which people practice their lives. But it's also the case that
state ways can change a lot and, over time, can change the ways in which people
live and that, at the same time, the process of transforming a society from below
also becomes the method for transforming the legal system of any country.
I would argue that, in order to promote the rule of law in the former Soviet
Bloc, it is necessary to pursue a broad approach from the bottom-up, to accompany
the constitution-making and the establishment of constitutional courts, and that it is
a broad effort that includes a need to instill a sense of personal responsibility and
accountability in everyday life.
It is an effort that requires the establishment or the acceptance of a rule of law
culture that permeates all institutions of a society. It's necessary to encourage
people to see rights as meaningful in their everyday lives and to demand, there-
fore, of the state and of the judicial system, that they should uphold and express
the values that are inherent in the rule of law.
I think that there are ways in which it is possible to approach those issues fairly
directly through legal education in the various countries of the region. The reform
of legal education is an arduous effort; arduous because there are not the law
teachers in the region who are familiar--or most of the countries of the region-
who are familiar with the rule of law as I think those of us in this room understand
it.
There are not the textbooks that are adequate to the task. And very often there
are not the students who have been produced by the secondary schools and the
universities who are ready for the kind of legal education that is required in order
to promote the rule of law.
I believe the question can also be approached directly through the establishment
of local government institutions that are responsible to the citizenry. To a very
large extent, the local government institutions of the countries of the former Soviet
Bloc feel accountability to central government, rather than to the citizens of the
communities they serve. They derive their budgets from the central government,
rather than from the local taxing authority. Sometimes, or very often, they are ap-
pointed by central government, rather than elected on a local basis, and one can
encounter story after story of episodes in which local government officials have
figured out ways to reduce the expenditures on various public services. And the
consequences of that is a reduction in their budgets. Therefore, the incentive to
reduce those expenditures is simply nonexistent.
So the distribution of powers, the distribution of responsibility between local
government and central government, and the need for the creation of a sense of
accountability to the local electorate, I believe, is a critical component of the effort
to establish the rule of law within the region. I believe that the question of the rule
of law can be promoted fairly directly by the establishment of citizen's organiza-
tions that engage in legal advocacy on behalf of rights.
Fortunately, in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, there are now signifi-
cant human rights organizations that have emerged in most of those countries.
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There are still not organizations in some countries which actually use the legal
process in order to try to protect rights. In some countries, there is simply a sense
that it is not possible to use the legal process to effectively attempt to protect
rights.
But the very fact that there are such human rights organizations, which, in a va-
riety of ways, try to create a consciousness of rights and engage in the protection
of rights, is, I think, a significant part of the process of creating the rule of law.
And there needs to be a significant development of the capacity of those organiza-
tions to actually use the legal process in their struggles to promote rights.
But quite aside from such efforts that I think fairly directly help to promote the
rule of law, I believe that the effort has to be embedded in a broader effort to try to
transform the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. In countries where schools
continue to operate on an authoritarian basis, where the teacher is the font of all
knowledge, and in which critical thought is not valued and not encouraged, it is
very difficult to promote the rule of law.
When I look at the various programs that our foundations are engaged in, in the
countries of the region, if I had to pick a single one which I would consider the
most valuable in the entire region, it is our effort to establish and sponsor debate
programs in the high schools and universities of the region, because the very idea
of a debate program suggests there is more than one point of view that ought to be
considered with respect to any issue. It suggests that controversial issues ought to
be discussed. It suggests that the quality of the information and the quality of the
arguments that can be mustered in dealing with an issue is going to be the determi-
nant of the outcome of the process.
That is, it's not going to be the position of authority that is occupied by some-
one who is presenting a point of view. Rather, it is going to be how well the ar-
gument is going to stand up against arguments that are marshaled and information
that is marshaled in opposition to it.
I think all of these ways of trying to transform societies have to be considered
when one is trying to promote the rule of law. And I think it's also important to
recognize the limitations of efforts which proceed from a top-dovm basis, how
subject they are to political developments which are beyond the capacity of outsid-
ers to influence.
There was a first-rate study that the Carnegie Endowment published earlier this
year of democracy assistance in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. It was a
study that focused on democracy assistance to Romania, written by Thomas
Carothers. And looking at the question of judicial reform, Carothers suggested that
there were a number of limitations that had been apparent in the effort to secure
judicial reform in Romania.
Distilling his findings, he said: "It's futile to provide judicial reform assistance
if the Ministry is not committed to reform." He argued that "judicial independence
and integrity are more related to basic structural and contextual features, such as
low judicial salaries and systematic political interference, than lack of understand-
ing by judges or than the absence of appropriate judicial values." Finally, he
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Carothers stated that "the effort to secure judicial reform is inevitably related to
politics more than to any question of technical capacity or technical assistance that
may be available in the effort to establish an independent judiciary."
Now, I think these are difficulties that are encountered and that will continue to
be encountered through the region. It doesn't mean that it is hopeless or futile to
engage in the effort to secure judicial independence or the rule of law. It does
mean that the process is extremely difficult, that it cannot be limited to the effort to
draft the appropriate language in a constitution or in a law. It cannot be limited to
the effort to provide training. It has to be an ongoing effort, an effort that will per-
sist at times of political difficulties, but an effort that is also flexible enough to take
into account the variety of obstacles that stand in the path and that simultaneously
proceeds through the broader effort to change the context, as well as the effort to
specifically address the issues or the institutions that are directly related to the rule
of law.
I mentioned earlier the case in which it seemed to me there had been a signifi-
cant advance for judicial independence in Croatia. Let me mention, then, a con-
trary case in another Balkan country. And that is the removal several months ago
of the chief judge of Albania, Zeff Brose (phonetic), by the government of Presi-
dent Sali Berisha. That, it seemed to me, was an example of the most severe
problem that is faced in the effort to establish the rule of law in the region. And
the removal of Brose indicates the weakness of civil society in Albania, as com-
pared to the relative strength of civil society in Croatia.
As between Tudjman and Berisha, I would not want to choose in suggesting
who is the more authoritarian figure of the two. But Tudjman operates in a context
in which there has been this quite substantial development from below. And un-
fortunately, in Albania, there has not been comparable development.
There is a human rights organization in Albania, but it is very weak, has little
capacity to organize, to be able to speak out and make its voice heard within the
country. There are independent media in Albania, but they have been very subject
to manipulation by the government and have not been able to stand up effectively
when the government has acted against them. None of the kinds of institutions of
civil society have effectively emerged in Albania that have emerged in Croatia.
And so the removal of the chief judge, when he displeased the president politi-
cally, was something that was accomplished relatively easily.
And it even became necessary for the chief judge to leave the country because
under Albanian law, the only basis for removing him was that he had committed a
crime that was punishable by law. Therefore, there was a significant possibility
that the removal would be followed by a criminal prosecution in order, retroac-
tively, to justify the fact that he had been removed from office. It's very difficult to
imagine how the rule of law can develop in a country where a judge or a chief
judge can be removed so blatantly on political grounds, as happened in that in-
stance. And I think the manner in which the recent elections were conducted in
Albania reflects the same set of problems that was manifest in the way in which
the chief judge was removed.
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In the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, there has been significant headway
that has been made in a number of them in establishing the rule of law, principally
in the countries of Central Europe. The least headway has been made in the Bal-
kan countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union, and the countries fur-
ther east in Eastern Europe. Those countries remain essentially countries where the
rule of law is not established and where enormous efforts are required and efforts
that have to be extended over many years before one could effectively say that the
rule of law has been established. But in my view, it is an effort that must proceed
from the bottom-up, as it proceeds from the top-down.
Thank you very much.
PANEL II
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
PROFESSOR HERmAN SCHVARTZ: One of the things those of us who work on
constitutions come to realize very quickly is that things never turn out the way we
expect. That is, the dice come out differently. We plan it one way, things are
written to produce one result, and often they produce results which are quite dif-
ferent.
One almost perfect example which we've seen just in the last few months, not
in Eastern Europe, but in Israel, is that the change in their electoral system,
whereby they were adopting this unique system of direct election-popular elec-
tion of the prime minister, was supposed to shrink the number of small parties.
Instead, it enhanced their power.
Constitutional courts, in a way, are the same thing. This strange creature
roamed the constitutional landscape, really rarely seen anywhere prior to World
War II. Austria and Czechoslovakia were the only two.
And perhaps Herbert Hausmaninger should mention something about the Aus-
trian experience. But I know the Czech-Slovak experience was minuscule. I don't
think they even dealt with a single statute during this period, just with some admin-
istrative decrees.
So that in a sense this creature, this constitutional court, which is very different
from the American model, this creature which started to be developed in Italy and
Spain and Germany in the 1950s, has turned out to be a remarkable creature. And
it has turned out to be remarkable even in places where one did not expect it to be
at all.
Mark Br-zezinski will talk about the Polish Tribunal. But I doubt very much
that those who decided to adopt it back in 1982 had much of an idea of the way it
was going to work out.
I am told-Kim Scheppele can talk about this more knowledgeably-but a
Hungarian friend tells me that the Hungarian constitutional court was put through
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because the Communists, who were then running the government, didn't know
what it was and therefore didn't much care. And the opposition figured this was
something brand new; they may as well try to load it with as much power as they
could.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: That's not what happened.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: That's what Pozali (phonetic) told me. But in
any event, these institutions have turned out to be, I think, far, far different from
what was imagined. And what we're going to talk about in this first session this
afternoon are three examples of these. And we're going to talk about them in the
order essentially in which they were created. The first one went into effect in Po-
land in 1986. The second one in Hungary, I think in January 1989.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: 1990.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: 1990. January-that's right, January 1, 1990.
And the third one in Russia-I think it was late 1990, was it?
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: 1991.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Well, actually, it went into operation in Janu-
ary 1992, I think. Wasn't that right? Yes, in January 1992.
These three, though they are not necessarily typical, are and have been im-
mensely prominent in various ways. To talk about them, we have three people who
are about as knowledgeable about each of these as much as anybody in the world,
except perhaps some of the judges who've been there themselves.
And I'm not even sure that given the somewhat limited perspective of some-
body sitting in an institution, whether even they would have the perspective and
knowledge about these courts that our three people here have today.
Our first speaker will be Mark Brzezinski. And although he's the youngest of
our panelists, he has already made a reputation for himself and has insight and
wisdom about what he has been working on.
He left the University of Virginia, where he was a student of Dick Howard's,
where he wrote an exceptionally fine student note on the Polish constitutional
court. Then, we spent several years in Poland, working closely there with the
court on various fellowships, the Fulbright, a National Foreign Foundation.
From there, he went on to Oxford, to St. Anthony's College, where he obtained
a doctorate. And his doctoral dissertation has the distinction of having been ac-
cepted for publication by MacMillan. It will be published in 1997, I think. And,
obviously, it will be a major contribution to the literature.
Our second panelist is Kim Scheppele, and it's an illustration of the fact that on
each of our panels we have a nonlawyer who is as knowledgeable and as-and this
is not said condescendingly-who knows as much law as those of us who burn the
midnight oil over the more traditional kinds of law materials. Kim is a sociologist
by training from the University of Chicago.
Her first book, which is a book entitled "Legal Secrets," which I think was her
Ph.D., "Legal Secrets, Equality, and Efficiency in the Common Law," won a series
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of major prizes, including the Corwin (phonetic) Prize from the American Political
Science Association.
She then went to Michigan as a member of the political science faculty, pub-
lished numerous articles. Then, a few years ago, went to Hungary, mastered that
incredibly difficult language, and worked very, very closely with the Hungarian
constitutional court during this period. So much so that the court has asked her to
give lectures on behalf of the court to those high-level groups who come and need
lectures in English.
She has just moved to the University of Pennsylvania, where she's a professor
at the law school and simultaneously is director of-it's called, I think, the Pro-
gram on Gender and Culture at the Central University in Budapest-Central Euro-
pean. And she's currently working on a book about the Hungarian constitutional
court.
Our third speaker, Herbert Hausmaninger, is one of the most distinguished
scholars in Europe today. He's a member of the faculty-and I think has been for
some 29 or 28 years--at the University-maybe I shouldn't say that, that date -
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: Makes me very old.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Right. Right At the University of Vienna,
one of the most distinguished institutions in Europe. And, in addition, has been a
steady visitor at the University of Virginia every fall-for some six or seven
weeks, I think it is, and, very often at Comell.
He was one of the first to write about what was happening in Russia with Gor-
bachev's efforts to introduce some kind of rule of law, and wrote a landmark arti-
cle on the predecessor of the Russian constitutional court. The Russian Constitu-
tional Committee it was called. And he has since continued to write about the court
and the Committee.
He was one of those who, together with Lloyd Cutler and Eric Stein and Dick
Howard and myself, were involved very intimately with efforts to try to put to-
gether some kind of-help put together some kind of constitution for Czechoslo-
vakia, which, as Eric detailed so vividly this morning, I'm afraid foundered. Al-
though some of what we did I think did survive, particularly in the bill of rights
portions, parts of which were adopted by both.
Herbert Hausmaninger has also been involved in Polish reform and has stayed
in this field quite (inaudible). So, let's start first with Mark.
MR. MARK BRzEziNsKi: Thanks, Herman. Eleven years ago this month in War-
saw, the Polish Communist regime was busily assembling a room in the basement
of the Polish Parliament, a room that would house a unique judicial institution in
the Soviet Bloc. A twelve judge constitutional court, called Trybunal Kons'tue-
jkny, or Constitutional Tribunal, was being created because the democratic opposi-
tion had increased its pressure on the regime for some form of constitutional re-
view of state action. But it was with mixed motives that the regime set up the
Tribunal in 1986. They wanted to create an institution that looked like a real
constitutional court but which could be prevented from overstepping politically
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acceptable limits. The result was a tribunal with substantive and procedural limits
on its judicial review power. It couldn't review laws more than five years old,
which, of course, precluded the Tribunal from reviewing the Martial Law Decree
of 1981. It couldn't review laws for conformity with international agreements.
And, of course, Communist Poland was a party to numerous human rights agree-
ments.
The most significant limitation was that a Tribunal decision finding a Parlia-
mentary statute unconstitutional had to be submitted to Parliament, which would
consider it within six months, and by a two-thirds vote could reject the Tribunal's
ruling, and the Parliament's decision would be final and binding. This limitation
applied only to statutes. A substatutory regulation found unlawful would become
null and void. The Tribunal began to consider cases in 1986 after its twelve judges
were elected by Parliament. And over the last ten years, it has issued over two
hundred decisions.
Today, I'm going to provide a general survey of the Tribunal's jurisprudence to
give you an idea of how its role has changed dramatically over the last decade. I
divide the Tribunal's work into two distinct periods. First, from 1986 to 1989,
when the very existence of the Tribunal conflicted with the fundamental assump-
tions of the Communist regime. During this period, the Tribunal was relegated to
resolving issues of little constitutional importance. Even during this early period,
the Tribunal established important limits on the lawmaking powers of the execu-
tive branch. And this case law wasn't without political significance.
The second period is from 1989 to the present. After the collapse of the regime,
the Tribunal assumed an active role in constitutional matters. While the limitations
on its review remained, the Tribunal has since 1989 played a defining role in
forging post-Communist constitutionalism.
This institutional evolution that I have just described can be paralleled in certain
ways with its physical evolution. When I first visited the Constitutional Tribunal in
1990, it was still operating out of the dingy room in the basement of the Polish
Parliament given to it by the regime. There were no judicial chambers. There was
no support staff. There wasn't even a room where the Tribunal could hear cases.
When they wanted to hear a case, they had to borrow a room from Parliament,
schedule it ahead of time, and eventually hear the case.
By 1991, the Tribunal was given its own wing of the Parliament building. So,
whereas it did have some kind of infrastructure, it wasn't a physically autonomous
institution. And only last year did the Tribunal move out of the Parliament build-
ing across Warsaw to a grand building formerly occupied by the Department of the
Army, which, as you might imagine, during the Communist regime was a very im-
portant institution. So the Tribunal has a grand building with big rooms. And that
finally symbolized the complete separation of the Tribunal from the National Leg-
islature.
During its first three years, the Tribunal was an unwanted child of the regime
and existed in a political culture which still aspired the principle of legislative su-
premacy and unity of state power. During this period, the Tribunal didn't focus on
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the review of Parliamentary statutes. Only three of the thirty-three cases the Tri-
bunal reviewed between 1986 and 1989 concerned Parliamentary statutes. And of
those three, only one was found unconstitutional.
Instead, the Tribunal focused on reviewing regulations issued by executive
agencies. And while the Tribunal's cases involved politically unimportant matters,
it did manage, through its case law, to control the often arbitrary lawmaking prac-
tices of executive agencies. Executive agencies were technically allowed to issue
regulations only on the basis of Parliamentary statutes. But Communist govern-
ments, including Poland's, were notorious for their bureaucratic arbitrariness. And
this is what the Tribunal sought to curb.
From its very first case in 1986, the Tribunal began to strike down executive
acts which lacked sufficient statutory basis. It adopted a narrow construction of an
executive agency's right to issue regulations and held that only explicit statutory
delegations authorize the executive branch to issue regulations. For example, a
1986 case involved a statute passed by Parliament to combat alcoholism that lim-
ited consumer access to alcohol. The statute authorized the government to de-
crease the number of state-owned liquor shops in Poland. And implementing the
statute, the Council of Ministers issued regulations that reduced by ten percent the
number of liquor shops in the country.
But in an action not provided for by the statute, the Council of Ministers, in a
sub-delegation of authority, empowered the Minister of Trade to further reduce the
number of liquor shops in regions with a high incidence of alcoholism. And that
sub-delegation of authority was struck down by the Tribunal.
This decision was one of almost thirty decisions between 1986 and 1989 in
which the Tribunal voided an executive regulation for exceeding the scope of a
statute.
While legislative supremacy wasn't challenged during this early period, the
Tribunal managed to limit the well-established lawmaking practices of state bu-
reaucrats, while gaining acceptance, or at least tolerance, of other political actors.
And that initial success laid the foundation for more important work later on.
After 1989, the Tribunal's practice of judicial review blossomed. It became
much more aggressive in reviewing Parliamentary statutes and abandoned its re-
luctance to address controversial issues. Practically every separation of powers
question, every socio-economic issue, issues of lustration, de-Communization, has
come before the Tribunal. And the Tribunal has played a prominent political role
adjudicating these cases, a dramatic change from its role before 1989.
The Tribunal's self-confidence was enhanced by the change of regime. But two
other factors made 1989 a real beginning for judicial review in Poland. First, the
composition of the Tribunal changed. Half of the justices completed their terms of
office and were replaced by six new ones in November 1989. Solidarity took ad-
vantage of this opportunity and packed the court with its own candidates. Among
the new justices were scholars like Janina Zakrzewska, who was an early advocate
of a strong constitutional court in Polish political life. As a member of the opposi-
tion, she frequently demanded that the regime create this constitutional court.
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Second, the new political elite signaled its expectation of a stronger role for the
Tribunal by expanding its jurisdiction to include the review of legislation passed
by Parliament but not yet signed by the President, as well as the review of the aims
and activities of political parties. The most obvious sign of the Tribunal's new
role was that it became more aggressive in its review of Parliamentary statutes. In
1989 alone, it found unconstitutional seven of the eight statutes it reviewed. And
this trend has continued since then.
From 1990 through the first half of 1994, of fifty-two statutes the Tribunal re-
viewed, forty were found unconstitutional, which is a large percentage if compared
to any European constitutional court, or even the American Supreme Court's dis-
position of statutes.
As a side note, let me say here that this aggressive review of Parliamentary
statutes made political elites-including members of Parliament-practically in-
stantly more sensitive to constitutional arrangements. By 1991, the Sejm Legisla-
tive Council, the Parliamentary body which receives all new legislation, began re-
viewing for the first time pending legislation not only from a political and
economic standpoint, but from a constitutional standpoint, because they were sick
and tired of having what they were producing going before the Tribunal and get-
ting declared unconstitutional.
But the most auspicious development in the Tribunal's practice of judicial re-
views after 1989 is similar to what the German constitutional court has done since
the 1970s. And that's to develop and protect substantive rights on the basis of gen-
eral constitutional clauses. The constitution's Rechtsstaat clause is a particularly
important tool for the Tribunal in this area.
The Rechtsstaat, or state rule by law, principle, is rooted in German legal cul-
ture. It's roughly equivalent to American substantive and procedural due process.
Rechtsstaat jurisprudence maintains that positive law should be consistent with
both written and unwritten rules ofjustice, fairness, and equity.
Article I of the Polish Constitution now contains the Polish Rechtsstaat clause.
It reads simply that the Republic of Poland is a democratic state ruled by law im-
plementing principles of social justice. That very general language, based on the
German Constitution's Rechtsstaat clause, has been used by the Tribunal as it de-
velops principles of super-positive law and constitutionalizes them in Polish law.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal frequently looks to German Rechtsstaat juris-
prudence for guidance as it constitutionalizes norms and principles it sees as es-
sential in a state of law.
This judicial activism became very apparent in 1990, when the Tribunal held
that legislative enactments infringing the principle of nonretroactivity of law vio-
late the Rechtsstaat clause. The case involved then-President Jaruzelski's chal-
lenge to a new pension law which had reduced the pensions of former
high-ranking Communist officials. While the Tribunal found that law to be consti-
tutional, it emphasized in that case that nonretroactivity of law is one of the basic
components of the Rechtsstaat and thus has constitutional rank.
Since that decision, the Tribunal has developed and constitutionalized other due
[12:1
REFOLUTION
process principles through the limited language of the Rechtsstaat. These include
judicial review of service-related dismissals of state employees, judicial review of
alien deportations, and judicial review for individuals defending unemployment
benefits.
I asked several Tribunal judges where they feel they get the prerogative to en-
gage in such dramatic judicial activism. They responded that in the static political
circumstances of Poland today, where constitutional reform has been slow, they
have a special role in introducing new principles which political elites would not
otherwise get to.
Surprisingly, Polish political elites have not objected to this activism. While
political elites disagree with many Polish Tribunal decisions, they haven't com-
plained about the Tribunal going beyond the written text of the Polish Constitution
to develop principles of super-positive law. They see this, also, as responding to
the necessities of the post-Communist transition.
Another area where the Tribunal has been willing to develop normative princi-
ples from the limited language of the Constitution is in the area of equal protec-
tion. The Polish Constitution's equal protection clause states simply that equal
rights are guaranteed irrespective of sex, education, nationality, race, and religion.
But this provision and its general language has become one of the most oft-cited
clauses in the Tribunal's case law and has provided the basis for more than fifty
decisions.
In developing its equal protection jurisprudence, the Tribunal first held that this
list of forbidden classifications--sex, race, religion-isn't exhaustive, and that
equality should be enforced wherever the rights of individuals belonging to the
same category are impacted. Accordingly, the Tribunal has found unconstitutional
laws differentiating pension privileges according to whether unemployment oc-
curred before 1945 or after 1945 (in communist Poland) classifications imposing
regionally disparate tax burdens.
In its case law, however, the Tribunal has not found the principle of equality to
be absolute and has permitted differential treatment of otherwise similarly situated
individuals if it found a compelling social interest or human right to do so. In
gender-discrimination cases, the Tribunal has even required differential treatment
to ensure "equality in the law." In a 1989 case, the Tribunal found unconstitu-
tional a law that permitted male and female miners to retire with full pension only
after having worked for at least twenty-five years. Previous statutes had distin-
guished between men and women, establishing a lower twenty year minimum for
female miners.
The Tribunal held that for purposes of equal protection, a mechanically equal
application of the laws would not always be sufficient. It wrote that female miners
should be allowed to retire at an earlier age because the physical and biological
differences between the sexes amount to "objective and fair criteria justifying dif-
ferential treatment." But in a subsequent gender-discrimination case, the Tribunal
held that when physical differences between men and women do not justify une-
qual treatment, both genders should be treated alike.
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In 1991, the Tribunal invalidated a provision of the 1990 Universities Act
which had required retirement at the age of sixty for female instructors and sixty-
five for male instructors. In its decision, the Tribunal emphasized that the law
could not make an earlier retirement age an obligation where biological and physi-
cal differences between the genders are irrelevant.
Although in its early stages, the Tribunal's equality jurisprudence is remarkably
progressive. And as in Rechtsstaat jurisprudence, the Tribunal has shown itself
willing to develop normative principles on the basis of the limited language of the
constitution.
Before I close, let me say a few words about the Parliament's power to overrule
the Tribunal's decisions. When Parliament is deciding whether or not to uphold a
Tribunal decision, its consideration is inevitably distorted by explicitly political
issues. After the Tribunal sends its cases to Parliament, the debate in Parliament
often pits political blocs against one another. It frequently degenerates into wran-
gling over compromise solutions, with Parliamentary caucuses offering to uphold
one part of the decision in exchange for the rejection of others. It's not uncommon
for the Government itself, even if it might have been a party in the case, to weigh
in at the Parliamentary level to press its own case. And various ministers have
threatened to resign if Parliament didn't overturn the Tribunal's decision.
It's remarkable that the Parliament has overruled the Tribunal only five times in
the last ten years, despite the many times a Tribunal decision has had drastic po-
litical or fiscal consequences. But the limited validity of the Tribunal's decisions
allow its jurisprudence to become diluted by nonconstitutional considerations, and
this threatens the Tribunal's legitimacy.
A positive development can be seen in the new draft constitution. While there
has been a lot of disagreement in the debate on the draft constitution over a wide
variety of constitutional areas-such as whether to include positive or just negative
rights and the future relationship between the Church and the state-it is important
that there is unanimity across the political spectrum on the future powers of the
Tribunal.
For example, all sides of the political spectrum agree that the Tribunal's deci-
sions, including those on statutes, should be final and binding. All sides support
the expansion of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to review laws for conformity with in-
ternational agreements.
Let me close by saying that this year marks the eleventh anniversary of the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the pioneer court in the former Soviet Bloc. The
Tribunal has evolved from a body forced on the Communist regime, and inevitably
marginalized by it, to become an institution that's playing a central role in defining
post-Communist constitutionalism.
But its judicial review power, as restricted as it is, continues to reflect the days
of "enlightened Communism" and Parliamentary supremacy and has yet to be
transformed to reflect the new era of liberal democracy and decentralized state
power.
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Thank you.
PROFESSOR Ki LANE SCHEPPELE: My role today, I think, is to be both an in-
formant and a provocateur in talking about the Hungarian constitutional court.
The Hungarian constitutional court has the well-deserved reputation of being one
of the most activist courts in the world and certainly the most activist court in the
former Soviet world.
For the last two years, I've had the great fortune of working day in and day out
at the constitutional court on a grant from the National Science Foundation to
study its operation.
And the court has given me access to all of its files, and I've been a participant
in a lot of conversations around the court about both its role and about concrete
cases. I went there without intent to advise, and so I report today as a kind of
constitutional anthropologist--to add to the idea of a constitutional surgeon from
this morning--to talk about what the court does and how it is that it thinks of its
role. And I would like to end today by making what I think are some provocative
comments about the role of a judiciary in what I call a conception of judicial de-
mocracy.
But, first, that remarkable Hungarian constitutional court. This is a court that
opened for business on January 1, 1990. And for those of you who keep track of
dates, you will notice that that's five months before the first elections occurred in
Hungary. The constitutional court was a creature of the revised Hungarian Consti-
tution, which is a highly amended version of the State Socialist Constitution of
1949.
The amendments of 1989 grew out of the roundtable process. IfI had been a
member of this morning's panel, what I would have told you is that they didn't set
out to do this. In some ways, this was a kind of accidental constitution, where all
the parties agreed actually not to revise the constitution and then wound up adopt-
ing the constitution anyway.
The idea for the constitutional court itself came actually from the last State So-
cialist Justice Minister, Kalman Kolchar (phonetic), who actually got the idea from
the horse's mouth.
In the early 1960s, he had been a student for a year at Berkeley, and he listened
to some of Hans Kelson's (phonetic) last lectures on the idea of a constitutional
court. And he claims that he had gotten the idea at that time.
In any event, there was actually a draft law prepared to set up a constitutional
court in 1988, which was really before all of the changes had become quite appar-
ent. And, in fact, Kolchar's Justice Ministry had also introduced a new plan for a
constitution at the beginning of 1989. So, when the roundtable process started in
the summer of 1989, there were already on the table some proposals for starting
these institutions.
However, the idea for a constitutional court came very late in the roundtable
process. In fact, some of the participants in the process have told me that the idea
came up on a Friday afternoon when the Parliament was supposed to vote on the
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constitution on Monday.
And so, in fact, the Constitutional Court Act was drafted over a weekend in a
little room on the third floor of the Justice Ministry, working from this first draft
that had been prepared by Kolchar and Kelaney (phonetic) and the staff at the Jus-
tice Ministry. The Constitutional Court Act was thrown together reasonably
quickly as a result. And as a result, the Act gave the court a number of powers that
at the time, I think, no one really understood-at least no one understood exactly
what an activist court would make out of these powers.
So, for example, the constitutional court, like most constitutional courts, has the
power of abstract review of laws, power to nullify already existing laws. The
court went on to use this power in a quite expansive way, to the point where, out
of all of the laws that have been challenged-and this includes both the laws en-
acted before 1990 and laws enacted after 1990-the court has declared roughly
one challenged law in three unconstitutional.
So it interprets its powers very broadly. It does this by adopting the interpretive
principle that if there is any unconstitutional interpretation of a challenged law,
then the whole law has to be declared unconstitutional. So, rather than trying to
come up with interpretations that will save laws, the court, in fact, looks for inter-
pretations that are likely to lead to unconstitutional results and nullifies them on
that basis.
The court also has the power to issue advisory opinions, both in concrete
cases-and there were some cases early on when, for example, the prime minis-
ter-the first elected prime minister-in an elected government, Jozsef Antall,
asked the court for an advisory opinion on the reprivatization law that his govern-
ment was thinking about enacting. The court at that time actually did issue an ad-
visory opinion. It has since backed off issuing advisory opinions in concrete cases,
even though it actually has the power to do so.
But the court will frequently take advantage of any opportunity it's given to is-
sue abstract interpretations of constitutional clauses. So, for example, if the Par-
liament asks the court, "What does the right to property mean in the Hungarian
constitution?" they will write a sort of abstract opinion that lays this kind of thing
out.
But perhaps the most remarkable power of the Hungarian constitutional court is
to declare that Parliament is acting unconstitutionally by omission, which is to say
that if Parliament has failed to enact a law on a subject that, in the view of the
court, requires a law because of constitutional provisions, the court can order the
Parliament to pass a law within certain parameters, looking kind of like this by a
certain date. And the court has done this on 260 occasions between 1990 and the
end of 1995, so it's actually a fairly common practice. On average, the court de-
clares a law or an omission about once a week, and it does this week in, week out.
So, it's a very, very aggressive constitutional court. And in its first five and a half
years, six years of operation, it has published more than 1,500 decisions.
By the way, for those of you who read Hungarian, a group of counselors from
the court and I put together an edited collection of Hungarian case law-
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constitutional case law-which just has been published and distributed to all
judges in Hungary. We are now running some workshops to try to educate ordi-
nary court judges about constitutional jurisprudence in Hungary.
The range of topics that the Hungarian constitutional court has dealt with is
truly broad. In fact, some people claim that there is nothing that is not a constitu-
tional question in Hungary. So, starting with some relatively obvious cases, like
the death penalty, which the court struck down. Retroactive justice, which the
court was not allowed in a Rechtsstaat. A series of cases about data protection in
which the court held that what they call, borrowing from the Germans, "the right
of informational self-determination"-it's one of the most fundamental principles
of Hungarian constitutional law-the court struck down a whole series of data
collection practices of the old and current regime.
The court has issued a series of extremely broad decisions on reprivatization,
which required that any property-any restitution that was made be made equally
to groups, not just in the form of--the Antall government had simply wanted to
give, basically, farmers their land back. The court said, "No, you can't do that,
because it singles out a certain form of property for special treatment." So, all
forms of property had to be treated equally.
And what's more, the court said, "You can't just begin in 1949, because the
constitution says nothing specific about regimes. You have to go back to property
that was seized in the 1930s"; which meant that if the current government wanted
to compensate farmers, they had to go back and compensate Jews whose property
was seized in the 1930s. So, the court presided over this very broad reconsidera-
tion of restitution.
The court has not backed off from pronouncing the powers of other branches,
so it has a very big decision outlining what the powers of the president are. It has
a number of separation-of-powers cases in which, for example, the budget for the
ordinary courts was constitutionally required to come out from under the Justice
Ministry. And similarly, the budget for the state-run media had to come out from
under the Prime Minister's Office. And there's a series of state functions cases of
that kind.
Last summer, the court, in a series of fourteen decisions, struck down large
parts of the IMF-mandated austerity program and outlined a very complex system
of social rights and protections. The court has also announced one of the most
sweeping gay rights decisions of any court in the world.
And just to give you a sense of how everything is a constitutional question in
Hungary, right before the court shut down for the summer last spring, it issued a
decision holding unconstitutional a regulation of the City of Budapest which al-
lowed cars with outstanding fines to have those little boots attached so that the cars
couldn't be moved. The court held this was a violation of the property rights of car
owners. So, virtually everything is a constitutional question.
Now, what the court has done is to establish what I think is a really quite inno-
vative jurisprudence and way of imagining constitutional questions. Borrowing
from the German constitutional court, but using it in a quite different manner, the
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court takes the principle of the right to life and human dignity as the most funda-
mental and central principle of the constitutional order. But like the Polish court,
the constitutional court of Hungary has also made a great deal out of its antidis-
crimination clause. And, in fact, the antidiscrimination clause, which, in the Hun-
garian constitution, says that discrimination may not be made on the basis of-it
was about fourteen categories-and then it says "or any other reason."
So, in fact, the court didn't have to go beyond the text to hold almost any legis-
lative distinction unconstitutional. That's the most frequently cited provision of
the Hungarian constitution for striking down claims. And it's also one of the most
fundamental in the court's thinking about constitutional principles, that basically
one of the fundamental ways in which rights can be violated in a state is for classes
of citizens to be singled out for unequal treatment.
The court has also elaborated a very broad principle of what they call "legal se-
curity," which is something akin to due process in American constitutional juris-
prudence. And by "legal security"-the most substantive part, according to the
court, of the rule of law principle-the state may not destabilize citizens' expecta-
tions through the use of law. So, it, in some senses, says the government must be
held accountable not only to the law itself but to citizens, to make sure that they
don't use the law as a weapon against them in a way to destabilize their expecta-
tions.
Now, one of the most remarkable things about this court is who gets to access it
and how the court is mobilized. The constitution says literally anyone may file a
petition with the court. It doesn't say "any citizen," "any person with standing,"
"any person with a legally redressable interest." It says "anyone," which means
that anyone in this room, if you thought a law, a legal regulation, or a decree in
Hungary was unconstitutional, could file a petition with the Hungarian constitu-
tional court. And the court has no power of discretionary jurisdiction. That is to
say, any legitimately framed challenge to any legal regulation in the state must be
answered by the court. So, it doesn't have the power to turn these things away.
In most years, the court receives between 1,000 and 1,500 letters. Most of them
are from ordinary citizens and most from ordinary citizens with no specialized le-
gal training. I've been spending a lot of the last couple of years reading these let-
ters, because I was interested precisely in the question that Aryeh Neier mentioned
over his lunch speech, which is this kind of bottom-up picture of constitutionalism.
I was curious: If anyone can write to the court, what do they say? And there are
quite remarkable arguments that get made there, like the widow from Szeged who
writes in and says, "The government may not unilaterally modify a contract," and
other arguments of quite a fair degree of legal sophistication.
What I want to say about this court is that it is an extraordinarily activist court.
And in fact-and here's the provocateur part-I would like to claim that actually
Hungary is not really, as all the transitologists say, a parliamentary democracy.
Instead, I think what Hungary is doing is creating a different shape and form of
democracy, something we might call a juridical democracy. If there are presiden-
tial and parliamentary forms of democracy, why not a juridical one, as well? From
[12:1
REFOLUTION
an American perspective, the Hungarian court looks impossibly, unadvisedly activ-
ist. And, in fact, most foreign advisers who have passed through have urged the
court to cut it out. The court doesn't listen to this particularly.
And so, one of the questions that I'd like to ask at the very end to try to provoke
us into thinking about the role of constitutional courts and their appropriate role in
a democratic system: Is a constitutional court that exercises these extraordinary
functions undemocratic?
Now, the American constitutional literature cautions us about the
counter-majoritarian difficulty, that the reason why courts should not have so
much power is precisely because they will be striking down the outcome of the
duly elected branches of government, and that this is a problem in a democracy
because democracy is equated with elections.
But if you look at how parliamentary regimes are structured and you think
about what the democratic pedigree is of parliamentary regimes, the agendas for
them are typically set by a prime minister, council of ministers, by the so-called
government, which has exactly the same democratic pedigree as constitutional
courtjudges. That is to say that they're elected by the Parliament for a fixed term.
And so in some ways the judges of the Hungarian constitutional court actually
have in some ways a bigger democratic majoritarian check on their elections. Be-
cause, at least in Hungary, you need not only a two-thirds vote of the Parliament,
which comes second, but you need, first, to be screened by a constitutional com-
mittee in which every political party gets one vote. So, in order to be elected as a
judge in Hungary, you need a majority of the political parties and two-thirds ma-
jority of the Parliament itself to go onto the court.
What that has meant is that judges hardly ever get elected in groups of one.
They typically get elected in more groups, because it takes actually more open
judgeships before all the political parties can strike a deal that gives everybody
somebody on the court.
And so the court represents, in fact, a broader spectrum of political opinion at
any given moment than a particular coalition in the Parliament. So, I begin to
wonder, if you look at the sort of democratic electoral pedigree of the constitu-
tional court, whether it's really that different or that much worse than a prime
ministerial system.
In addition, the constitutional court in Hungary is the most popular institution in
the government, with the exception of the presidency. Hungary has a cosmetic
sort of presidency, without very many powers. And the current occupant of that
job, who's the only president that has been in existence since 1990, is a very, very
popular, charismatic figure. So, I'm not so sure that poll results are about the insti-
tution or the person.
But the Hungarian constitutional court routinely gets sixty percent or above
popular approval in public opinion polls despite the fact that it's doing all of this.
The Parliament and the government routinely hover between twenty and thirty
percent in their popularity ratings. And so here, again, it's hard to make the
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counter-majoritarian difficulty argument stick against a court that has that level of
popular approval.
Also, people worry that judges who have this much power are sort of loose
cannons. "And while you might like a particular set of judges," people tell me,
"you won't like the next set that comes along." What the court has actually done, I
think, is to constrain itself not within the democratic system of Hungary alone, but
against what we might call the shadow of Europeanism.
The Hungarian constitutional court is extremely aware of human rights juris-
prudence elsewhere in the world, and particularly elsewhere in Europe. It is ex-
tremely common practice on the court, whenever the court gets a major human
rights question, to go out and look at the international human rights literature and
see what that literature says, and really primarily to be guided by that.
That's how the court got to this gay rights decision. They did a sort of literature
review of the literature on gay rights, and they discovered that nobody writing in
the human rights literature is ever against gay rights. If people are against it, they
write in other kinds of periodicals. So, when they did their literature review and
found this kind of consensus, it was an easy decision for the court. If the court
actually finds itself constrained by European human rights norms, my guess is that
it's not going to look very dangerous.
Finally, I think one of the things we might do, in thinking about what democ-
racy and the rule of law mean in this part of the world, is to ask whether our con-
ception of democracy, as simply being tied to elections, is really sufficient, particu-
larly in areas where elections are new, where people are new voters, and where the
political parties are simply sorting themselves out.
The view of the constitutional court of Hungary is basically that a democratic
regime will invariably, if the democracy is working well, develop certain kinds of
substantive policies. For example, they would see a country which had a death
penalty as having some failure of democratic process because democratic govern-
ments don't do that kind of thing. They always ask me about the United States in
this regard.
But if they have the view that basically a lot of experience in democratic re-
gimes has produced some consensus over actual substantive policies and that it's
quicker to just say that's what the law is than to go through the trial-and-error
process of creating it, the court actually has in its mind, in some sense, a picture of
substantive democracy that runs counter, I think, to the view of procedural democ-
racy that we typically have in the United States.
That said, one might say-and people always do say-about the Hungarian
constitutional court, "Well, this a temporary phenomenon. This is just a transi-
tional arrangement, and that eventually the Parliament will strike back and cut
back the powers of the court and something will happen that will make this court
not the aggressive activist court that it is now."
And to that, I say it certainly seems to have become the case in Hungary that
the constitutional court in Hungary is rather like Social Security in the U.S., which
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gets referred to as the kind of "third rail of politics." When politicians touch it,
they die. And in Hungary, when politicians attack the constitutional court, their
ratings go very, very far down. And so, as I've talked to members of Parliament
about this and said to them, "Why-you know, why are you putting up with
this?"--they all look at me like I've lost my mind. And they say, "We're a consti-
tutional rule-of-law state, and that's just how they operate."
Thank you.
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: Well, I wish I could be as upbeat as my
colleagues. But my topic is the Russian constitutional court. Established in 1991,
one could say it was off to a fairly promising start. But all too soon it became in-
volved in a terminal political confrontation between President Yeltsin and
Hezbollahtov's (phonetic) Congress of People's Deputies. And the result of that is
well-known.
Suspended and threatened with abolition in September 1993, it was subse-
quently given a new lease on life in the constitution and a new lav on the consti-
tutional court. After a protracted selection process of six additional justices,
bringing the number from thirteen to nineteen, the Court was able to resume its
work in March of 1995. Not surprisingly, it has become a chastened court with
reduced legal functions in an entirely different political environment.
The 1993 constitution and the 1994 lav on the court reacted strongly against
perceived mistakes of the Zorkin (phonetic) court. The constitutional court was
demoted from its previous position at the apex of the judicial pyramid and placed
on an equal footing with two other supreme courts. It was deprived of functions
that had encouraged its excessive politicization; for instance, the right to examine
cases on its own initiative, to play a substantial role in impeachment proceedings
against the president, or the duty to accept requests for constitutional review from
single deputies of Parliament. The court may no longer review the constitutional-
ity of political parties. And its function to decide jurisdictional disputes among
organs of state power has been relegated to a subsidiary role, behind a conciliation
procedure conducted by the president.
Most of these restraints seems justifiable as an attempt to refocus the court on
the traditional task of constitutional review under the European model-that is, to
examine the constitutionality of statutes at the request of other organs of state
power. The framers of the new Russian constitution, however, for no apparent
reason, chose to add a new function that appears to be as political as it is superflu-
ous, the right of most of these other state organs, supreme courts excepted, to ask
for authoritative interpretations of the constitution. They also modified the rights
of individual citizens to bring complaints before the court in cases of violation of
their constitutional rights. And they opened a new access route to the constitu-
tional court by providing for the referral of constitutional questions from the ordi-
nary judiciary.
I will briefly discuss these three new areas of jurisdiction in the light of the
court's practice, pointing out problems and concluding with a personal appraisal.
First, the authoritative interpretation of the constitution. According to the consti-
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tution, the president, the Federal Council, the State Duma, the government, and
any legislative organ of any of the more than eighty subjects of the Russian fed-
eration may ask the constitutional court for an authoritative interpretation of the
constitution.
The law on the court declares this interpretation to be binding on all state or-
gans. It requires a decision of the plenum of the court, that is thirteen out of nine-
teen justices, and it has to be adopted by a two-thirds majority. Neither the consti-
tution nor the law on the constitutional courts subject this request to any
procedural or other requirements.
But the court, clearly sensing the dangers of political entrapment, has refused to
accept requests for interpretation when other avenues of access were available,
such as a request for examination of constitutionality of a statute under the respec-
tive article of the constitution that was asked to be interpreted. The court will also
grant a request for interpretation only when it directly concerns the fulfillment of
constitutional functions or duties of the requesting organ.
In another context, but in terms capable of generalization, the court has signaled
that it will not admit requests that would involve it as an immediate participant in
an ongoing political process. Between March 1995 and July 1996, the court issued
five interpretations, mostly at the request of the Duma in some sort of confronta-
tion with the president. It has also rejected two requests of the Council of Federa-
tion as inadmissible, unfortunately without publishing them. But they are referred
to in a commentary that has just appeared written by justices of the court and thus
making clear what their position was.
Point two involves citizen complaints. The new constitution reads: "The consti-
tutional court examines on the basis of complaints of citizens concerning the vio-
lation of constitutional rights and freedoms and, at the request of courts, the consti-
tutionality of a statute applied or to be applied, in the specific case, in a procedure
determined by federal law."
Under the previous law of the old constitutional court, citizens could, after ex-
hausting remedies in the ordinary court system, lodge complaints against the vio-
lation of their fundamental rights by an unconstitutional court practice. The old
court interpreted the word "practice" liberally, never rejecting a request because
the petitioner could only point to a single violation in his own case and not to an
established practice.
Today, petitioners may no longer contest unconstitutional court decisions, but
only unconstitutional statutes that have been or are about to be applied to them on
any level of the judicial hierarchy, trial or appeals court. And they have also lost
the right to contest the application of unconstitutional substatutory regulations.
Thus, protection of constitutional rights has become easier on the one hand, be-
cause one no longer has to exhaust an appeals hierarchy. But this is a heavy price
to pay for what has been lost, namely standing in the constitutional court concern-
ing unconstitutional court decisions on the one hand and unconstitutional presi-
dential decrees and government regulations on the other hand, because these are
obviously the two areas where constitutional law is most frequently violated. The
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framers of the constitution apparently tried to strengthen the executive branch and
the regular court system vis-i-vis the constitutional court that had lost their trust.
It is less clear that they were conscious of three serious problems that would re-
sult from this approach: First, although the courts are not bound to apply unconsti-
tutional or illegal substatutory regulations, they have no power to nullify them.
Thus, they remain on the books. And one judge will observe them; the other will
ignore them.
A second point, the Russian constitutional court has lost one big opportunity to
teach ordinary courts modes of constitutional interpretation in a case-by-case ap-
proach involving the balancing of conflicting values.
And the third observation would be that there is ample reason to believe that
ordinary judges in the Russian system will be slow, if not reluctant, to uphold citi-
zens' rights against the state.
In an interview with Gusudastre Klava (phonetic), the leading Russian law
journal, edited by the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences,
Court Chairman Tumanov (phonetic), formerly a professor at that institute, re-
ported that, in its first five months, the Russian constitutional court received no
fewer than 3,100 citizens' petitions, of which eighty percent were rejected out of
hand by the Court Secretariat for formal reasons, such as obvious lack ofjurisdic-
tion by the court. The remaining 600 were examined by legal specialists in the
Court Secretariat and reported to the Chairman of the Court within two months
after registration. The Chairman then assigns one or several justices as reporters to
each case, and their task is to verify the conclusions of the Secretariat and report
the case to the plenary meeting of the nineteen justices within one month. The
Plenum, then, either accepts the case for oral argument in a plenary meeting or as-
signs it to one of two panels, one of nine and the other of ten members, or, with
much higher frequency, rejects the request as inadmissible.
This process appears to be somewhat short on both legitimacy and efficiency.
On the one hand, the screening of petitions by the court staff and a single judge
may provide insufficient substantive exploration of constitutional issues. On the
other hand, it seems wasteful to involve the Plenum of nineteen justices in pro
forma rejection of hundreds of cases.
The constitutional court heard the first citizen's complaint in April 1995. In the
meantime, seventeen out of a total of thirty-five published decisions of the court
have been devoted to citizens' complaints. The concern alleged violations of citi-
zenship, housing, labor, health protection, pension rights, judicial independence,
and a number of provisions of the criminal--and criminal law and criminal proce-
dure codes. Virtually all of these decisions were taken in the panels and not by the
Plenum of the court.
It may be argued that the forerunner of the Russian constitutional court, Gor-
bachev's Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR, wisely chose to
concentrate its endeavors in the civil rights area, where it could acquire legal rec-
ognition and popular profile without running into serious trouble with the execu-
tive and legislature. The Zorkin court largely ignored this opportunity. Among
1997]
AM U J INT'L L. & POL'Y
the twenty-seven cases it decided in 1992 and 1993, we find only eight concerning
citizens' rights. The present constitutional court seems to have realized that a shift
of focus to that area may be a good way of regaining institutional prestige and le-
gitimacy.
Let me briefly address the third point: judicial referral. Article 101 of the law
on the constitutional court provides: "When examining a case at any level and
concluding that the statute applied or due to be applied in the said case does not
conform to the constitution, the court shall ask the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation to verify the constitutionality of the statute in question." Un-
fortunately, the Article says, "the court asks" (sic), and not "shall ask" (sic) or
"may ask."
On October 31st of last year, the Supreme Court Plenum sent a decree, or, as it
is also called, "a guiding explanation," to all lower courts concerning the applica-
tion of the constitution in the judicial process. There was a heated discussion pre-
ceding the adoption of this decree, some of which is clarified by an article written
by the Supreme Court President Libyadeau (phonetic), who explains that the Ple-
num took the position that judges are to approach the constitutional court only in
case of doubt concerning the interpretation of a clause of the constitution, and that
this judicial reference was a right and not a duty. Tamara Marshakova (phonetic),
Vice President of the Constitutional Court, comments on this Article of the law
and takes, not surprisingly, a much different view.
On the one hand, she claims, doubt on the part of a judge is not sufficient. He
must be convinced that the constitutional provision has been violated by the statute
he is about to apply. But if he is convinced, he cannot simply ignore the statute,
but he has an obligation to certify the question to the constitutional court.
Among the constitutional court's published decisions, we find only three judi-
cial referrals. This is regrettable and will hopefully improve over time, for judicial
referral of constitutional questions to specialized constitutional courts has been an
important part of European systems of constitutional review.
It is an important teaching tool of constitutional awareness and is, in several
variations, practiced very successfully in countries like Austria, Germany, Italy,
and also by the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
Given the legal and political culture in Russia today, we can hardly expect
judges in the regular court system to assume the stature and qualities of an Ameri-
can role model. In the light of their training and exercise of ordinary judicial func-
tions, they will not be fully responsive to the challenges of a liberal democratic
constitution without receiving guidance from a special constitutional court. It will
be difficult enough for them to uphold their independence in statutory interpreta-
tion vis-A-vis daily interference from executive law-making bodies.
Russian legislators seem to have been misguided when they reduced the central-
ized function of constitutional review by the constitutional court. And it is even
more deplorable that the present distribution of jurisdiction will inevitably leave
gaps on the one hand and lead to conflicts between the Supreme Court and the
constitutional court on the other hand.
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Let me conclude with two brief observations of a broader type. In a way, the
Russian constitutional court seems to have adjusted all too quickly to the new po-
litical realities. It avoids being drawn into political contexts which might force it
to take legal decisions that appear to be harmful to the president. The Chechnya
decision and the electoral law decision clearly demonstrate this point.
According to some Russian critics, the court has been bribed into submission to
the president. And indeed, the prudent majority opinion in the Chechnya case
seems to have been instantly rewarded by a presidential oucaz (phonetic) of Sep-
tember 15, 1995, showering a full complement of nomenclatura privilege, ranging
from cars to travel grants, vacation opportunities, expense accounts, medical care,
and shopping benefits on the members of the court and their families.
It will not be easy for the constitutional court to dispel the unfortunate impres-
sion that it has been bought. And sooner or later, it will not be able to shirk ad-
dressing questions that include political aspects if it will maintain-and I suppose
it has to-its function in building a constitutional culture that involves the con-
structive interaction of all players in the game.
Yet, for the immediate future, a low profile of the court may indeed make
sense. Avoiding political conflict with a powerful executive and sidestepping ju-
risdictional rivalry with a strengthened Supreme Court, the constitutional court
could gain that window of opportunity that seems, to me, to be most important,
namely to intensify the dialogue with scholars and undertake a serious effort in de-
veloping a cohesive body of constitutional doctrine.
Several promising beginnings have been made. Scholars and justices are pub-
lishing articles of improving quality. The court has just produced a useful com-
mentary on its own law. There have yet to appear critical notes on individual court
opinions in leading law journals. The future prestige and impact of the court will
primarily depend on the plausibility of legal arguments supporting its decisions
and the persuasive force they radiate.
And, here I chime in the chorus of all other observers of Eastern Europe. The
process will obviously be longer than all of us have expected at the outside, yet
there is some hope for ultimate success.
Thank you.
PANEL Il-AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: We have about a half hour for questions.
Please use the microphone and identify yourself.
PROFESSOR ROBERT SHAuRET: Bob Sharlet, Union College. A fascinating
panel. A quick general question to the whole panel, especially to the two rap-
porteurs on the East European courts. Did you find that the justices engage in ex-
tensive extrajudicial commentary before, during, and after cases? As we have
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found with both versions of the Russian court, Tumanov and Zorkin seem to be cut
from the same cloth in that respect.
But specifically, if I may, Herman, just ask a broader question of Kim, since she
challenged the audience with this fascinating question, this interesting concept of
juridical democracy. I'm absolutely intrigued. We have to rush right out and call
Robert Dole or somebody. But it would seem that Hungary, whatever it may be,
does not meet either the criterion of representative democracy or a constitutionalist
system, in the sense that the representative institution, the normal one, can be di-
rected by the court to produce certain legislation and, on the other hand, in the
sense that it fails on the constitutionalist side because the court itself appears to be
exempt from any control.
Are the judges recallable? Can you think of any situation which may deflate
the reputation of the court? Are we looking at a kind of extraordinary historical
bubble which won't be around after the year 2000? But excellent panel. Thank
you.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Could we turn to the question which is easier
and quicker answered about the extrajudicial statements. I think that's an easier -
MR. MARK BRZEZINSKI: Well, in the Polish case-shall we go
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: Yes, please.
MR. MARK BRZEZINSKI: No, well -
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: It's easier this way.
MR. MARK BRZEzINSKi: Okay. Yes. In the Polish case, there isn't as much
commentary on specific cases pending before the Tribunal, but at times there has
been commentary from the justices generally in terms of legislation the Parliament
is considering. At times, Tribunal justices have suggested in press that if a particu-
lar piece of legislation is passed, it would be inconsistent with the constitution.
Also, the Tribunal's justices have been very vocal about the restrictions on their
power of judicial review. For example, the president of the Tribunal has been
pushing Parliament for years to make the Polish Tribunal a legitimate constitu-
tional court, with its decisions on parliamentary statutes final and binding. And
that has been interesting.
The process of judicial selection in Poland has gone from a very apolitical
process to an extremely politicized process. In 1989, when the court's justices
were replaced, the process of putting new justices into the office was rather pro
forma, with not too much political overtones.
In 1993, there was much pressure on the parties leading the parliamentary coa-
lition to accept the candidates for the Tribunal bench offered by parties outside the
coalition. By then every one had learned of the Tribunal's political potential.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Yes, I liked your judicial statements. The
court has typically refrained from this. President Shoyum (phonetic) often gives
interviews in which he refers to the court as if it's this thing quite separate from
him, "The court does this. The court does that."
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And so I think that all the sort of public pronouncements coming from individ-
ual judges have been very judicial. They are very similar to the kinds of state-
ments you'd hear from American Supreme Court judges, who will give speeches
on the Court and its role and nothing personally critical and nothing like Zorkin's
kind of external criticism.
Now, one thing the court has done, which is quite interesting, is that the court-
and you can fault---one of my big criticisms of the court's operations that I didn't
say in my remarks is that they get these petitions and there's no procedure through
which the court ever announces what its docket is. So you don't actually know the
court is reviewing the law until it comes out with it. Now, there are a few cases,
particularly in abortion, and now in the euthanasia case which the court is consid-
ering, where there has been a kind of public pronouncement from the court that
they are considering this question.
And members of the court staff will organize sort of public fora at which lead-
ing academics will present papers, academic papers on the subject in question.
There was just one on euthanasia last fall. And that generates a kind of public de-
bate. And the Court waits for the public debate to settle down before they actually
issue a decision.
So, while they don't make a kind of judicial pronouncement about the case,
they will announce in some cases that they're considering a topic. And they want
there to be other pronouncements on the case coming from politicians and from
interested groups, and particularly from academic experts. So, in that way, the
Court has been very professional, I think, certainly by norms of West European
and North American courts.
Now, on the broader question about juridical democracy. What controls there
are on the court, in particular, I think is a very important question. This court is
like courts everywhere, which is to say it has no enforcement powers. There's a
sense in which the court is powerful only by virtue of its public status. And if the
court were to act in such a way that undermined the public status, then it would
cease to be this third rail of Hungarian politics, where politicians couldn't attack it.
And so really what the court has to do in order to maintain this status is to maintain
its good image as a professional body in the general public. So that's really the
constraint.
The other constraint is something which I think a lot of people have criticized
about-because we heard it this morning-about these East European constitu-
tions, which has to do with their ease of amendment. The Hungarian constitution
can be amended by a single-time two-thirds vote of the Parliament, which means
that any decision of the court can be overridden by an amendment to the constitu-
tion.
Now, the fact is the Parliament has only done that once, and that was in a case
before the first election. So, it was the outgoing Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party Parliament that did that. There has been no constitutional amendment that
has overridden a court decision since. But those are actually reasonably decent
checks, I think, on the court. There's also a procedure for removing judges for
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malfeasance in office, but not for something like decisions with which the Parlia-
ment disagrees. So, in fact, in the system, there are these checks kind of built into
it, I think, already.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Kim, isn't there also the check-as I recall
the Hungarian system, it allows a renewability of one term.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Yes. Yes.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: And I remember, in Czechoslovakia, Abner
Mikva-Judge Mikva saying, "You know, politics is always a part of the appoint-
ment process, but it needn't affect independence once they're there." On the other
hand, it's the renewal-it's the reelection that really can have a deleterious influ-
ence on independence. And I think Hungary allows one renewal.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Yes, it allows renewal. But all of the judges
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Now, whether it's-that's exercised, whether
that's pro forma, as it is in a lot of American states -
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Yes.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: -that may be, I don't know.
PARTICIPANT: What's their term?
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: It's a nine-year term, once renewable. But
there's a mandatory retirement age of seventy.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Yes.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: And most of the judges hit that before they
hit the nine-year, once renewable.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Although the president of the court will be
an interesting case -
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Yes.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: -because he was very young when ap-
pointed.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Yes.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: He was forty-seven -
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Yes, forty-seven.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: -- or something. And, in fact, what's now
happening is everybody thinks the president of the court wants to be the president
of the country, and they think he's got his sights-they think his sights are set
higher by being president. I said, "Well, wait a second. The president of the
country has no power. The president of the court actually"--well, anyway. So,
there is this renewable power. And it's also the case that the judges have been ap-
pointed in these staggered terms. So, that means that when the Parliament, as I
think is currently the case, has gotten annoyed with the court decisions but can't
publicly attack it, it has made the appointments more contentious.
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PROFESSOR HERM1AN SCHWARTZ: Are there any other comments on Bob Shar-
let's-Herbert-Mark--on the second question, about are we seeing a sort of ju-
ridical democracy?
It's my impression, by the way-and perhaps you might comment on this-that
this has been said, to some extent, of Germany, that the German constitutional
court has been so powerful and influential that the German Parliament, if there is a
hint of unconstitutionality in the enactment process, they will work very hard to
avoid that danger. But, Herb, you may know that far better than 1.
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: The Austrians are even more cautious.
There, the executive that introduces a bill has a special constitutional law service
that checks every bill for unconstitutionality. And these are constitutional law
scholars of high reputation sitting there and performing that job.
Now, just one word about legitimacy and democracy deficit of courts. In a
West European perspective, there is, of course, this question concerning the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in Luxembourg. And very interestingly, this court is defend-
ing its position. It's affected by this deficit.
There's the Intergovernmental Conference reviewing the Maastricht Treaty and
all that. And some of the defensive positions taken by the Luxembourg court
would be interesting to use as a comparison.
The justices go out and write articles about this and give speeches, say, "Well,
democracy isn't just decision-making by Parliament. Democracy is also upholding
civil rights. And look what we have done. We may have been deficient first, and
the German court had to tell us, 'You better watch it, or we'll not defer to your ju-
risdiction."' But now they are spearheading European human rights in a sense,
and they claim that this is one argument of democratic legitimacy in their favor.
They upgrade the role in their decisions of the European Parliament, which is also
a potential democratic ingredient.
And they say, interestingly, "The big number of requests for preliminary rulings
by national courts and the willingness of national courts attest to the fact that we're
accepted. And that's what democracy is all about"
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Other questions? Yes, sir.
MR. MrITLEBEELER: My name is Emmett V. Mittlebeeler. I'm a professor
emeritus of the American University. I have a question for all three of the partici-
pants. If there is a claim that the court has no jurisdiction-which I can see how
that would happen on occasion-who makes the final determination there, the
court itself?
MR. MARK BRZEZINSKI: The Tribunal has refused to hear cases concerning
political questions from the government agencies and government actors that have
the right to send cases to the Tribunal. And so, on jurisdictional questions like
that, the Tribunal has been very forthright in setting its own parameters.
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: And actually the Hungarian process is iden-
tical to the current Russian process, which is there's a secretariat that screens the
cases. And in fact, when I first went to the court and they gave me the full amount
1997]
AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y
of-reading all the letters, the first thing I wanted to see was how the Secretariat
screened things.
And really, most of these are quite uncontroversial judgment calls. Somebody
writes in and they have a personal complaint about a decision in an individual
case. The court has no jurisdiction over administrative decisions in individual
cases. And that's the kind of thing they're screening out typically.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Other questions? Yes?
MR. POMERANZ: Will Pomeranz, from the National Endowment for Democracy.
I just have a quick question for Professor Hausmaninger. You mentioned in your
talk that you foresee potential conflicts between the supreme court and the consti-
tutional court. I'm just curious if you could clarify a little bit more the separate
jurisdictions that these courts have and where you foresee potential conflict.
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: Yes. They're both in the European
tradition of having a centralized and specialized constitutional court for the pur-
pose of reviewing basically the constitutionality of statutes. The ordinary courts-
that is, a system of appeal that culminates in a supreme court-have jurisdiction in
civil and criminal matters. And they usually must take the statute as they find it
and certify constitutional questions to constitutional courts.
But the Russians modified this now. They created a mix of the American and
the continental systems. And it is my claim that this mix is not going to work well.
Because what's going to happen is that given the authoritarian structure of the
regular Russian court system and the role traditionally played by the Supreme
Court not to teach by precedent even if it's only defacto, but by generalized in-
structions to the lower courts, the burden of constitutional interpretation will be
readily assumed by the regular supreme court. And this is an inroad into the ju-
risdiction of the constitutional court which the latter will not put up with.
So, this is the conflict I see arising, and it has already arisen. And it's almost
impossible to avoid if, in this guiding instruction, the regular supreme court says if
the constitution says right to work, this is to be understood in such-and-such a
way. Well, this is clearly up to the constitutional court to say.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Mark, did you want to comment?
MR. MARK BRZEzNSKI: Yes. Herbert mentioned earlier, during his talk, this
symbiosis that's supposed to work within the judiciary in these East European
court systems. When regular courts come across a constitutional case, they are
supposed to send that case to the constitutional court, and how that's not happen-
ing in the case of Russia.
In the case of Poland, that's been the same, and I wanted to highlight that.
Regular court judges have been very reluctant to send cases on to the Constitu-
tional Tribunal.
And I've heard that that's the case in other Central European courts, in part be-
cause they have as their heritage a training that regular court judges are supposed
to stay away from constitutional matters.
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And that has affected the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, because
there are quite a few cases involving judicial procedure that never actually get to
the constitutional court,
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Kim?
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Yes. I wanted to say something about this,
also. Because I think the problem here isn't actually the legacy of Communism.
The problem is the legacy of positivism and this is the same problem that hap-
pened in Germany. It has happened in other countries where you've tried to im-
pose a constitutional court framework on a very positivist judiciary.
What you have to imagine that ordinary court judges will do is to say that
there's a possibility that a duly enacted law could be unconstitutional. Now, that
requires a kind of thinking about the law that says the process of enactment, the
positivist pedigree, isn't enough to make a law legitimate.
And that's exactly the second step, where you say, "And there's another re-
quirement for a law to be valid, and that is its correspondence with the constitution
is something that no positivist-trained judge will have ever encountered absent a
constitutional framework."
So, in this way, I think, actually, the prior experiences of civil law countries that
have grafted constitutional courts are very relevant, and that the countries in this
part of the world are not unique in this fashion.
There have been turf battles in Hungary between the supreme court and the
constitutional court, where the supreme court has taken the very positivist view
and the constitutional court was surprised.
And there were a couple of counselors on the court-in fact, including Jerry
Parmalee (phonetic), who was supposed to be initially on this panel but couldn't
attend-who wrote very stinging attacks against supreme court judgments even
though they worked at the constitutional court
And what just happened last year, since they had asked the Parliament to pass a
law that sort of specified the jurisdictional conflicts and Parliament didn't act, so
the president of the supreme court came over to the constitutional court and they
made a deal. They sort of figured out a division of labor, and they presented this
to the Parliament as a draft of a proposed law, which the Parliament has not yet
acted on. So, they're just acting as if it's a law until the Parliament tells them oth-
erwise.
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: May I add just one observation? The
system, strange as it may seem to Americans, seems to work quite well in Ger-
many and in the European Economic Union ("EEU").
In Germany, because due to the leading role of the constitutional court, the
regular court system has been constitutionalized in a sense of absorbing the values
very readily, so that there is a decreasing need for the regular judiciary to certify
questions. But that's a different situation. This court has been operative for so
many years and has adjudicated so many questions.
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And with EEU, we see, of course, differences from country to country, but par-
ticularly from Germany there have been hundreds of those questions submitted
and, perhaps surprisingly, from England, too. England follows EEU law painstak-
ingly. The English judiciary has made a turnaround which has been surprising and
has absorbed this very well. And it's this collaborative effort which can be a
model, but it takes a long time working up to that.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: On the other hand, although the English ju-
diciary may have, partly because of some new appointments that are rather surpris-
ing given the government, the EEU's jurisprudence has become a major political
battle in England, as a great many of the Euro-skeptics in the Tory Party have used
the power of the European court to tell the British what to do as an argument for
curbing the power of that court. And they have been trying to drum up with, I
think, Turkey and Greece and some other countries an effort to curb the European
courts.
Yes?
MR. QUiNN: Fred Quinn, Federal Judiciary. I wanted to ask the three panel-
ists-in many of these constitutions, international law has precedence over do-
mestic law. Now, how do you see this playing out in the jurisprudence of your
three courts? Is it going to be strict constructionist? Broad constructionist?
Where is this headed?
MR. MARK BRZEzINSKI: In Poland, the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal
doesn't allow the Tribunal to review the conformity of domestic legislation with
international treaties. Despite that, the Constitutional Tribunal has begun to high-
light in its case law whenever domestic legislation it is reviewing doesn't conform
with international conventions. But the Tribunal suggests that those international
treaties are binding. They always back their decisions with domestic legislation as
the binding doctrine.
Poland is a member of the European Convention on Human Rights. And the
European Convention assumes that a member state's judiciary is going to be one
of the first lines of defense for human rights. But as we were just discussing ear-
lier, the regular judiciary hesitates in sending constitutional cases to the constitu-
tional Tribunal, and it certainly hesitates to send any cases to Strausburg.
So, Fred, the role of international law domestically in the case of Poland is still
de minimis, despite the best efforts of the EU and the Council of Europe, to send
people to train the judiciary of Poland to begin to refer to the European Conven-
tion.
And on the streets of Warsaw sometimes there are people handing out copies-
in Polish, of course--of the European Convention on Human Rights, so that peo-
ple see that they have these rights. But, still, there isn't that nexus. There's a real
dissonance between international treaties and domestic action.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Kim?
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Well, in Hungary, Article 8 of the constitu-
tion requires that domestic law be brought into conformity with international trea-
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ties, and the constitutional court has the power to make those rulings. It hasn't
been very frequently invoked. But where it has been, the court has interpreted in-
ternational treaties-international law very broadly, and it has tended to strike
down domestic legislation.
That said, there's another way in which the Hungarian constitutional court at
least uses these international law provisions. And that is the court typically uses
international law as a device for interpreting the domestic constitution. That is to
say, if they have a question about what it means, they look at the usage of terms of
that sort in international practice and cite other constitutional courts and interna-
tional bodies for authority on the question of what the Hungarian constitutional
provision means.
And just one footnote on the institutionalization of this. The court recently
hired, in its general Secretariat, a man who had been a counselor at the European
Court of Human Rights. And his job, when any case comes in that bears on Euro-
pean human rights norms, is to write a memo for the court on European law on
that subject. And that's his full-time job within the court. So, it's considered very
important.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Yes?
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: The Committee of Constitutional Su-
pervision under Gorbachev made a very bold move in looking at the international
covenants and applying them directly, although they were-it was a question of
whether that was permissible under the constitutional doctrine.
The Constitutional Court of Russia has followed in this tradition. They have a
very progressive bill of rights. And in their human rights decisions, they still make
an occasional reference to the international covenants. But there is less of a need
to because this has, for large part, been written into the Russian constitution.
Now, they have signed the European Convention in February of this year. And
once they have ratified this, it becomes law of the land. And certainly the juris-
prudence of the Strausburg courts will be guiding, as it has to be, for all the others.
PROFESSOR HERIAN SCmHARTZ: Well, I think the last two questions.
MR. FISHMAN: David Fishman, George Washington University, Institute of
European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. A panel this morning discussed the in-
terrelationship between economic transformation stresses and the development of
the rule of law. Would each of the panelists care to comment on that with respect
to their own countries?
PROFESSOR KiM LANE SCHEPPELE: Well, last summer, when the Hungarian
constitutional court declared the IMF austerity program unconstitutional, it was a
big deal. The IF had been threatening to shut down its office in Budapest and
move out unless the government passed a program that brought transfer payments
under check. And the government had resisted this for a long time and then finally
caved and passed the budget.
And in my view, although this is-I don't have very good evidence for this, but
my view is that the Parliament passed this austerity plan in such a way that it was
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maximally unconstitutional. It practically had things written on it like "President
Shoyum's (phonetic) pet right, 'Here's the budget cut."' And so it was not surpris-
ing, after this was passed, that the constitutional court got this and within two
weeks issued a decision basically freezing the cutting of transfer payments.
And, then, the court came out with a whole series of decisions in which they,
like I said, developed-actually, a reasonably fiscally responsible way for Hun-
gary to maintain a kind of social safety net by subjecting transfer payments to
means tests and so forth.
When that happened, it generated a huge debate in the popular press about the
clash of economic expertise versus constitutional expertise. And in Hungary, this
debate is now very far along about their-a lot of people said, "Well, wait a sec-
ond. That's not a constitutional question. That's an economic question"--
including people who had previously been defenders of the court. And constitu-
tional lawyers were writing by saying, "Well, this is a matter of social rights."
It's too long to go into now, but there's a series of fourteen decisions in which
the court really lays out what's a rights question and what's a legitimate question
in which economic expertise has some play.
And now we're waiting to see when the empire strikes back.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SC-vARTZ: Herbert and then Mark. Okay.
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: Well, unfortunately, I wasn't here to
follow the course of the morning's discussion, so I may be well off track. When
looking at Russia and the relationship of rule of law and the economic system,
looking at the past, you had two economic systems, the official economy exploita-
tion by nomenclatura, which means service, feudalism, nobility-type exploitation.
And you had the underground economy, a Mafia-type exploitation.
Now we have three economies, the two old ones firmly in place and a small
sliver of legitimate economy in the middle. And unless this considerably expands,
I don't see much of a chance for rule of law, for judicial independence, and all
that. They will be wavering from one to the other. They will be crushed in the
middle.
MR. MARK BRZEznSKI: One of the things that the Polish Tribunal focused on
since 1989 is a line ofjurisprudence it calls "vested rights jurisprudence." And the
Tribunal's reasoning is that, in the post-Communist era, one of its principal roles is
to prevent the new government from taking away pension rights, social security
rights, unemployment benefits that were legally "vested" during the Communist
era. And through this vested rights jurisprudence, the Tribunal has struck down a
number of state budgets that were in keeping with IMF guidelines but weren't
continuing pensions that had been legally vested in the communist era. And so
there has been this collision on socioeconomic issues between the Tribunal and the
government.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Last question.
MR. BABB: For my first question, I would not like to identify myself. Professor
Scheppele, would you please give us a cite for that case striking down the auto-
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mobile boot law?
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: This case hasn't been translated yet. I have
to look up the official publication number. And I just haven't -
MR. BABB: I'll give you a call on it.
PROFESSOR Kai LANE SCHEPPELE: Okay. That's fine.
MR. BABB: My name is Craig Babb. Would you please give us a quick review,
all of you, of the gender and ethnic makeup of the courts; and whether, either in
fact or in perception, there is any impact of that on decisions of the courts?
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHwARTZ: That's easy enough. Why don't we just start
at that end?
MR. MARK BRZEzINSKI: In Poland. there is one woman on the Tribunal. And
there is essentially a seat on the Tribunal that is considered "the woman's seat" in
the sense that when the justices were replaced in 1989, the seat that was vacated by
a woman justice was filled by another new woman justice. And when that woman
justice, Janina Zakrzewska died last year, she was replaced. in a special session,
with a regular female court judge who's now on the Tribunal. And in this sense,
the diversity is not that great. But I think that, with its gender discrimination cases
and other equality cases, the Tribunal is trying to compensate for inequality that
exists in Poland through its jurisprudence.
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: Of the original 13 members of the Rus-
sian court, there was one woman and two people with ethnic background. Today,
this has imperceptibly changed. There's another woman, and there may be an-
other-well, another justice that may be considered someone with an ethnic back-
ground. It's so difficult to say because many of those identify with the Russian
culture. And I don't think there is anyone on the court who, for instance, in the
Chechnya decision or in any other ethnically colored problem, would project him-
self as a defender of an ethnic against the Russian culture.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Does that mean, Herbert, that basically-just
to clarify what you're saying, they're all essentially Russian?
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: Yes, I would say so.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Right. Following through on what has been
happening even before this period?
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANiNGER: Mm-hmm.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHVARTZ: Kim?
PROFESSOR KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: Well, in Hungary, there are no women.
There is a woman who is the director of the Institute of State and Law of the Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences who is mentioned as a constant possible nominee.
But so far there have been no women. And there has been no ethnic diversity of
any particular note.
The most striking thing on the Hungarian court is that there are no Jewish
judges, despite the fact that there are a substantial number of Jewish constitutional
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law experts who would have been in the pool that would have been considered.
But there is diversity of another sort, and that is the nominations process has
guaranteed in some ways diversity of political parties. So, every political party in
the Parliament, save one, has at least one person on the court who is kind of the
judge they talk to, even though judges weren't allowed to be party members before
they were put onto the court.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Thank you very much. Mark?
MR. MARK BRzEziNsKI: Well, I was just going to add that in Poland there are
no Jewish judges on the Polish court, despite the fact that there are eminent Polish
jurists who are Jews. And there are also no ethnic Lithuanians, ethnic Ukrainians,
and so forth. So, it's a very homogenous body.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCI-WARTZ: And I take it that's true in Russia as well?
PROFESSOR HERBERT HAUSMANINGER: I'm not sure. I couldn't answer that
question.
PARTICIPANT: No Chechnyans, for sure.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Thank you very much.
PANEL III
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN EXPERTS IN ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Although it may look like a somewhat trun-
cated panel, it really isn't. Dimitrina Petrova will be up in a second. She is trying
to disprove all the anti-tobacco advertising downstairs.
And I gather that Ambassador Schifter is caught in what has become one of the
worst traffic jams in America, which is a problem on Massachusetts Avenue, on
his way up here. So, I assume he will be here. And when he comes, we'll just fit
him in.
Our last panel deals with a matter that is of special concern to many of the
people in this room, many of the people we have worked with for many years.
And that is this remarkable sort of pilgrimage of Westerners moving into Central
Europe, often at the request of the people there who are looking for models. And
in many cases that has involved an almost bizarre mix of cultures, different legal
systems, civil law, common law, different ways of thinking, different mind-sets.
Those of us who have been involved in this realize that it's a very difficult
process. The same word doesn't mean to a common law background what it
means to a civil law background, what a "judge" means, or the like. And so we
thought, as our final panel today, we would discuss that from differing perspec-
tives. The one thing that all of the people on the panel have in common is that
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they all have been involved in this process.
And I'm sure you sort of heard all of the superlatives you need for today. But
the truth is the moderator of this panel, Judge Patricia Wald, really is entitled to
them as much as anybody else who has appeared today. Judge Wald is one of the
most distinguished judges in America. Many of us think that there are very, very
few peers for her. She has been a lawyer in almost every branch of government-I
guess maybe not the legislative branch, except her work has brought her in contact
with that.
When she graduated from law school, in a way she served her first apprentice-
ship with one of the great legal minds of the century, Judge Jerome Frank of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
In the 1960s, she was a member, as I recall, of the D.C. Crime Commission.
And after attending to the raising of five children, became a litigator, did public
interest work for a lot of the public interest groups in town. Then, when President
Jimmy Carter was filling his slots, one of the easiest slots to fill was to ask Patricia
Wald to become assistant attorney general in charge of legislation, where she did a
superb job. I know because I was on the other end. I was working on the Hill at
the time. I remember one night Pat was at my house for a dinner party, and it was
about 11 o'clock on a Saturday night. And the phone starts ringing, and phone
calls start taking place. That was then.
And then, in 1979, Patricia Wald was appointed to the bench on the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the second most important court in the United States. And her performance
there has been extraordinary. Again and again-often, I'm afraid, in the minor-
ity-she has spoken out for human rights, for constitutional government, for
playing by the rules. She was Chief Judge during much of this period. And, then,
when she retired from being the Chief Judge, she went back to being a member of
the Court, which, of course, she had always been. During this entire time, there
was a steady stream of really quite penetrating, insightful scholarship on a whole
range of topics.
And starting around, I guess, 1990 or 1991, she was called on by many of us
and by many others to participate in the process of talking and trying to help create
an independent judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe. She has been back and
forth to Europe on this, has given many lectures, workshops, and the like, has
written about this. So, I can't think of a better person to moderate this panel.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: That introduction was awesome, Herman. As you
said, for the last panel of the day, we're going to treat the intriguing subject of the
appropriate role of foreigners in establishing the rule of law in newly emerging
democracies.
Some of the questions we're going to explore are, do we foreigners have a con-
tribution to make, and what is it? When do we overstep our bounds or not do
enough? How does our inevitable ignorance of native culture, language, mores,
and history impede our efforts, and what can we do to mitigate it?
In the case of the United States, as the participants in the prior panel mentioned,
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does the pervasiveness of our own common law background make much of our
experience and orientation irrelevant for civil law countries?
Now, today, we've got three battle-scarred-two so far, but I hope a third bat-
tle-scarred veteran will appear soon-examples of activist intervention with us to
discuss their experiences and perspectives.
And the format we're going to use is that each one of the speakers will open for
ten to fifteen minutes, telling us their most basic observations on this topic of the
appropriate role, the up side, the down side of out-of-country experts in the de-
mocracy-building process. Then, I hope we'll cross-connect between us for a bit.
And, finally, we'll take questions from the floor.
So, our first speaker will be Mark Ellis. Now, I might mention one connection
here, in the interests of full and fair disclosure, that Herman didn't. Mark Ellis,
who's our first speaker, is the executive director of CEELI, a project of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. Actually, I'm on the Executive Board, and many, many of
my trips to Eastern Europe have been made on CEELI's behalf.
And in his capacity as executive director of CEELI, Mark serves as special
counsel to the Coalition for International Justice. That's a project which provides
technical assistance to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.
He's also an adjunct professor at Catholic University. He's been a consultant to
the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. He's got degrees in
economics and law, and was twice a Fulbright Scholar at the Economic Institute in
Zagreb, Croatia.
He's also a recipient of grants to the European Union. And he has represented
the United States on three separate lecture series in Central and Eastern Europe,
sponsored by the United Stated Information Agency; and has -as they always say
at the bottom of these resumes-publications too numerous to mention. Mark?
MR. MARK ELLIS: Pat, thank you. I will keep my comments brief in order to hit
on some of the important points that we were asked to talk about. I remember,
when we first started CEELI five years ago, I had no idea what we could do, what
we should do. We were being besieged with requests, primarily on constitutional
drafting, because that was the first area of importance for many of the countries in
Central and Eastern Europe.
As I was calling around, before I got to Herman, I contacted a professor out in
California, a well-known professor who I had read about when I was in law
school. And I told him my dilemma, that we had been requested-by, I think at
that time, Bulgaria-to assist on some constitutional drafting. He said not to
worry, he would help. And I hung up the phone, very relieved by his commitment.
Two days later I received by mail a suggested model constitution. And in it, I
looked on page 15, and it said "The Constitution of the Republic of 'blank."' And
so, therefore, all we needed to do was to fill in the name of the country and we
were pretty well set. And I thought to myself, well, I don't know much about Bul-
garia, but I don't think that's the way to do it. I've thought about that experience
many times since that was the first time I asked a fundamental question: How do
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you go about providing technical legal assistance? I assure you CEELI has gone
through a lot of trials and tribulations. But I think we've learned a lot, and, hope-
fully, I will now be able to impart some of those lessons to you.
The first question was could we provide the assistance? And if so, what were
the basic tenets that were important when going forward to provide, perhaps na-
ively, technical legal assistance to these countries? So we set down these tenets,
and I still believe them to be the basic foundation for providing technical assis-
tance in any developing country.
Number one, we felt it was important to be responsive. Now, you may say that
this tenet is fairly basic, and should be a part of any technical assistance project.
But I assure you that's not the case in many of the experiences I've seen.
Ideally, what CEELI wanted to do was to secure representatives of the pro-
grams they wanted to implement, and then to work with them in designing the
program. This started a partnership, and that was absolutely essential for a suc-
cessful technical assistance program from the United States or anywhere else.
A second tenet was to utilize a comparative approach. And I give credit to
Herman for this, because the first project we ever did in then-Czechoslovakia, he
suggested bringing in some West Europeans to insure that the views were not just
from the American perspective. And this was absolutely correct. From that mo-
ment on, we've never initiated a project where we didn't include West Europeans.
Having West Europeans involved was essential, because it brought credibility to
our program and what we were trying to accomplish.
The third tenet adopted by CEELI-one I still feel very strongly about-is the
pro bono/conflict-of-interest aspect of the program. CEELI has very strict con-
flict-of-interest guidelines, and it's apro bono project. I believe it has brought us a
significant degree of credibility. We've seen and we've read instances where con-
suiting firms have not been as sensitive to those issues, and I think that has some
very negative consequences on U.S. assistance programs. Hopefully, CEELI has
been able to balance that perspective.
With the basic tenets now adopted, we set forth to design several modes of as-
sistance. In designing the programs, we felt that one of the most important things
for us was long-term commitment. We did not believe it was sufficient to have a
series of programs, or seminars, or conferences; you had to be there, you had to
commit long-term. Therefore, CEELI started the Liaison Program, where U.S.
attorneys volunteer to live in-country for a period of one or two years. The liai-
sons direct the project and this element of our project is the most important
We have a number of other modes of assistance-workshops, draft law assess-
ments, U.S.-based training law and sister law school programs. Without the
long-term presence of liaisons living day-to-day, not at the Sheraton, but among
the people whom we are partnered with, CEELI would not have gained credibility,
nor would the program been successful.
With the modes of assistance now in place, you have to design a substantive
program that will have an impact for this. And that gets back to what Pat asked
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and what Herman asked earlier, about whether the United States can play a role in
providing legal assistance in a civil law system. And the answer is yes, but you
have to do it carefully. And you have to select the comparative advantage that the
United States has that is consistent with the civil law system in the particular
country that you're working in.
Let me give you an example: judicial restructuring. Now, the judiciary is quite
different, as you would imagine, between the common law and civil law systems.
And so, at first breath, you might say, "Well, we have very little to offer in that re-
gard." But that is wrong. We have a great deal to offer. We designed a program
based on the principles of an independent judiciary as defined by the U.N. princi-
ples.
So, when CEELI talked about creating an independent judiciary, the need to
have protections in the constitution and in the judicial laws, CEELI was able to
provide this type of assistance by working with the countries on the drafting of a
constitution, and new laws focused on the judiciary. This was the first step.
Another U.N. principle on the independence of the judiciary is judicial associa-
tions. And so, rather than attempt to assist these countries in every aspect of creat-
ing an independent judiciary, we selected an aspect that had a comparative advan-
tage: judges' associations. We have now helped create these associations in
roughly six countries. Another area which we thought we could assist was
(inaudible) training. In this way we could bring together continuing legal educa-
tion programs within the association building.
And finally, we have tried to assist in improving the issues of tenure and dis-
cipline. We were not as successful because these issues are really the responsibil-
ity of the government, and primarily the Ministry of Justice.
And although we frequently talked about the importance of these issues, it was
much more difficult to convince the government or the Ministry of Justice to im-
plement reforms in those areas. Fortunately, judges' associations have picked
those issues and have moved them forward, and I think that's absolutely crucial.
The last question I would like to address is whether foreign lawyers can con-
tinue to make a significant contribution through the provision of technical legal
assistance? And I say, yes, if we follow four conditions: First, we have to know
our place when we provide assistance to these countries. There's a lot of "isms"
that we face in these countries: Socialism, Communism.
There is also the "I-ism." That is when I hear U.S. and West European profes-
sors, and lawyers as well say, "Well, am I really responsible for drafting the Bul-
garian Constitution or the Constitution of Albania?" And I cannot tell you how
many times I hear individuals here in the United States and elsewhere take credit
for drafting legislation in a foreign land. That is the surefire way of ruining one's
credibility.
The second condition is the long-term, on-the-ground commitment. And I be-
lieve any program that has its premise on creating a long-term commitment in a
country can be successful. The short-term fly-in, fly-out programs do not work
[12:1
REFOLUTION
unless it's consistent with and part of the long-term objectives that you have es-
tablished. Workshops and seminars that are frequently used-and CEELI cer-
tainly uses them-can be successful if they are part of a long-term program. For
instance, CEELI worked closely in the creation of the Bosnian Constitutional
Court
So, we've created a series of programs, including workshops and seminars that
were integrated with CEELI's on-ground liaisons. And that, to me, was absolutely
crucial for the success of the project.
Third, know your limitations, including problems with the language. One of
the questions you might have is, can Americans be successful in an environment in
Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union where they do not have
the language ability?
I think the answer is definitely yes. I wasn't certain about this question five
years ago, when I started with this program. But it clearly works. Some of the
best people we've had on the ground did not have the language ability, but they
were extremely successful. And so, yes, it's helpful if you have language capa-
bilities, and we certainly seek individuals who have foreign language knowledge.
But it is absolutely not essential, and I'm convinced on that.
And, finally, it's important that technical assistance programs not turn into a
large taxpayer program to subsidize lawyers and law professors.
I'll finish with a letter that I received from a person who had been providing
technical legal assistance with a consulting firn. We talked to her about the pos-
sibility of doing some work for CEELI in Bulgaria. So she sent me a letter saying:
"I've reviewed the facts, but the figures, the pro bono figures that we talked about,
seem to be incorrect. The right figures for my involvement in this project are as
follows: Four and a half months' work at $14,000 a month, plus travel and lodging
expenses, plus office and translator, Or one week residence in Bulgaria each
month at $4,000 a week for the week and the four days' travel time back and forth
from Indianapolis for as long as needed. Travel expenses, first-class hotel, office
and translator are also to be provided. One week expenses and $3,000 for a stay in
Washington to review the management of the Patent Office."
And so, she goes on to describe that. That was not quite the way CEELI does
business.
And I don't think that should be the model for the technical assistance program.
Because you'll note, when you're working in Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, that one of the biggest criticisms echoed by our hosts is the
high-paid consultants that are running around with cars and living in luxurious
homes. And, hell, if a third of that money was reallocated to actual programs,
imagine the success of the programs.
Those are some of the lessons I've learned. I'll be glad to answer questions at
the end of the panel.
Thank you.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Thanks, Mark. Our next participant is Dimitrina
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Petrova who is the executive director of the European Roma Rights Center, which
is an international human rights organization that defends the legal rights of the
Roma, more colloquially known as "the Gypsies," in Europe. Her center is based
in Budapest. And before she became director there, she directed the Human
Rights Project in Bulgaria, which also provided legal services for the Roma mi-
nority in that country.
She received the Human Rights Award of the Litigation Section of the ABA in
1994. She has also been a coordinator in Southeastern Europe for the International
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. She also teaches philosophy, law, human
rights, and, I'm sure, various other subjects. Dimitrina?
Ms. DIMITRINA PETROVA: Thank you. I was only on the receiving end of assis-
tance provided from the West, and particularly from the United States, on estab-
lishing and consolidating the rule of law in Eastern Europe.
Then my life turned in such a way that I am now in a position where the success
of my organization, which is an international human rights organization, crucially
depends on what strategy I will adopt on exactly this issue that is discussed in this
panel, namely how the expertise of foreign lawyers will be provided.
My really shocking discovery, some time ago, was that there was a need for a
staff attorney to be employed in my organization, and I published a job advertise-
ment. I ran it once in The Economist and once in The Chronicle of Higher Educa-
tion, and I did not expect that many Western lawyers would show interest. In re-
ality, before I stopped counting, just in the four weeks that followed the
publication of this ad, I had about four hundred applications from the United States
only. I was really surprised.
I shared this with Herman, who happened to be in Budapest at that time. And
he said, "You should not be surprised." There are so many people, like
free-floating lawyers in the United States or lawyers who are mid-career, very
good public law litigators who would be very happy to come and spend some time
in Central Europe and devote their work to the most threatened minority, the truly
transnational European minority, the twelve million strong Roma minority. Ac-
tually, it's estimated at twelve million in the world. It's ten million in Europe
only. That was a real discovery for me. So now, I understand that there is a po-
tential for foreign assistance.
And, then, the problem is, what should be the strategy? How should these law-
yers-how should their willingness to be exploited, be used, so that public interest
law for Roma can be--can make headway in Europe?
However, the more general issue of foreign assistance provided by foreign law-
yers, to Central and Eastern Europe, I see as a question which cannot be answered
simply. It's not just the question of whether foreigners who are coming to our part
of the world can make a contribution. It's also the question of the various ways in
which Western lawyers have influenced the rule of law in Central and Eastern
Europe.
I, for example, would argue that there is a stronger exposure to rule of law val-
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ues when the East European lawyers are brought to this country in particular for
terms of, like, one month or more, placed at law firms or at public interest law
groups, and observe the daily work of their American colleagues. This approach
has the limitation that very few people can be selected and brought over to the
United States, or to West European countries, to learn in this way. And here,
probably, everything would depend on who is selected, whether opinion-makers
are selected, whether people who have a potential when they return to their coun-
tries, and if they return to their countries, to spread their experience among col-
leagues and to address realities there.
As to lawyers being invited in various forums as consultants, or as employed
persons, or as lecturers, visitors, etcetera, to Eastern Europe, this is a strategy
which has this advantage: that it exposes broader audiences-broader as, in this
foundation's jargon, "the target groups" are much larger. Because, then, the West-
ern lawyer who visits our region comes in contact in one way or another not only
with lawyers, who are colleagues, in the very strict sense of the word, who work in
the same area of law, but also with politicians, NGOs, and very often with disad-
vantaged groups of people.
And the effect of the presence of the Western lawyers in Eastern Europe has to
be estimated not only as an effect on colleagues, including practicing attorneys and
judges, and prosecutors and constitutional justices-court justices, but also they
have a much broader influence.
It's the same issue whether we, when we discuss the role of foreigners in estab-
lishing and consolidating the rule of law in Eastern Europe, talk about things like
assistance in the constitution-making or in the legislative process, or whether we're
talking about curriculum development in law schools, or whether we are talking
about litigation, in helping litigation, or the development of public interest law in
Eastern Europe, or whether we are talking about commercial law, or whether we
are talking about different areas.
For example, there are areas in which the potential of Western lawyers to influ-
ence processes in Eastern Europe is much bigger, such areas like the oversight and
the accountability of the security services. This is one issue where the expertise of
some Western lawyers is indispensable in Eastern Europe.
This has to be very strongly highlighted, because there is nobody-there is no
force, no political force, even in the political opposition in many countries, which
has the standards-which has been ever in contact with the standards that have
been developed in this respect in Western countries, especially in some Western
European countries such as the Netherlands.
I would like to point out, answering Herman's questions for the panel, very
briefly, what are the areas in which Western lawyers participating in programs, be
it people who come to our region or people who are involved in contacts with
Easterners who come here to this country, what are the strongest points of influ-
ence that Western lawyers have on Eastern lawyers and on the public generally?
And then, I want to say a few things about whether foreign lawyers could have
achieved more.
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On the first question, I think that, first of all, I should say nobody expects the
foreign lawyers, in interaction in some way with Eastern Europe, to help in those
areas of law which involve knowing in detail the substance and procedure of the
East European legal systems. This is not really the help that is needed by the local
lawyers.
In fact, what really makes a difference, and what justifies dollars invested into
this effort, is the fact that Western lawyers reveal for us a very different attitude to
law. I would specify this argument in two ways. One is that, for Eastern European
lawyers, it is a real discovery to see that the Western lawyers do not regard their
own work as something which is a historical solving of a problem, of a life crisis,
or anything that can happen in the 19th century model of a workshop, where
somebody can walk in and have all problems solved, starting from shaving and
dental services and everything at once. There's a lot of this mentality among East
European lawyers, that they can be approached for everything. Contact with
Western lawyers, first of all, demonstrates the very high specialization of law, and,
therefore, brings responsibility into the way in which Eastern European lawyers
see themselves.
Secondly, and much more importantly, I think that what our lawyers generally
lack is a vision of law as a tool of social change, or progressive social change.
They see law much more in the old Communist tradition. They still do, and it will
take generations to change this. They still see law as a tool of political expedi-
ency. I have observed this. And even though there are heroic attempts by individ-
ual courts, or individual lawyers to overcome this Communist assignment to law,
this is not generally the case in the region.
Western lawyers just provide a very different perspective on what law is.
Western lawyers give a sense of social responsibility. They give a sense of how
law can participate in progressive social change, especially in areas such as human
rights law, or, more generally, public interest law, environmental law, and con-
sumer law.
These are, especially for me, the areas where Western lawyers bring their-not
so much their expertise and their concrete knowledge of exactly how to litigate a
case-but they bring a very different attitude to the role that law has to play in so-
ciety. This may sound too general to justify expanding, but I think that exposure
to this other attitude of law, non-Communist attitude to law, is more important in
the end than any concrete expertise, which, by the way, as time goes, will more
and more be needed.
For example, more and more Eastern European lawyers will need help, in the
form of briefs and comparative legal analysis on concrete issues, especially in the
area of nondiscrimination law. In Eastern Europe, nondiscrimination legislation is
really very limited. And, insofar as it exists, it's very rarely a subject of litigation.
So, this is, for me, the focus, the most important role that Western lawyers have
played.
Together with this goes a totally different attitude that Western lawyers seem to
have to the limitations to law reform rooted in politics, in current politics, and in
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the state structures, in the machine of the state. Under Communism, the principle
of statism was overwhelming. In post-Communism, there is a strong inertia to re-
gard everything, even such things as success in life, as connected, closely con-
nected, to a career in the state.
The dignity of the independent lawyer is still to be built. The judge does not
have the aura of honor, of dignity, of honesty, that ajudge in the United States has,
somehow, almost by definition, because of a long history of tradition. There was
nothing respectable about Communist-time judges, who were really tools of politi-
cal will. And this is part of this first argument.
And then there's something else which should be mentioned as well. Western
lawyers, when they interact with East European lawyers, reveal a healthy skepti-
cism toward majority rule and an emphasis on the rule of law, as opposed some-
times, to majority rule. For East European lawyers, majority rules. Despite what
Kim said about Hungary--and I'm sure that what she said is true about the consti-
tutional justices, but not about the judiciary in general-lawyers themselves do not
dare oppose majority rule. They do not dare see themselves as guardians of lasting
values. And they do not see themselves as a container of morality. Lawyers are
not an exception of the general public, which held this-or used this cynicism to
all-which was typical of Communism. Lawyers shared this cynicism to all.
And when they are confronted, challenged by a Western colleague, and when
they see how seriously a Western lawyer takes herself or himself, that's a problem
for them to solve. That's a personal problem about their place in the world.
Another positive aspect of the influence of Wester lawyers that I would like to
point out is that Western lawyers-and this is specifically in public interest law,
and especially in public interest litigation-bring a number of approaches to public
interest litigation which do not exist, but can be introduced, in Eastern Europe.
For example, they bring a number of ideas of how to liberalize the standing to
sue, which is extremely limited in Eastern Europe. They bring a number of ideas,
approaches, on the right to legal counsel-on access to justice, especially for the
indigent; a number of ideas about the role of judicial review. These are ideas, the
exchange of which is revolutionizing for litigators in Eastern Europe. Because, as
I said, the problem is not so much legal expertise. The problem is that
post-Communism, very much like Communism, is still a closed society. And the
problem is how to open society, how to broaden the horizons.
So that if I have to generalize about the role of foreign lawyers in Eastern
Europe, I should say that their very presence relativizes the views, the certainties
of East European lawyers, broadens their horizons, so that what had seemed nor-
mal and universal in the domestic law, now starts to look, to the local lawyer,
strange and arbitrary; and therefore, open to change.
I would like to have -
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: About five minutes more?
Ms. DIMrTjNA PETROVA: Okay. So, I would also like to say a few words
about what could be done, more into this direction of positive influence by foreign
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lawyers, areas which have been relatively less exploited in terms of foreign assis-
tance. In the first place, as I mentioned, there are limitations to litigation that come
from the limitations of standing.
Western lawyers should be mobilized to think, together with Eastern lawyers,
about class action suits. Nobody really, to my knowledge, has come to Eastern
Europe with this very ambitions idea of how to, at least, imitate class action.
One finds in the Eastern Europe of today so many disadvantaged groups. Roma
is one example, but also other disabled people, gays, women, and ethnic minori-
ties. Some ethnic minorities are more disadvantaged than others, of course. But
generally, ethnic minorities throughout the region are also a special group. These
groups do not have venues to remedy when their rights are violated. I'm speaking
about individuals belonging to these groups, in the language of this, (inaudible) on
political rights. I am not tailing about collective rights at the moment.
But in any case, there has been no attempt yet in Eastern Europe to introduce
class action. Procedural possibilities for these do exist, but there is no strategy to
achieve this. This is one area which I would like to think about and to have some-
body good from this country as well. And I hope I do have already. Out of the
hundreds that did apply, I really think I chose somebody good to do this.
Then, another in which more could be done is the question about the procuracy
throughout Eastern Europe. Procuracy has no counterpart in the institutional ar-
rangement of the United States or Western Europe. It's a specific phenomena
which differs from country to country. But it's a part of the judiciary, and it's part
of the judiciary by law.
It has very, very strong powers. The problem with the procuracy, if I am al-
lowed to put it not in legal terms, because these are different in the different coun-
tries. But the general problem is that the procuracy in Eastern Europe symbolizes,
expresses, in an absolutely monopolistic way, public interest. And public interest,
at that, is considered to be identical with state interest. And it's the procuracy that
owns opinion about what is the state interest. That is the public interest.
And this has, again, a historic tradition in Communism, where the very idea of
privately organized public interest law is an absurdity. In the Communist
mind-set, this is a contradiction in objective. Because, by definition, it is the state
that expresses the public interest, and there is a hierarchy of interest. The state-
that is, the state of the totality-comes first, in its interest. And then, the group
interest has to be subjected to the whole, and the individual interests come as third.
So, therefore, any attempt to express group interest threatens the whole.
And the procuracy was, under Communism, and still is that institution which
concentrates too much power. Plus, it has conflicting roles in the criminal proce-
dure. It has, at the same time, the role of a party to the case, and of executive su-
pervisor of the proceedings, in most countries. Probably Ukraine is the extreme
case, where even the new procuracy law repeats the same attitude to this institution
which was introduced by Peter the Great, and then reinforced by Lenin.
A third area, which I think Western lawyers have a lot to bring into Eastern
[12:1
REFOLUTION
Europe, is the way in which cases can be solved at the pre-court level. Allow me
put it this way: lawyers in Eastern Europe are identified apart from judges and
prosecutors. "A lawyer"---as Herman said, words mean different things-"the
lawyer" is the attorney. This is the person who goes to court.
We do not have the whole class, the whole professional class which exists here,
of lawyers who deal with cases that may be solved prior to the courtroom. This
whole field does not exist. And I know of many attempts now, at least two very
good attempts, one in the Czech Republic and one in Poland, where attorneys
come together and start to fund-raise in order to create something like-they call it
"arbitration" probably, not wrongly, but in a way that does not easily translate.
But what they mean is they want to have a way to reduce the enormous caseload
on the courts. So this is also one thing that is very important.
And one last thing I want to say is that we, all of us--repeatedly, all the time, at
all conferences, we keep making, very obstinately, the same mistake of talking
about one in the same region when we refer to Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union. Even each of those, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, in-
side is not, I think, one region. The need for reinforcing the rule of law is different
in all these places.
And unfortunately, countries like Hungary, where I also live now, are packed
with Westerners. You have as many Western experts as you want to find. The
problem there is to find jobs for them sometimes. Because, very often, I don't
mean just lawyers, but experts of all sorts, tend to go to beautiful cities like Prague
and Budapest, where living is, as it was said, closer to the Western standard. But if
you move to the East, where the need is really great-for example, if you go to
Ukraie, yes, there are efforts, also by the ABA, there are projects.
But this is really very significant, but it's not enough. It's not enough for a
country like Ukraine, where there are at least twenty law schools, where the prob-
lem is not so much the capital city, but the provinces.
Russia is also a huge problem, let alone Central Asia, where, as it was men-
tioned this morning, we have dictatorships, and one doesn't see many lawyers
there. There is no rush of Western lawyers to go there.
Thank you.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Our third speaker, the Honorable Richard Schifter,
is special assistant to the President, and counselor on the staff of the National Se-
curity Council. He has previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Hu-
man Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Deputy U.S. Representative in the U.N. Se-
curity Council with the rank of Ambassador, and U.S. Representative to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission. In 1992, Dick was awarded the State Department's
Distinguished Service Medal.
But perhaps one his most outstanding achievements is that he and I were in the
same Yale Law School class of 1951.
AMASSADoR RiCHARD SCHMTER: Yes, indeed, it was in 1951 that we left New
Haven. Let me start out by telling you a story that just came to mind, that is
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somewhat illustrative of the problems that we have in Eastern Europe. When I
served as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, I had the opportunity of
getting to know well my Soviet counterpart, a deputy foreign minister with whom
I became very friendly. And my wife and I got to know his wife, as well. And he
once came to Washington. And I remember driving the wife of this deputy foreign
minister around town.
And as we started talking, somehow, in the course of our conversation, I
mentioned the case, if you remember it, if anyone remembers it, Coplon v. United
States. If you don't remember it, Judy Coplon was an employee of the United
States Mission to the United Nations, in late 1940s, early 1950s. And, as it turned
out, she had fallen in love with a member of the Soviet Mission, who was, as it
turned out, connected with the Special Services of the Soviet Union. She began
turning quite a bit of information-documents over to him and was, in due course,
arrested, tried, and convicted.
An appeal was taken. And when the case went up to the Second Circuit, one of
the points that was made was that the initial information that reached the FBI about
Judy Coplon was a result of an illegal wiretap. Under the doctrine of the tainted
fruit of the poison tree, the conviction was reversed, she married her lawyer and
lived happily ever after.
I explained all of this to my friend from the Soviet Union, who, by the way, had
always been suspected by our embassy of being a closet Democrat. And when
Gorbachev came along, she indeed came out of the closet and is well-known as a
Democrat.
Her response was: "How awful. She betrayed your country." And, then I had
to explain to her that, as far as our country was concerned, it was more important
to stick with the rule that the Justice Department has to go to court to get a court
order for a wiretap, rather than having the FBI just put a wiretap on.
Well, I'm just suggesting that this, indeed, is one of those clear divides with
somebody who really genuinely believes in democracy and freedom. This was
something she just couldn't quite grasp. And that now takes me back to the gen-
eral proposition that we are discussing here.
Having left Yale, I spent quite a number of decades in the private practice of
law. And like all of us, I thought I understood the importance of an independent
judiciary of a system based on the rule of law. But it was only when I became in-
volved in international human rights work that I really fully appreciated what it
meant. Let me tell you how it first really grabbed my attention. And that was in
the context of Latin America.
During the 1980s, Latin America basically began to turn from these military
dictatorships to democracy. And one country after another would have genuine,
free elections, in which the executive and the legislature of the country in question
would be chosen.
But there was something missing. And what was missing was an independent
court system that could really discharge the functions that Dimitrina Petrova men-
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tioned, of assuring the general public of its-of the fact that the government was
not beyond the law, that there was a law that would be governing, and that it
would govern everyone, including officials of the government, and would assure
the general public and the individual citizen of his safety and her safety.
The first case that came to mind that we really paid attention to was El Salva-
dor. El Salvador had a genuine free election in 1954, in which the incumbent
leadership was basically voted out, and the Christian Democrats, under Jose Napo-
leon Duarte, took over. The president was the Christian Democratic Party. They
had a majority in the Parliament. But what was missing was an independent judi-
ciary that could really be relied upon to deliver justice to the general public in the
country. So, this is when I became alerted to this particular problem, more so than
I would be alerted to when one just thinks of it abstractly.
So that when things began to turn in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in
the first instance, we began to pay a great deal of attention to what it is that we
could do there. And as a matter of fact, it was in 1988, as things starting warming
up in the Soviet Union toward democracy, that we began our first exchanges of
judges. And what I want to say is that, again, apropos of what Dimitrina Petrova
had to say before, it is really extremely important to think, not only of giving lec-
tures and seminars, but for the kind of personal contact to be established in that
part of the world with lawyers, judges, prosecutors to get them to understand what
it is that the rule of law really means.
As was pointed out, in the Soviet Union, and in the Soviet Bloc generally,
judges have, across the decades, essentially been functionaries that would preside
over what were reported to be trials, but which really were a matter of essentially
rubber-stamping courtroom decisions made by the prosecutors. And it was, in-
deed, the procurators, a procuracy, and prosecutors that made the decisions on the
basis, essentially of what their view was of the public interest, the public interest
being the interest of the Communist Party. And then, the decision was made there.
And you, then, went through the process of getting all of this into the courts. And
the judge was really a glorified clerk.
For that particular group of people, judges, to be elevated to the position that
they hold in a Western democratic system, would necessarily take effort. But it is,
as I say, not the kind of thing that you can just read in books and get in lectures. It
is really personal contact that was important.
I remember, at one of the very early occasions in which we had an exchange of
thoughts between American judges and Soviet judges, one of my friends, an
American judge, explained that once he was elevated to the bench--this happened
to be a circuit court judge in Rockville, Maryland-that he decided no longer to go
to the place where he usually had lunch because he would encounter the lawyers
who practiced before him. And he thought it just wasn't a good idea to become, at
that particular point, involved in situations where people who might, the next day
or so, appear before him-that he would be seen with them essentially in a social
situation.
I'm saying this is not something that you read in books. This is something that
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you get out of contact of this kind, to see whether one can, indeed, begin to trans-
plant some notions as to what it is not only that the state can do, that a legal system
can do to elevate the judge, but what judges themselves need to do in order to be
able to acquire the position of recognition and respect that is needed in order for
the rule of law to be effectively practiced. So, this is one of the points that I would
like to make in that context.
I also believe that what is very important is, in countries in which people are
used to essentially letting bureaucrats make day-to-day decisions for them, for
somebody to acquire the understanding that there is a way of protesting against
that. Again, so as to simplify the process, a system somewhat like our administra-
tive procedural system would be appropriate to be introduced in a good many of
these countries, so that rather than saying "Da" to what a bureaucrat has just de-
cided, they may say, "Nyet. I'll try to go and get you reversed." This is something
that is simply not common in parts of the world, and needs to be done. And,
again, for that, we have happily introduced necessary systems. I'm told that the
Poles have a system like that, but it's missing in other places.
The judicial review of administrative actions becomes, then, of course, very
important. And also, the importance of being able to get injunctive relief from the
courts against executive action. This is, again, something that simply is not even
part of the thought process of people in a good many of these countries.
As a matter of fact, what I have done in lectures that I've given in that part of
the world, I start to speak also of how long it took for all of these things to evolve
in our own country. What I like to do is to start out by telling people about the
decision of the Supreme Court in Wooster v. Georgia in which two Episcopal
ministers in Georgia were prosecuted under the Georgia state law that prohibited
any kind of interaction between non-Indians and the Cherokee Indians. The Su-
preme Court held that the state law was in violation of the federal principle with
regard to treatment of Indian reservations and that, under the circumstances, the
conviction was invalid, and was reversed. And the two ministers were ordered set
free. Well, Georgia did not abide by that particular decision. This matter led to a
famous quote by Andrew Jackson, who was President of the United States at the
time, who said, "The Chief Justice made his decision. Now let him enforce it."
My point is that in 1952, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, what was
at issue was that during the Korean War the steel industry had gone on strike.
President Truman had, under the auspices of executive War Powers, ordered the
steel mill seized, put the Army in charge, and everybody was ordered back to
work. That was ultimately taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. And
the Supreme Court decided that the President had exceeded his authority. And that
is the point that I've made in my talk.
On the next day, the Army of the United States, which is really the power of the
government, on the basis of the decision of five members of the Supreme Court
against three others, including the Chief Justice, pulled out of the steel mill be-
cause this is what the majority of the Supreme Court had told them to do.
Again, this whole idea that the U.S. Army, having gone into the steel mill-and
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this is still actually being, in the exercise of the War Powers, during the middle of
a war-withdrew, for the Court's judgment to be respected. By the way, since
then, it has been discovered that President Truman, before he issued that order,
consulted with the Chief Justice, which he should not have done. But the Chief
Justice, who should not have done it either, gave him advice, and he was saying it
was okay. And, well, the Court's vote was five to three. And as I say, the Court's
order was obeyed.
I want to tell you, when I first delivered this analogy--this was still during the
days before Gorbachev-and I gave a talk-I remember it was in Sri Lanka, of all
places, that I gave that talk. And a Soviet representative was there, and he was sort
of taken aback as to what he could say about how the legal system works in his
country. And I remember he got up and he said, "We have executed five ministers
of interior." These are the people who are responsible for the secret police.
Well, the point that I want to make is that what is important-for all these
countries, where they really genuinely do want to move from the system that
they've had in place, to a more open democratic society-is not only for them to
hold free elections, but for them to really begin to understand how an independent
judiciary, an independent legal system, and the rule of law, can effectively operate.
And, in order for them really to learn it, the kind of direct contact that has been
provided by organizations like CEELI and others, that is really very important.
And it is critically important, also, for the relationships afterwards, to be main-
tained, so there can be a back-and-forth that stretches across the years as one tries
to instill, really, a new way of thinking about the law and the operation of the court
system in countries of this kind.
Thank you.
JuDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: The program-before everybody leaves, the pro-
gram said that I was a "moderator/commentator." I want to leave plenty of time
for questioning, so I'm going to make my remarks very brief. I'll give you a guar-
antee that they won't go over seven minutes, and the rest of the time we'll give to
questioning.
I'm probably the only part-timer here because while all of the other people have
been devoting full-time to this very important mission, I've been trying to run a
steady course on our own domestic jurisprudence, most of the time. But, I have
managed to get to Eastern Europe probably a dozen times, to eight or nine coun-
tries, plus host numerous delegations of judges from those countries here in
Washington. They go to the Supreme Court, and if the Supreme Court is not in
session, they go straight down the Hill, and they end up spending a lot of time with
US.
So, let me just share with you some of my observations. All of my work has
been primarily with the judiciaries of some of the emerging democracies in East-
er Europe and, interestingly enough, not always with the highest level of consti-
tutional court judges we heard so much about before, and, who the scholars are
primarily interested in. If the rule of law is going to prevail in a country, it has to
not just trickle down, it has to be infused in the judges down the line.
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And so I think some of the programs we've had that involve judges, not just at
the highest constitutional level, not even at the supreme court level, but sometimes
the municipal judges, the provincial judges, the judges in the intermediate courts, I
think may be, even though they're not dealing with the great constitutional ques-
tions of our time, just as important to concentrate on if you really want to have a
rule of law prevail where the ordinary citizen, most of whom don't get concerned
with the big constitutional questions, will see and feel it.
Okay. Number one is sort of background-and you all know it-that an inde-
pendent judiciary is, I think, widely considered a sine qua non of a rule of law re-
gime. But the fact is that for more than four decades in most of Eastern Europe--
and in some countries long before that-there has never been an institution called
"an independent judiciary" that exists in practice or even in theory.
As we've heard again and again, judges in most of the countries we are dealing
with now, at least for the last several years in Eastern Europe, the last several dec-
ades, were basically adjuncts to the party or the administration in power, subservi-
ent to its will, dominated by the ministries of justice who determined judicial ap-
pointments, placements, salaries, working conditions, assignments, transfers,
removals, as well as, in cases of any importance to the party, the actual outcome of
many of the decisions. Herman has written about "telephone justice."
The interesting thing is the tradition in most of the countries for young men and
women to emerge from the universities or the law schools and choose the judicial
tract. Now, it's the least desirable legal career placement, or at least it was right
after the revolutions in most of the countries I went to. The young law graduates
served apprenticeships, probationary periods in the judiciary and then became
judges-ordinary judges, not constitutional court judges-in their twenties and
early thirties, with basically no other experience. It's a low-paying, nonprestigious
job.
In one survey in the 1980s in Poland, eighty-six percent of parents said they
would not want their children to become judges. Ironically-and one interesting
question from the last panel provokes this-in several of these countries, women
judges predominate. The first time I was in Czechoslovakia for one of these pro-
grams, I looked around the room, and it was all women. And I got up, and I said,
"You people must be way ahead of us, in America. Less than twenty percent, or
maybe ten percent, of our judges are women."
Somebody took me aside and talked about, you know, the naive America and
explained that there were so many women judges because it was absolutely the
bottom layer. Promising young, male law graduates went out into state enterprises
or into the very embryonic private kinds of law.
Okay. That's number one: Now number two: You know, interestingly enough,
most of the constitution-makers and reform legislators in the countries right after
the "refolution," however you pronounce it, saw the concept of independent judi-
ciary in the United States, and in parts of Western Europe, as one of the most ap-
pealing parts of a democratic regime. An independent judiciary means working at
every level ofjudges in countries or traditions for independence for judges.
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And they were attracted by the relatively high prestige of judges in our country
and decent wages, at least, good working conditions, immunity from retaliation by
the executive, or the legislature for their decisions, and the power to declare the
acts of the other two branches void for nonconformity with the constitution. So, in
a majority of the countries I'm familiar with, these kinds of expanded powers-
most notably in the case of the constitutional courts, but some of the others coming
down the line as well, were written into the new constitutions or into their new ju-
diciary laws. And I think distinct improvements in the selection processes, and
guarantees against arbitrary removal, were legislated for judges at many levels.
And as we've heard in the prior panel, constitutional courts started flexing their
muscles in some of these countries and behaving independently, many times to the
consternation of the appointing authorities. In a few cases I know about, the newly
liberated judges actually suffered retaliation, some, in one case at least, having to
flee the country.
And I don't think anything like that would happen to us. But the reason is that
we, here in America, have 200 years of experience under our belts and probably a
citizenry and free press that wouldn't stand for it. They may stand for us being
criticized in the newspapers, but I think if we got exiled and run out of the country,
there might be a fuss. But the judges abroad have no such traditions to fall back
upon.
My third and final simple-minded point, which follows from the first two, is, in
terms of the role of foreign experts or interventionists, it probably is not enough to
help draft those sound and high-sounding constitutional or legal provisions about
judicial independence. Like Herman, I think one out of every two lawyers I've
talked to in the Washington metropolitan area helped draft the Czechoslovakian
constitution.
I wasn't there at the time, so I'm the other-one of the two that didn't. But I
think that the need and the responsibility is often much greater than talking and
writing-I'll stick, again, to what I know a little bit about-especially in the judi-
cial independence area. Now, what we found is creating an independent judici-
ary-and Mark touched on this-is that it must be an exercise in institu-
tion-building, not in legislative drafting. Based on trips that I've taken and the
judges I've talked to here and there, anything approaching the reality of an inde-
pendent judiciary, who will administer a rule of law in any of the senses that we
think about it here, requires certain physical stamina.
One or the would-be access to the laws that are supposed to be the rule of law.
Now, that may sound kind of silly, but it isn't; in actuality, in many of these coun-
tries, the judges don't even have copies of the laws. They have to ask the counsel
who appear before them, or they have to get it by word of mouth. But they liter-
ally don't have access to the laws they're supposed to abide by and administer.
A lot of them don't have typewriters or secretarial assistants. They need facili-
ties to implement some kind of a decent filing system. You've got to be ajudge to
know how important that clerk's office is. And if you can't even get access to the
folder with the information in it, I don't care how many constitutions you read.
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Another thing is facilities for distributing and receiving the opinions of higher
courts or of peer courts up and down the judicial line. Finally, a salary that, at
least, allows you to survive.
But getting past that, and a bit more subtlety, I think it means, for most of these
countries, that there's got to be an accepted code of conduct for judges that the
citizens and the judges' peers themselves expect them to abide by. Because in
many of these countries, bribery and corruption, and undue influence from above,
is still cynically accepted as the judicial way of life.
I think, too, the rule of law in an independent judiciary, means there has to be
educational opportunities for the judges to learn about the changes in the law ,and
the implications of their new constitutions, treaties, and laws. Before they can be
expected to put their lives and careers on the line, and oppose executive and legis-
lative violations of the rule of law, they have to be-and I think this is what Dick
Schifter was saying-they have to be imbued with a sense of their own compe-
tence, their own professionalism, and, more difficult but fundamental, a sense that
public opinion, and maybe even the press, will support their efforts at independ-
ence, not abandon them to whatever fate the political powers decide to inflict.
The judges also need regular contact with one another inside their country.
That sounds like nothing to us, but it's a great deal to them. And they need it
across national borders, in many cases, in regions. Different judiciaries, in differ-
ent countries, are anticipating and meeting some of the same problems, and they
need some chance to-the wherewithal to network through their own organiza-
tions and professional groups. They need, again, as Dick said, one-on-one contact
with judges from other countries, outside their region, who do function independ-
ently.
Now, in our country, academic and bar support for judges' independence is
pretty well assured. But in many of these countries, my impression is the academ-
ics are not that much involved with the courts, and sometimes, they're not even,
themselves, reform-oriented. Lawyers' organizations are fledgling, to say the
least, and without the political clout to counter public retaliation. The press is er-
ratic, and it's often, itself, the subject of threatened suppression.
So, where does the outsider's efforts fit into all of this? This is point four:
CEELI and other organizations have pursued a strategy of trying to help the judges
down the line organize themselves in order to pursue their needs for better work-
ing conditions, better operating courts, better administered courts, and codes of
conduct, as well as continuing education in their new constitutional and statutory
responsibilities. I think most on-the-spot observers now concede that judicial in-
dependence is a task for long-distance runners, not sprinters. It may take genera-
tions, if we're lucky.
Because, until these judges have more stature in the eyes of the public, and
more confidence in themselves, they can't win the perennial fighting going on in
almost all of these countries to extricate themselves from the tentacles of ministries
ofjustice--even democratic ministries ofjustice-like power, just as much as their
socialist predecessors, understandably they want to control judges through control
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of their salary, their placement, their working conditions.
And ironically, sometimes our own reform efforts meet up with the law of unin-
tended consequences. Indeed the drive to get judges to adopt codes of ethics,
codes of conduct which will enhance their stature, their impartiality, have met with
some resistance in some countries, because the judges are afraid of instituting any
kind of formal code of conduct because they're afraid that the code of conduct,
once it's there, will be used as a weapon by the ministry of justice to remove them
or to intimidate them if they come down with unpopular decisions.
Point five: Judges in many of these countries don't have any experience at all in
mobilizing themselves, running organizations and programs, in pressing their de-
mands, lobbying in the executive or parliament. This is an area in which Ameri-
cans especially, and maybe other Westerners as well, can be useful; and it may be
just as critical to the intent of law as critiquing draft laws is.
Of course, if we can provide some tangible resources for these efforts, it's even
better. Because, you know, how realistic is it to provide a management plan for
running a court when there are no funds for buying case folders; or where you find
all the records have been thrown in a soggy, mildewed pile in the basement, as was
actually true in one case? Of what use is a guarantee of counsel in criminal pro-
ceedings if there's no organized system of legal aid?
Establishing the rule of law, like it or not, costs money. You need advice and
money. One without the other is no good. In one country, the one computer pro-
vided by the government for every single court lay unused because no one figured
out how to use it constructively.
Number six: Out-of-country judicial experts quickly become aware of the need
for continuity in relationships with in-country judges. As we've said innumerable
times, the three-day seminar of talking heads-here today and gone tomorrow--is
of limited help. It's the judge or judges from out-of-country who come back to
check a few months later, see how things are going, who can stay for a time to get
new innovations started, who invite the foreign judges back to their own country,
take them into their offices for a week or a month, play host to them, who provide
the better model by far.
While we can never entirely overcome our ignorance of traditions, culture, or
experience in any country, you know much more on the third than on the first visit.
For instance, why Bosnian judges would cringe at the notion that we have in our
country that, in a code of conduct, judges should be allowed to identify themselves
with public parties, or at least be members of a political party. The Bosnian judge
experience was that most major parties were ethnically and religiously related, and
to have ajudge be identified in any way with those parties would be the antithesis
of impartial justice.
Finally, all of us know that the first commandment is don't try to impose our
systems or mores on other cultures. And actually, most of the Eastern European
countries have soundly rejected most of our prized justice concepts, like our par-
ticular brand of separation-of-powers system. And they're somewhat dubious of
what they consider our politically laden judicial selection procedures as well. \Ve
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must be humble. Our own judges didn't get budget independence until a few dec-
ades ago. And we didn't have a disciplinary mechanism, short of impeachment,
for errant judges until a little over a decade ago.
That all said, we do have many benefits to bestow, as the speakers before me
have emphasized. We have a few centuries of experience on how constitutional
verbiage works in practice, albeit in a different culture. We can bestow interna-
tional acclaim or disapproval on the efforts and halting steps forward on new de-
mocracies. Most of these countries, I think, want eventually to enter either the
European Union or be part of bona fide international organizations.
I think, too, that we can contribute to an international academic community
which will give many of these struggling judges in these countries more interna-
tional support when they do try to exercise independence in controversial situa-
tions.
On the opposite side-I'll end on a little bit of an edgy note here-I think we
have to worry sometimes whether all of our platitudinous talk will be discounted
when we do nothing, for our own reasons, when executives in some of these new
countries flout the rule of law and retaliate against the exercise or fledgling inde-
pendence by hesitant but helpful judges.
Thank you.
PANEL 111-AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: I think we'll now entertain questions from the floor.
If you'd come to microphone and then tell us who you are and ask your question.
Thank you.
MS. MADELYN CRONE: I already said who I was. I'm Madelyn Crone
(phonetic). I'm a senior adviser with International Program at the National Center
for State Courts. Two very brief comments, because I've been a little bit con-
cerned by this last panel.
The first one is that, for example, in Western Europe, there is no class action
suit to speak of either. And the notion of access to justice and public defense are
notions that you'll need a lot of work on.
But the broader issue, I guess, is that the issues that were raised-and I'm
thinking, for example, of the list that Judge Wald just gave us-are the same lists
that I have found in Latin America, I found in the Caribbean, I find in Africa, in
the Middle East. And it's the same issues everywhere. The notion of three
branches of government which are totally independent is the exception. It's not
the rule. And in every country, the judiciary continues to be basically dominated
by the executive.
So, I'm raising those issues, because I think that when we go and we try to be
sensitive to the culture and to their tradition, at the same time I think that we still
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have quite a bit of unease in trying to figure out what will be an independent judi-
ciary in a system that is so different from ours and that is still struggling to find its
own balance. That's the kind of issue that I think we have to do a lot of work on
still.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Thank you, Madelyn. Now, let's see if we have
some reactions from our panel members. Go down the line. Mark?
MR. MARK ELLIS: I, in fact, have an example of what I think is a pretty solid
case that the independence of the judiciary is beginning to take root. I got word
yesterday from our liaison in Croatia that the Zagreb municipal court judge,
Maureen Marcela (phonetic), today acquitted two Croatian journalists accused of
violating a new restrictive criminal defamation law, publishing articles critical of
President Tudjman. Although I don't suggest a direct correlation here, but this
judge was brought to the United States by CEELI for a three week program. If this
type of decision is being made in the depths of Zagreb by this judge, I would have
to say that there is some hope there. And I believe that's a positive step.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Dimitrina, do you have some thoughts?
Ms. DMflTRINA PETROVA: No, I don't have thoughts. I just have one sort of
wishful thinking strategy. I think that wherever there is a need, there will be a
procedural forum in which this need will be expressed. There is a need for legal
representation somehow of a group. And if you look at the history of Indian-of
how India developed class action-it contains many lessons for Eastern Europe, I
think.
When I said that there are procedural opportunities, I don't want to go into this
discussion, because it would be very boring for most people here. But there are
such simple formal abstract possibilities, like, for example, to file a collective
complaint, just a joint complaint by a number of individuals.
At this stage, we do not have yet the opportunity to replace one client by an-
other. But this can develop somehow. I'm sure about this, that this can somehow
work out in the future. That what I am saying, it was not so much the importance
of class action as such, but I wanted to stress that there are needs that have to be
addressed other than this.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: And just as add-on to that, we do have some, I'm
told, promising experiments with jury assistance with juries in Russia. Dick, do
you have something to say on this one?
AMBASSADOR RICHARD SCHIFTER: Yes. I want to say that in dealing with the
question of spreading information and understanding of our system and the rule of
law, we ought to make a distinction between, let's say, the most recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court refining Fifth Amendment---or First Amendment
rights, on the one hand, and the basis of our democratic system.
And I, for one, am not going to make any apologies for the proposition that the
democratic system and the rule of law works for individual human beings, wher-
ever they may be, better than a good many of the alternatives do. I have really no
problem with that.
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And let me simply say, as far as culture is concerned, if I think back, the fact
that my grandparents and anyone preceding them was not part of this Anglo-Saxon
culture that we are part of. As far as I'm concerned, I am happy that my children
and my grandchildren, will have the benefits of this Anglo-Saxon culture that I, at
least as far as my part of the ancestry is concerned, was not part of.
So, let me simply say I think it's great that we are in the position of making
available-we're not forcing anyone, we're making available-to people through-
out the world an understanding of how this system that developed initially in Eng-
land, and that we have certainly carried forward quite significantly, how it works
and how it can work for the benefit of individuals and the life of a society.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Yes? If you'd tell us who you are and what you'd
like to ask us?
MR. ROSENTHAL: My name is Eric Rosenthal. I'm the director of Mental Dis-
ability Rights International, which is a human rights project based here at this law
school, a joint project of the Center for Human Rights and the Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, a civil rights organization that works for the rights of people
with mental disabilities in the United States that Judge Wald was associated with
many years ago.
I'm interested, based on your experience training judges, promoting legislative
reform, your thoughts in particular on promoting public interest advocacy and, on
that note, the role of lawyers versus non-lawyers.
I ask, in part, out of the frustrations that we have experienced promoting advo-
cacy for people with mental disabilities in Central and Eastern Europe, where the
concept of the role of the lawyers is beyond many people's understanding; and a
frustration with the legal profession's feeling of noninvolvement, of the lack of a
public interest culture among the legal profession, which, in part, underscores the
importance of all your work in promoting that culture.
But, in part, because the real strengths that we see are among the citizen advo-
cacy groups, the family members of people with mental disabilities, the profes-
sionals, who have really been leaders-and wondering whether we can make bet-
ter use-in terms of public education, using international law as a model for policy
reform in promoting human rights and the rule of law by going beyond kind of the
turf that we think of as that of lawyers in promoting human rights.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Any volunteers on this one?
MS. DIMITRINA PETROVA: May I?
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Yes.
Ms. DIMiTRJNA PETROVA: If you look at the composition of the human rights
lobby in Eastern Europe, and if you look at the origin of this quite limited group of
people, you will notice that the lawyers are newcomers in this group. The human
rights activists under Communism had many sociologists, philosophers, actors,
writers, intellectuals of various sorts, physicians, physicists, all sorts of scientists,
and very, very few lawyers. In some countries, very few journalists as well.
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Especially in my country, Bulgaria, the lawyers and the journalists were the two
pillars of the Communist regime. Counter selection in these groups, moral counter
selection was particularly strong. Control of their education was particularly
strong. Liberal values developed outside these groups.
And the lawyers joined later somehow in the human rights movement, if we as-
sume that there was such a thing as human rights--more broadly speaking, the
human rights or pro-democracy or anti-regime movement in the 1980s in Eastern
Europe. This led to very complicated relationships immediately after 1989 and all
the way to the present moment.
It continues to be the case that lawyers have very strong challenges to overcome
in order to join a human rights group. First of all, because lawyers now have much
more opportunities, especially in business and commercial law, with privatization,
with the restitution of property, with the fledgling of the first-and the only-
because you said a private firms' lawyers have much prospects for enrichment and,
even as they understand it, for a role to play in society, than to seek a career in
human rights law.
And it has been my conviction that here the approach of the human rights lead-
ers should be not to try to convey to the lawyers that this is their or duty anything.
But to, rather, present the human rights career as an attractive way of life because
it's their life, because they will be doing something meaningful. In fact, the very
reason for which Western lawyers turn to human rights law, to public interest law,
because, as Herman told me, when I had all those applications, he said, "But, of
course, this is their life."
And there are many people in the United States, lawyers, who would come to
Central Europe simply because it's their life. And I think this should be stressed,
what benefits they have from working for causes, rather than assuming that it's
their duty or accusing lawyers that they been obedient under Communism and
profiteers now in the first years after this. I think that would be the better strategy.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Dick?
PROFESSOR HOWARD: Dick Howard, University of Virginia. Having in mind
the title of the panel's discussion, "The Role of Foreign Experts," I wonder if the
members of the panel might sharpen our appreciation of the difference it makes if
the visiting expert, whether a lawyer, or some other, is, on the one hand, an
American or he is, on the other hand, a Westem European-German, French,
whatever.
I have in mind specifically, first, whether those two groups of people, American
and Western European, respectively, would have different expectations or different
agendas when they make these visits?
And secondly, whether there is some difference in the way in which these visi-
tors are viewed or received once they're there?
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Mark, you must have some thoughts?
MR. MARK ELLIS: Sure. Briefly, Dick, I have a bias in favor of West European
participation, even to the exclusion of U.S. participation.
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And I have to admit, although Keith Henderson from AID has left, that there
have been times when I've allocated funding to bring a West European over to
provide some requested assistance. And I've had no Americans on that team, ex-
cept for our liaison, because I have just become a convert to this idea that so much
of what is being offered and what is being requested is set in the West European
perspective.
Now, having said that, I think there's a very nice approach of having a combi-
nation of both the U.S. and West European perspective, and that's what we've
tried to do. And I think that has generated a dynamic program. But, I admit, I'm
biased in favor of the West European.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Do you want to say something, Dick?
AMBASSADOR RICHARD SCHIFrER: Yes.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: And then Herman, I know, wants to say something,
I guess.
AMBASSADOR RICHARD SCHIFTER: I'm very much biased the other way. And
let me just tell you, my impression is that, by and large, there's something unique
about American volunteer spirit.
And there's also perhaps a missionary aspect to what it is that Americans want
to do in going abroad. They're more enthusiastic, more committed to making per-
sonal sacrifices in order to be able to function in some of these societies.
What I think goes hand in hand with that is the greater effectiveness in reaching
out to people, as distinct from societies that make contacts with countries of this
kind usually in a quasi-colonial relationship. It's one aspect-if I may add a few
words-that the-it is also, I believe, the case that, at the end of the day, greater
attention is paid to American than to others.
I remember talking at one point to the chief prosecutor after the revolution-
after the change in Hungary. And what he was saying to me was that a good many
people say, well, what he ought to do is follow the French and the British model.
But he said, "You know, the fact of the matter is that the French and the British
ultimately-the West Europeans generally-will, in many of these situations, look
to you. So, why should I have to look to them and they look to you? Might as well
look to you directly."
MS. DIMITRINA PETROVA: May I, very briefly, add a word?
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Yes.
MS. DIMITRINA PETROVA: I cannot speak for all East Europeans, but if I now
look back at what has been the difference in the way West Europeans and Ameri-
cans operate, the difference has been, to me at least-it's an accumulated percep-
tion of six years-that Western Europeans come and organize conferences and
seminars and give lectures.
And Americans are much more oriented toward programs that bring Europeans
to America, or sending, like CEELI sending, for long-term periods, lawyers. That
it's much more interactive approach.
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MR. MARK ELLIS: Okay. But -
Ms. DIMITRINA PETROVA: All the differences follow.
MR. MARK ELLIS: -you might change your opinion.
Ms. DIMIfTRINA PETROVA: All the differences follow.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Okay. All right You're next, Herman.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Not so fast. Well, even after the experience I
had precisely of something that Dick Schifter talked about, handing prosecutors.
He mentioned, I think-oh, or maybe Dimitrina mentioned, or somebody--the
problem of the procuracy in the Ukraine, which is really quite dreadful. Back in
around 1992, 1993, there was a then-procutor who was very reformist minded, a
fellow named Shiskin (phonetic), Victor Shiskin. And I got involved with him.
And he said he would like to bring over some Western prosecutors to talk to all of
his prosecutors. He was hoping to go on from there to get some legislation to
change the system they had, which, in the event that, as Dick pointed, it failed.
And I said, "Fine. What do you want? Whom do you want?"
And he said, "Well, I don't want any Americans," he said, "because your sys-
tem is so different from ours." He said, "Your whole prosecutorial system is so
different."
And, frankly, I think our prosecutorial system is terrible, particularly on the
state level, with elected district attorneys, so I wasn't about to disagree with him.
But I said, "Look, this is an American project. We've got to have a least one
American."
So, he said, "Okay." So, I said, "Well, what do you want?" So, we had a Bel-
gian, a French, a German, and an Italian-Italian partly because Italy is in the fore-
front of procedural reform.
Now, they came. There was, as Dimitrina says, the two-day lecture. But they
set up arrangements to continue the relationship afterward, with hoped-for visits. I
don't now what happened, but they offered to do this.
And the only American who came, just as a-how life sometimes works out-I
asked-some of you may know Joseph di Genova, who is a former U.S. prosecu-
tor here, and really a very, very capable charming guy. The day he was supposed
to leave, he developed an inner ear infection, and his doctor told him he couldn't
fly.
Well, I had once spent eight weeks as an assistant district attorney just to see
what it was like. So, I'm afraid I did not give a typical impression of what Ameri-
can prosecutors are like.
But the point is, they wanted the others. They wanted a different thing. Now, I
think it would have made sense, honestly, to have a mix. But their system is so
close to the civil law system. So, it seems to me it depends a lot on the particular
area of law.
In some areas, I think it makes a lot of sense. But in other areas, just if one is
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talking solely of knowledge-and I don't know about the follow-up, I think that
could be worked out. And I think some of these European Commissions are doing
more follow-up and having people there.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: I think once you get out of the realm of the rule of
law, that if you get into anything like-I note Kurt Muhlenberg is in the audience
and he has worked on engaging us in the new democracies--you get like anything
into reforming your criminal law system -
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Yes.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: -using technology for strike forces, federal com-
munications kind of law, then they gravitate toward one expert and they really
want us.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Yes.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: We represent the highest specialization.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: Right.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: When you get down to separation of powers, their
traditions are closer to the civil law on the continental side.
The last comment I have, though, is that a lot of Eastern European judges are
slightly schizophrenic. They would eventually like to be like American judges,
but they think it's too much to hope for, now. They keep talking about our marble
chambers and that sort of thing, but they'd love to be like we are, but they think
it's probably more realistic to aim for something a little less than that.
Okay.
More--oh, I'm sorry, Professor. Yes, go ahead.
PROFESSOR STEIN: I just wanted to support-Eric Stein is my name, University
of Michigan-what Herman said. I think the ideal combination is Mark Ellis' type
of a group, having Americans and some Western Europeans, for two reasons.
The first reason is that many of these countries have a parliamentary system
corresponding more or less to one of the Western European models, so that the
continental experience is quite relevant when it comes to institutional problems.
The second most important reason is that most of these countries want to be a
part of the European Union. So, when you get to areas where the European Union
counts-which are steadily expanding-then, it is natural that these governments
would talk to their prospective partners and adjust their systems to be compatible
with the European Union. But I also agree that American experience is extraordi-
narily important.
There is a real contribution Americans can make, exactly as regards the ideo-
logical principals that Ambassador Schifter has mentioned, access to justice, judi-
cial independence, etcetera.
I think there are certain things that are unique to Americans, and at the same
time, extremely desirable and attractive to Eastern Europeans. One thing I re-
member, for instance, a Minister of Justice working on the code of criminal proce-
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dure that was an inquisitorial code. Aspects of the American-type system were
appealing to him, even if he said, "I can't get this thing through." So there is a set
of ideals and objective which ought to be stressed, and if nothing else, that ought
to be a function of Americans in this group.
I should mention one instance where the Europeans are in good position to offer
continuing help. The Council of Europe has a separate section that provides con-
tinuing advice on constitutional problems, human rights problems, by very compe-
tent people, both academics and bureaucrats. So they offer quite a bit on that
score, too.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. VALD: Did you want to say something?
AMBASSADOR RICHARD SCHIFrER: Yes, I just want to say that the distinction,
the first one you have just made, is the one that I fully agree with. In other words,
when it comes to matters that are essentially related to civil law and where purely
technical advice ought to be given, yes, obviously the West Europeans are quali-
fied to work in that context.
When it comes to really transmitting a feel for the rule of law, and basically
transmitting an ideological approach to the rule of law, this is where Americans
can do the missionary work much more effectively than anyone else.
JUDGE PATRICIA M. WALD: Okay. Any more questions? No? We've ques-
tioned you all out. Well, then, I'll turn it over to Herman.
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ: You've been here long enough, so there
aren't any. I just want to put in one plug for our school, the Washington College
of Law. It's our centennial, and so we're entitled to that.
And that is that the program that Dimitrina talked about, namely bringing over
European lawyers to see how we do these things and to spend time, with
Dimitrina's help and thanks to the Open Society, we've started that program.
We have two people here, one from Bulgaria and one from Hungary, who will
spend a year with us, three months doing course work, and eight or nine months
working with public interest firms, other groups, where they will be working di-
rectly with people doing this kind thing. We've been doing it for some thirteen
years with Israeli lawyers, and we have expanded it to Eastern Europe. And so
that may make a small contribution.
So, thank you all for coming. You've been a wonderful audience. And I hope
it has been a useful day.
Thank you.
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